

May 22, 1979



Georgia Power

*the southern electric system*

Chas. F. Whitmer  
Vice President  
Engineering

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D. C. 20555

NRC DOCKET 50-366  
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5  
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2  
PROPOSED CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS


Gentlemen:

Pursuant to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's letter dated February 1, 1979, Georgia Power Company hereby provides the requested changes to the Unit 2 Technical Specifications. These changes include the Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, and the Bases for Applicability specification. This letter also noted our exemption from fees pursuant to footnote 2 of Section 170.22.

The Plant Review Board and the Safety Review Board have reviewed and approved these proposed changes to the Unit 2 Technical Specifications and have determined that they do not involve an unreviewed safety question. These changes reduce the probability of occurrence and the consequences of an accident important to safety by requiring that the inoperable trip channel be put in the tripped position. It also reduces the allowed time to obtain HOT or COLD SHUTDOWN. This change does not introduce the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than analyzed previously in the FSAR, however, it does mitigate the possibility of an unanalyzed occurrence, that of failure to trip due to inoperable instrumentation. The margins of safety are not decreased since the system response is not reduced.

Enclosed with these changes are instructions for the incorporation of the proposed revisions into the Technical Specifications.

Yours very truly,



Chas. F. Whitmer

MRD/mb  
Enclosure

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 22nd day of May, 1979.



Notary Public, Georgia, Notary at Large  
My Commission Expires Sept. 28, 1984

xc: Mr. Ruble A. Thomas  
George F. Trowbridge, Esquire

2047 332

7905290184

ATTACHMENT 1

NRC DOCKET 50-366  
OPERATING LICENSE NPF-5  
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 2  
PROPOSED CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

The proposed change to Technical Specifications (Appendix A to Operating License NPF-5) would be incorporated as follows:

Remove Page

B 3/4 0-1  
3/4 3-1  
3/4 3-4  
3/4 3-5  
3/4 3-9  
3/4 3-15  
-

Insert Page

B 3/4 0-1  
3/4 3-1  
3/4 3-4  
3/4 3-5  
3/4 3-9  
3/4 3-15  
3/4 3-15a

2047 533

## 3/4.0 APPLICABILITY

### BASES

---

---

The specifications of this section provide the general requirements applicable to each of the Limiting Conditions for Operation and Surveillance Requirements within Section 3/4.

3.0.1 This specification states the applicability of each specification in terms of defined OPERATIONAL CONDITION and is provided to delineate specifically when each specification is applicable.

3.0.2 This specification defines those conditions necessary to constitute compliance with the terms of an individual Limiting Condition for Operation and associated ACTION requirement.

3.0.3 This specification delineates the ACTION to be taken for circumstances not directly provided for in the ACTION statements and whose occurrence would violate the intent of the specification. For example, Specification 3.5.1 calls for the HPCI to be OPERABLE and specifies explicit requirements if it becomes inoperable. Under the terms of Specification 3.0.3 if the required additional systems are not OPERABLE, the facility is to be placed in HOT SHUTDOWN with the next 6 hours and be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours. The unit shall be brought to HOT SHUTDOWN and COLD SHUTDOWN within the required times by promptly initiating and carrying out an orderly shutdown. It is intended that this guidance also apply whenever an ACTION statement requires the units to be in (at least) STARTUP within 2 hours or to be in (at least) HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.

3.0.4 This specification provides that entry into an OPERABLE CONDITION must be made with (a) the full complement of required systems, equipment or components OPERABLE and (b) all other parameters as specified in the Limiting Conditions for Operation being met without regard for allowable deviations and out of service provisions contained in the ACTION statements.

The intent of this provision is to insure that facility operation is not initiated with either required equipment or systems inoperable or other limits being exceeded.

Exceptions to this provision have been provided for a limited number of specifications when startup with inoperable equipment would not affect plant safety. These exceptions are stated in the ACTION statements of the appropriate specifications.

2047 334

### 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION

#### 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

##### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.1 As a minimum, the reactor protection system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.1-2. Set points and interlocks are given in Table 2.2.1-1.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.1-1.

##### ACTION:

- a. With the requirements for the minimum number of OPERABLE channels not satisfied for one trip system, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour.
- b. With the requirements for the minimum number of OPERABLE channels not satisfied for both trip systems, place at least one inoperable channel in at least one trip system\* in the tripped condition within one hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.1-1.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5.

##### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.1.1 Each reactor protection system instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTION TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations during the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1-1.

4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months and shall include calibration of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip system.

4.3.1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip function of Table 3.3.1-2 shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least once per 36 months and one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor trip function.

\*If both channels are inoperable in one trip system, select at least one inoperable channel in that trip system to place in the tripped condition, except when this would cause the trip function to occur.

