

POOR ORIGINAL

11. Interpretation of GDC 19 "Control Room"

To : ACRS Members

March 24, 1967

From : N. J. Palladino, Chairman
ACRS

Subject: ACRS QUESTIONS RELATED TO PROJECT SAFETY EVALUATIONS

I have asked the ACRS Staff to compile a list of the questions being asked "routinely" by ACRS Members in connection with the Committee's review of nuclear reactor projects. I thought that this list might be helpful to Subcommittee Chairmen in the conduct of Subcommittee activities in "getting applicants ready" for their appearance before the Full Committee.

The Staff has prepared the attached list of questions which are those currently being asked on many of the cases which come before the Committee. Also included are those questions which were passed to DRL by Dr. Okrent as items to be considered by the Regulatory Staff in the review of projects at the operating permit stage.

In connection with the above, I would like to suggest that the attached list of questions be expanded and maintained current, with the list and periodic revisions provided to the Regulatory Staff to assist them in their support of the Committee.

Attachment:

List of ACRS Questions (Draft) dtd 3/17/67.

Controls and Instrumentation

a) Are safety systems designed so that a single failure would not deactivate them? (Include consideration of the times when bypassing, etc., is employed for testing.)

b) Will testing of safety systems be done at frequent enough intervals so that the "first" failure will be detected before the second occurs and deactivates the system?

c) Are the wiring, controls, etc., capable of performing their intended function under the conditions of temperature, humidity, pressure, radiation, etc., which will exist following an MCA?

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- d) Are local control stations being provided so that the reactor can be shut down and maintained in an undamaged condition if personnel are forced to evacuate the control room for some reason?
- e) If an MCA occurs and evacuation of the control room is required, are there adequate local control stations to handle the accident situation? Is there adequate access to these stations (e.g., is ^{and exit from} radiation protection adequate) as required?
- f) Are safety and control functions independent or do they involve the same components, equipment, etc.?
- g) Are safety systems, including sensors redundant? Are signals which initiate action diverse and separated physically?

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12. Load Break Switch

Working Group No. 2

-6-

Meeting Date: 3/26/76

Circuit Breaker Testing

Mr. Pollard alleged that certain large, low voltage circuit breakers were unique and could not be tested at full capacity. The NRC Staff had established a requirement that these breakers must be tested at full rated condition. At the time of Mr. Pollard's allegation the Staff did not know of a test facility with the capability to test these breakers. Subsequent to the allegation the license applicant brought to the NRC Staff representatives from a laboratory in the Netherlands that had tested the breakers in question.

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