

SOUTH CAROLINA ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY

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E. H. CREWS, JR.
VICE-PRESIDENT AND GROUP EXECUTIVE
ENGINEERING AND CONSTRUCTION

December 3, 1979

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
101 Marietta Street, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Subject: V. C. Summer Nuclear Station
Reportable Significant Deficiency -
Undetectable Failure in Engineered
Safety Features Actuation System
Nuclear Eng. File - 3.1051

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

On November 7, 1979 Mr. Jack Skolds and Mr. Tom Burdette of the NRC were notified by our Mr. R. B. Clary that Westinghouse had informed the NRC of an item considered to be reportable under 10CFR50.55(e). The item involved an undetectable failure in the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System.

A failure analysis, which assumed a failure of the affected circuit in both of the redundant protection trains (as required by IEEE 379 for undetectable failures), showed that the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System's ability to automatically initiate Safety Injection (SI) could be lost under certain conditions.

Currently, plant tests do not provide for checking the operation of the P-4 contacts or the interconnecting wiring. Therefore, a potential failure of the P-4 contacts or in the associated wiring, would be undetectable. This would result in either a prevention of the normal mode of resetting and blocking SI and alteration of the sequence of switchover operations from injection to recirculation phase; or following a previous initiation if SI and manual reset and block, the block of SI could remain following the reset of the reactor trip breakers and when the plant was returned to power.

Under SCE&G program requirements this item is reported to the NRC as a reportable significant deficiency under 10CFR50.55 (e).

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Corrective action involves revising appropriate plant procedures to require verification of the P-4 contact status following automatic reactor trip or any condition requiring opening of the reactor trip breakers. Verification tests will also be required following reclosure of the reactor trip breakers and prior to rod withdrawal. SCE&G Nuclear Operations has been advised to make these procedure changes.

Based on this status, SCE&G considers this report a final report on this item.

Very truly yours,


E. H. Cross, Jr.

EHC:RBC:jw

cc: Office of Inspection & Enforcement
Washington, D. C.

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