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION

- ACTION 1 - In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 2, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.
- In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and fully insert all insertable control rods within one hour.
- ACTION 2 - Lock the reactor mode switch in the Shutdown position within one hour.
- ACTION 3 - Be in at least STARTUP within 2 hours.
- ACTION 4 - In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.
- In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and fully insert all insertable control rods within one hour.
- ACTION 5 - Be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.
- ACTION 6 - Be in STARTUP with the main steam line isolation valves closed within 2 hours or in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.
- ACTION 7 - Initiate a reduction in THERMAL POWER within 15 minutes; and be at less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 2 hours.
- ACTION 8 - In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.
- In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4, immediately and at least once per 12 hours verify that all control rods are fully inserted.
- In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and fully insert all insertable control rods within one hour.

2047 536

TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

- ACTION 9 - In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.
- In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3 or 4, lock the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position within one hour.
- In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and fully insert all insertable control rods within one hour.

TABLE NOTATIONS

- a. A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
- b. The "Shorting links" shall be removed from the RPS circuitry during CORE ALTERATIONS and shutdown margin demonstrations performed in accordance with Specification 3.10.3.
- c. The IRM scrams are automatically bypassed when the reactor vessel mode switch is in the Run position and all APRM channels are OPERABLE and on scale.
- d. An APRM channel is inoperable if there are less than 2 LPRM inputs per level or less than eleven LPRM inputs to an APRM channel.
- e. These functions are not required to be OPERABLE when the reactor pressure vessel head is unbolted or removed.
- f. This function is automatically bypassed when the reactor mode switch is in other than the Run position.
- g. This function is not required to be OPERABLE when PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is not required.
- h. With any control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.11.1 or 3.9.11.2.
- i. These functions are bypassed when turbine first stage pressure is <250\* psig, equivalent to THERMAL POWER less than 30% of RATED THERMAL POWER.
- j. Also trips reactor coolant system recirculation pump MG sets.
- k. Also trips reactor coolant system recirculation pump motors.

\* Initial setpoint. Final setpoint to be determined during startup testing.

2047 337

## INSTRUMENTATION

### 3/4.3.2 ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

#### LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

---

3.3.2 The isolation actuation instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.2-2 and with ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.2-3.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Table 3.3.2-1.

#### ACTION:

- a. With an isolation actuation instrumentation channel trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3.2-2, declare the channel inoperable and place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition\* until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.
- b. With the requirements for the minimum number of OPERABLE channels not satisfied for one trip system, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped condition\* within one hour.
- c. With the requirements for the minimum number of OPERABLE channels not satisfied for both trip systems, place at least one inoperable channel in at least one trip system\*\* in the tripped condition within one hour and take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1.
- d. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5.

#### SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

4.3.2.1 Each isolation actuation instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST AND CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations during the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.2-1.

4.3.2.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and simulated automatic operation of all channels shall be performed at least once per 18 months and shall include calibration of time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip system.

---

\*With a design providing only one channel per trip system, an inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1 for that Trip Function shall be taken.

\*\*If both channels are inoperable in one trip system, select at least one inoperable channel in that trip system to place in the tripped condition, except when that would cause the trip function to occur.

TABLE 3.3.2-1 (Continued)

ISOLATION ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION

ACTION

- ACTION 20 - Take the action required by Specification 3.0.3.
- ACTION 21 - Be in at least STARTUP with the main steam line isolation valves closed within 2 hours or take the action required by Specification 3.0.3.
- ACTION 22 - Be in at least STARTUP within 2 hours.
- ACTION 23 - Be in at least STARTUP with the Group 1 isolation valves closed within 2 hours or in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours.
- ACTION 24 - Establish SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY with the standby gas treatment system operating within one hours.
- ACTION 25 - Isolate the reactor water cleanup system.
- ACTION 26 - Close the affected system isolation valves and declare the affected system inoperable.
- ACTION 27 - Verify power availability to the bus at least once per 12 hours or close the affected system isolation valves and declare the affected system inoperable.
- ACTION 28 - Close the shutdown cooling supply and reactor vessel head spray isolation valves unless reactor steam dome pressure  $\leq$  135 psig.

NOTES

- # Actuates operation of the main control room environmental control system in the pressurization mode of operation.
- \* Actuates the standby gas treatment system.
- \*\* When handling irradiated fuel in the secondary containment.
- a. See Specification 3.6.3.1, Table 3.6.3.1-1 for valves in each valve group.
- b. A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one other OPERABLE channel in the same trip system is monitoring that parameter.
- c. With a design providing only one channel per trip system, an inoperable channel need not be placed in the tripped condition where this would cause the Trip Function to occur. In these cases, the inoperable channel shall be restored to OPERABLE status within 2 hours or the ACTION required by Table 3.3.2-1 for the Trip Function shall be taken.
- d. Trips the mechanical vacuum pumps.
- e. A channel is OPERABLE if 2 of 4 instruments in that channel are OPERABLE.



- f. May be bypassed with reactor steam pressure  $\leq$  1045 psig and all turbine stop valves closed.
- g. Closes only RWCU outlet isolation valve 2G31-F004.
- h. Alarm only.
- i. Adjustable up to 60 minutes.

2047 340