LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (16) During a plant heatup on January 3, 1980, Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS)
Character 1 and 2 tripped at 1600 paig causing a level 2 actuation. Following Emergency
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Quires at least one reactor coolant pump operating in Modes 3, 4, and 5.
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SYSTEM CODE CODE SUBCODE SUBCO
TAKEN ASTION OF PLANT METHOD LEBROS EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. REPOR
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) [1 0 Operators acted correctly in tripping RCPs upon SFAS actuation. SFAS low pressure bi-
Istable setpoints have been raised, forcing operators to increase reactor coolant system
pressure beyond the range specified in PP 1102.02. They increased too rapidly, caus-
ing block permits to clear before they reset the trip bistables. Corrective action
will include modification of EP 1202.06 and PP 1102.02.
7 8 9 FACILITY STATUS * POWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA N
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 NA 1791 007
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (4) [1 0 0 0 0 0 NA
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43
NRC LISE CNLY
INSUED DESCRIPTION (45) IN (1) NA 68 69
DVR 80-002 NAME OF PREPARER Carl L. Berger PHONE 80-002 NAME OF PREPARER 243

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-32-80-01

DATE OF EVENT: January 3, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Loss of Reactor Coolant Pumps

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 3, with Power (MWT) = 0, and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: During a plant heatup on January 3, 1980, Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) Channels 1 and 3 tripped on 1600 psig low pressure causing an SFAS level 2 actuation. Both High Pressure Injection (HPI) pumps started automatically, although no water was injected into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) since RCS pressure was about 1750 psig and increasing. This is above the cutoff head of HPI pumps. Operators immediately tripped all three running reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) per emergency procedure EP 1202.06, Loss of Reactor Coolant, Loss of Reactor Coolant Pressure. This placed the unit in the action statement of Technical Specification 4.3.1 which requires a minimum of one RCP operating in Modes 3, 4, and 5.

Verbal notification of this occurrence was made to the Davis-Besse NRC Inspector at 1600 hours with a followup telecopy to Region III Offices at 1700 hours on January 3, 1980.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: Operators acted correctly according to current station procedures in tripping the RCPs upon SFAS level 2 actuation. The cause of the SFAS trip was due to a procedural deficiency. Plant Startup Procedure PP 1102.02, required RCS pressure to be held between 1625 and 1650 psig until properly resetting the SFAS trip bistables. Since the low pressure trip setpoints have been changed from 1620 psig to 1650 psig, RCS pressure must be increased beyond 1650 psig before these bistables can be reset. Reactor operators began increasing pressure at 0135 hours at a rate of 10-15 psi per minute. At 0143 hours, RCS pressure reached about 1750 psig, clearing the SFAS low pressure block permit and tripping Channels 1 and 3.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. Operators performed all the actions and verifications required per EP 1202.06. One reactor coolant pump was restarted at 0231 hours and RCS heatup and pressurization continued at 0256 hours.

Corrective Action: Resolution of these problems will include several changes.

Startup procedure PP 1102.02 will be modified to incorporate the 1650 psig SFAS trip setpoints. Also an additional step will be added to EP 1202.06 warning operators to check actual RCS pressure before tripping RCPs on SFAS actuation. A trip will be

required only if pressure is less than the 1650 psig bistable setpoints.

Failure Data: There have been two previous similar reportable occurrences, see Licensee Event Reports NP-32-79-11 and NP-32-77-20.

LER #80-001