



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY
PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-289

THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 13
License No. DPR-50

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Metropolitan Edison Company, Jersey Central Power and Light Company, and Pennsylvania Electric Company (the licensees) dated January 16, 1976, as supplemented February 13, 1976, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. An environmental statement or negative declaration need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.


POOR ORIGINAL

1555 297

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2. Accordingly, the license is amended by a change to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment.
3. This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment:
Changes to the
Technical Specifications

Date of Issuance:
February 19, 1976

1555 298

POOR ORIGINAL

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 13

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-50

DOCKET NO. 50-289

Replace pages 2-5, 2-6, 2-9 and Figure 2.3-1 of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached revised pages 2-5, 2-5a, 2-6, 2-9 and Figure 2.3-1. Changes on these pages are shown by marginal lines.

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1555 299

2.3 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTINGS, PROTECTION INSTRUMENTATION

Applicability

Applies to instruments monitoring reactor power, reactor power imbalance, reactor coolant system pressure, reactor coolant outlet temperature, flow, number of pumps in operation, and high reactor building pressure.

Objective

To provide automatic protection action to prevent any combination of process variables from exceeding a safety limit.

Specifications

- 2.3.1 The reactor protection system trip setting limits and the permissible bypasses for the instrument channels shall be as stated in Table 2.3-1 and Figure 2.3-2.
- 2.3.2 For the 24 hour period prior to Cycle 1 shutdown for refueling the high pressure trip setpoint may be increased to 2405 psig provided that the following precautions are taken during this period.
- a. If pressurizer level exceeds 315 inches as indicated by the high-high level alarm, the reactor shall be manually tripped.
 - b. If the reactor drain tank pressure exceeds 15 psig, the reactor shall be manually tripped.

1555 300

Bases

The reactor protection system consists of four instrument channels to monitor each of several selected plant conditions which will cause a reactor trip if any one of these conditions deviates from a pre-selected operating range to the degree that a safety limit may be reached.

The trip setting limits for protection system instrumentation are listed in Table 2.3-1. The safety analysis has been based upon these protection system instrumentation trip set points plus calibration and instrumentation errors.

Nuclear Overpower

A reactor trip at high power level (neutron flux) is provided to prevent damage to the fuel cladding from reactivity excursions too rapid to be detected by pressure and temperature measurements.

During normal plant operation with all reactor coolant pumps operating, reactor trip is initiated when the reactor power level reaches 105.5% of rated power. Adding to this the possible variation in trip set points due to calibration and instrument errors, the maximum actual power at which a trip would be actuated could be 112%, which is more conservative than the value used in the safety analysis⁽¹⁾.

a. Overpower trip based on flow and imbalance

The power level trip set point produced by the reactor coolant system flow is based on a power-to-flow ratio which has been established to accommodate the most severe thermal transient considered in the design, the loss-of-coolant flow accident from high power. Analysis has demonstrated that the specified power to flow ratio is adequate to prevent a DNBR of less than 1.3 should a low flow condition exist due to any malfunction.

1555 301

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The power level trip set point produced by the power-to-flow ratio provides both high power level and low flow protection in the event the reactor power level increases or the reactor coolant flow rate decreases. The power level trip set point produced by the power to flow ratio provides overpower DNB protection for all modes of pump operation. For every flow rate there is a maximum permissible power level, and for every power level there is a minimum permissible low flow rate. Typical power level and low flow rate combinations for the pump situations of Table 2.3-1 are as follows:

1. Trip would occur when four reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 108 percent and reactor flow rate is 100 percent, or flow rate is 92.6 percent and power level is 100 percent.
2. Trip would occur when three reactor coolant pumps are operating if power is 80.7 percent and reactor flow rate is 74.7 percent or flow rate is 69.2 percent and power level is 75 percent.
3. Trip would occur when one reactor coolant pump is operating in each loop (total of two pumps operating) if the power is 52.9 percent and reactor flow rate is 49.0 percent or flow rate is 45.4 percent and the power level is 49 percent.

For safety analysis calculations the maximum calibration and instrumentation errors for the power level were used.

The power-imbalance boundaries are established in order to prevent reactor thermal limits from being exceeded. These thermal limits are either power peaking kW/ft limits or DNER limits. The reactor power imbalance (power in the top half of core minus power in the bottom half of core) reduces the power level trip produced by the power-to-flow ratio so that the boundaries of Figure 2.3-2 are produced. The power-to-flow ratio reduces the power level trip and associated reactor-power reactor-power-imbalance boundaries by 1.08 percent for a one percent flow reduction.

b. Pump monitors

The redundant pump monitors prevent the minimum core DNER from decreasing below 1.3 by tripping the reactor due to the loss of reactor coolant pump(s). The pump monitors also restrict the power level for the number of pumps in operation.

c. Reactor coolant system pressure

During a startup accident from low power or a slow rod withdrawal from high power, the system high pressure trip set point is reached before the nuclear overpower trip set point. The trip setting limit shown in Figure 2.3-1 for high reactor coolant system pressure (2355*psig) has been established to maintain the system pressure below the safety limit (2750 psig) for any design transient.

* Except as specified in 2.3.2

1555 302

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TABLE 2.3-1

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM TRIP SETTING LIMITS


	Four Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Nominal Operating Power - 100%)	Three Reactor Coolant Pumps Operating (Nominal Operating Power - 75%)	One Reactor Coolant Pump Operating in Each Loop (Nominal Operating Power - 49%)	Shutdown Bypass
1. Nuclear power, Max. % of rated power	105.5	105.5	105.5	5.0 ⁽³⁾
2. Nuclear power based on flow ⁽²⁾ and imbalance, max. of rated power	1.08 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance(s)	1.08 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance(s)	1.08 times flow minus reduction due to imbalance(s)	Bypassed
3. Nuclear power based ⁽⁵⁾ on pump monitors, max. % of rated power	NA	NA	91%	Bypassed
4. High reactor coolant system pressure, psig, max.	2355 *	2355 *	2355 *	1720 ⁽⁴⁾
5. Low reactor coolant system pressure, psig, min.	1800	1800	1800	Bypassed
6. Variable low reactor coolant system pressure, psig, min.	(16.25T _{out} - 7756) ⁽¹⁾	(16.25T _{out} - 7756) ⁽¹⁾	(16.25T _{out} - 7756) ⁽¹⁾	Bypassed
7. Reactor coolant temp. F., Max.	619	619	619	619
8. High Reactor Building pressure, psig, max.	4	4	4	4

(1) T_{out} is in degrees Fahrenheit (F) * Except as specified in 2.3.2
 (2) Reactor coolant system flow, %
 (3) Administratively controlled reduction set only during reactor shutdown
 (4) Automatically set when other segments of the RPS (as specified) are bypassed
 (5) The pump monitors also produce a trip on: (a) loss of two reactor coolant pumps
 in one reactor coolant loop, and (b) loss of one or two reactor coolant pumps during two-pump operation.

Amendment No. 15

2-9

1555 303



* Except as specified in 2.3.2

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PROTECTION SYSTEM MAXIMUM
ALLOWABLE SET POINTS
THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1

Amendment No. 13

1555 304
FIGURE 2.3-1