

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION I

Report No. 50-423/79-11

Docket No. 50-423

License No. CPPR-113 Priority -- Category A

Licensee: Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

P.O. Box 270

Hartford, Connecticut 06101

Facility Name: Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3

Inspection At: NUSCO Corporate Office, Berlin, Connecticut

Inspection Conducted: November 21, 1979

Inspectors: *Al Cerne*
A. C. Cerne, Reactor Inspector

Dec 17, 1979
date

date

date

Approved by: *Lewis McGaughy*
R. W. McGaughy, Chief, Projects Section,
RC&ES Branch

12/26/79
date

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on November 21, 1979 (Report No. 50-423/79-11)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector, conducted at the licensee corporate office, of quality verification records for followup on NRC issued Bulletins and Circulars. The inspection involved 7 inspector-hours by one regional based inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO)

- *L. C. Albee, Millstone 3 Project Engineer
- *B. L. Carlson, Assistant to the Millstone 3 Project Engineer
- L. A. Chatfield, TMI Task Force Chairman
- A. Colello, QA Engineer
- G. L. Johnson, Director, Generation Reliability Engineering and QA

*Denotes those present at the exit interview.

2. Licensee Action on NRC Issued Bulletins

- a. The inspector examined corporate office records relating to NRC issued Bulletins, and discussed followup actions with licensee representatives. For the following bulletins, the inspector verified licensee action relative to a review for applicability, providing the required information with a timely response, and initiation of corrective action, as required:

- | | | |
|----|---------------------------------|--|
| -- | Bulletins 78-12, 78-12A, 78-12B | Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds |
| -- | Bulletin 79-03. | Longitudinal Weld Defects in ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Company |
| -- | Bulletin 79-07 | Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety Related Piping |

The inspector had no further questions on these items at this time. Additionally, the inspector noted the licensee's use of a computerized commitment listing, entitled "Northeast Utilities Service Company Commitment Follow Program," to record certain actions required in response to NRC Bulletins (e.g: 79-15). The responsible licensee representative indicated that more extensive use of this listing would be made to document those items necessary for final resolution of bulletins remaining open.

- b. With regard to Bulletins 79-04, 79-09, and 79-11, licensee investigation had determined that none of the identified and potentially problematic

equipment would be used in the construction of Millstone Unit 3. However, the inspector's review of substantiating documentation indicated that wording such as, "at present time, S&W is not buying any...", leaves open the possibility of future purchase of those items addressed in the bulletins. The licensee was unable to demonstrate the existence of a system which would identify and "flag", for further review, any future purchase of such items or equipment. While the licensee did indicate a commitment to establish such an "Exclusion Listing" system, this issue is unresolved pending NRC review of final licensee action to implement and effectively utilize such a system (423/79-11-01).

No items of noncompliance were identified.

3. Licensee Action on NRC Issued Circulars and Bulletins Issued for Information Only

- a. The inspector reviewed records relating to NRC issued Circulars and discussed with licensee personnel those actions required to adequately address and record the resolution of the issues raised by Circulars and any Bulletins issued for information only. The inspector verified receipt, review for applicability, and routing of the following Circulars to organizations responsible for action, as required; and he had no further questions on these items:
- Circular 77-14 Separation of Contaminated Water Systems from Noncontaminated Plant
 - Circular 77-15 Degradation of Fuel Oil Flow to the Emergency Diesel Generator
 - Circular 77-16 Emergency Diesel Generator Electrical Trip Lock Out Features
- b. With regard to Circulars issued in 1978, the inspector reviewed a project engineer instruction (NPE-79-283, April 4, 1979) which requested review and comment on various circulars by specifically named NUSCO engineering and management personnel. The licensee, however, could not present documented evidence that such a review had taken place and admitted that a uniform system for providing feedback on the results and recommendations of the review process had not been procedurally defined. Additionally, in the case of Bulletin 78-14 (for information only), the inspector inquired as to whether an initialed note on the Bulletin cover sheet recommending, "...no action or response required," constituted documented evidence of a proper review for applicability. The licensee indicated that this note most likely represented recognition of the fact that the bulletin primarily addressed a problem in a BWR piece of equipment, and not the results of a formal review to determine whether that or similar equipment may be intended for use in Millstone Unit 3 (a PWR).

Pending establishment by the licensee of a system which provides for review for applicability, corrective action as required, and documented evidence of both for NRC issued Circulars and Bulletins issued for information only, the status of licensee followup action on these types of NRC documents is unresolved (423/79-11-02).

No items of noncompliance were identified.

4. Licensee Action on Bulletin 79-06A (with Revision No. 1)

NRC Bulletin 79-06A, "Review of Operational Error and System Misalignments identified during the Three Mile Island Incident," was issued to all Westinghouse pressurized water reactor facilities with an operating license for action and to construction permit holders for information only. Since the information provided by this bulletin has impact upon the design evolution of Millstone Unit 3, the inspector inquired as to what actions were being taken by NUSCO in response to the information provided by the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI).

The inspector reviewed internal NUSCO documents indicating the establishment of a Northeast Utilities TMI Task Force within which is one subgroup directly responsible for the review of plant design of Millstone Unit 3. Interview with the TMI Task Force Chairman revealed that coordination of those aspects of design mentioned in Bulletin 79-06A, as well as those mentioned in other TMI-related bulletins and reports (e.g: NUREG-0578) was underway and that many of the required design features had been incorporated into Millstone Unit 3 engineering changes, even prior to the TMI accident. He stated that the design review process by his task force was still active and that final design changes to Millstone Unit 3 will be submitted to the NRC in the Final Safety Analysis Report, which will address not only those items dictated by Bulletin 79-06A, but also all TMI lessons learned, determined to be applicable to their plant.

The inspector had no further questions in this area at this time.

5. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 2 and 3.

6. Exit Interview

At the conclusion of the inspection on November 21, 1979, a meeting was held at the NUSCO corporate office with representatives of the licensee. Attendees at this meeting included personnel whose names are indicated by notation(*) in paragraph 1. The inspector summarized the results of the inspection as described in this report.