

ENCLOSURE

HARTSVILLE NUCLEAR PLANTS A AND B AND PHIPPS BEND NUCLEAR PLANT
INADEQUATE MATERIAL TRACEABILITY ON BERGEN PATERSON
COMPONENT SUPPORT ATTACHMENTS
10CFR50.55(e) REPORT NO. 1 (FINAL)
NCR'S HNP-A-077 AND PBN-051

On December 12, 1979, TVA notified NRC-OIE Region II, Inspector R. W. Wright, of a potentially reportable condition under 10CFR50.55(e) regarding the failure of the fabricator/supplier, Bergen Paterson, of component supports (pipe hangers), to provide required material traceability on integral attachments to the hangers. This is the final report on the subject reportable deficiency.

Description of Deficiency

In receiving and verifying documentation of component supports supplied by Bergen Paterson, TVA personnel determined that certified mill test reports (CMTR's) for certain integral attachments, pipe stanchions and shear lugs, had not been provided by Bergen Paterson as required by C. F. Braun Specification 400-21, which imposes ASME Section III, subsections NB, NC, and ND requirements.

Cause of Deficiency

The material traceability on the hanger attachments was not provided because the Bergen Paterson engineering office failed to specify heat traceability requirements on their detailed drawings. The omission of the traceability requirement for these attachments was not noticed in subsequent production steps and resulted in the CMTR's not being provided.

Bergen Paterson indicated to TVA that this deficiency was a one-time occurrence and did not apply to component supports supplied to any other nuclear plants.

Safety Implications

Bergen Paterson is providing TVA with proper CMTR's for all the attachments except for one pipe hanger which supports the 3-inch condensate makeup water line to the fuel pool on each of the six units (see corrective action) and which still has some question as to the material certification of the attachments. This is primarily a QA problem at Bergen Paterson and does not represent a situation which would jeopardize the safe operation of the plant.

Corrective Action

Bergen Paterson has undertaken an extensive study of material certification for the attachments which were not provided with CMTR's. As a result of their investigation, they are providing TVA with proper documentation (tied to the hanger number) on each of the attachments with deficient documentation except for the one hanger previously mentioned on each of the six units. They do not believe that incorrect material was employed in fabricating

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the attachments for the one hanger, but since confusion exists as to the correct material certification for that hanger, Bergen Paterson has recommended to TVA that that hanger be scrapped for all six units and they will provide a properly documented replacement for each.

Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence

The Bergen Paterson Quality Assurance Manager indicated to TVA that the following steps have been taken in Bergen Paterson to prevent recurrence:

1. Informed the engineering office of Bergen Paterson of the error.
2. Informed quality control documentation personnel of the material traceability "requirement" for welded attachments to ASME components.
3. Instructed internal audit personnel to verify implementation of this "requirement."
4. Instructed the processing group which initiates "shop traveler documents" (that follow components through the fabrication process) to automatically require traceability for attachments to ASME components even if not previously specified.
5. Instructed the QC unit which reviews shop traveler documents to check for this "requirement."

Essentially, Bergen Paterson has adopted a policy that requires traceability on ASME component welded attachments whether the drawing specifies it or not.

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