

74-02/SP



Duquesne Light

435 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pa.
15219

(412) 456-6000

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY
Beaver Valley Power Station
Post Office Box 4
Shippingport, PA 15077

January 11, 1980
BVPS:JAW:764

Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 1
Docket No. 50-334, License No. DPR-66
Supplement To "Special Report - Fire Main System Rupture"

Mr. B. H. Grier, Director of Regulation
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

The following answers are supplemental to "Special Report - Fire Main System Rupture" dated July 18, 1979.

The specific cause of the engine overheating is that with the Diesel Fire Pump [FP-P-2] at runout, supplying the pipe rupture, the coolers were starved for cooling water.

There is no means during normal operations to measure flow. The operator noted discharge pressure was very low, but did not note a value. The rating for both pumps [FP-P-1,2] is the same: 2500 gpm flow; and 289 ft., 125 psig head. Pumps are tested yearly in accordance with the fire insurance carrier (ANI) 150% flow requirements. This flow test is in accordance with the fire protection handbook guideline.

The largest single system demand is the turbine room sprinkler system. The design basis of a pump in this system is the turbine room sprinkler system plus two fire hydrants. (Refer to the BVPS FSAR, Section 9.)

1792 200

8001230 229


A002
S
1/1

Mr. B. H. Grier
January 11, 1980
BVPS:JAW:764
Page 2

Piping wash-out occurred due to the pipe failure. There was no indication of wash-out prior to this incident. The failure mode of the piping consisted of a longitudinal split that continued in a split that approximated a wave function. The failure appeared to be due to defective piping. Inspection of the surrounding area showed no wash-out of necessary foundation or base material.

Based on visual examination by repair and quality control personnel, we do not feel that we have a generic problem at BVPS, Unit No. 1. It is the opinion of A. C. Mazukna, BVPS Quality Control Supervisor, that the piping was probably struck a sharp blow during construction or installation of nearby conduit which contributed to the failure mode.

Very truly yours,


J. A. Werling
Superintendent

cc: Director Of Management & Program Analysis
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

D. L. Wigginton, BVPS Licensing Project Manager
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

D. A. Beckman, USNRC Inspector, BVPS Unit 1

G. A. Olson, Secretary, Prime Movers Committee - EEI

1792 201