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February 29, 1980

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Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ATTN: Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut, Acting Director Operating Reactors U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

> Subject: Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 & 2 Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368 License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6 Implementation of Short Term Lessons Learned Requirements (File: 1510.3, 2-1510.3)

Gentlemen:

In response to questions received by telephone from your Mr. Charles Long concerning our implementation of short term Lessons Learned (NUREG-0578) requirements, the attached information is provided.

Very truly yours,

John M. Off for David C. Trimble

Manager, Licensing

DCT:skm

Attachment

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MEMBER MIDDLE

ITEM 2.1.1 PRESSURIZER HEATERS - ANO-1

An actual system heat loss measurement conducted in November of 1975, indicates that 82.75 KW of pressurizer heaters is sufficient to meet the capacity requirements of Item 2.1.1. Each diesel generator bus currently supplies 84 KW of proportional heaters and, therefore, the Item 2.1.1 power supply and heater redundancy requirements are met.

Because B&W made a generic recommendation that 126 KW be considered as the necessary pressurizer heater capacity, AP&L provided 42 KW of supplemental heaters powered from a swing bus that can be connected to either diesel generator.

Additionally, at least 42 KW of supplemental heaters, which normally receive power from non-engineered safeguards buses, could be powered from either of the diesel generators. The method of supplying diesel generator power to these heaters is currently addressed in plant procedures.

ITEM 2.1.6.b DESIGN REVIEW OF PLANT SHIELDING

An in-house review is being conducted to determine what corrective actions will be needed in this area in the long term. Necessary corrective actions will be identified by March 31, 1980, and will be provided to you at that time.

We are reviewing the effects of radiation on safety equipment and will address this subject in the March 31 submittal.

ITEM 2.1.8.a. IMPROVED POST-ACCIDENT SAMPLING

As stated in our letter to you of January 31, 1980, portable shielding is being purchased which can be used in emergency situations to reduce personnel exposure. Aside from this, our actions in the short term will be procedural in nature. A review of the sampling problems encountered at TMI-2 was conducted. Information gained from this review which can improve our emergency sampling capabilities is presently being drafted into plant procedures. The revised procedures will be implemented as soon as possible, but no later than March 31, 1980.

ANO's counting facility is now located in the turbine building and, therefore, it offers an environment for sample analysis in which radiation and airborne contamination problems are minimized. In an emergency, chemical sampling for boron can also be accomplished in the turbine building.

ITEM 2.1.8.b INCREASED RANGE OF RADIATION MONITORS

Each unit at ANO has three monitors that can be used to quantify noble gases that may enter the secondary system in the event of a steam generator tube leak. Noble gases in the secondary will first pass through the condenser air ejector monitors as described in the Unit FSAR's. The gas then passes into the plant vents upstream of the recently installed monitors described under Item 2.1.8.b of our January 18, 1980, Lessons Learned implementation letter, and upstream of the original stack monitors described in the Unit FSAR's. Noble gases escaping out of relief or dump valves can be quantified by means of a calculation combining noble gas concentration (obtained from the monitors) and estimated flow out of the relief or dump valve.