

CONTROL BLOCK:

0	1	M	A	Y	K	R	1	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5	
7	8	9	LICENSEE CODE					14	15	LICENSE NUMBER										25	26	LICENSE TYPE					30	57	CAT 58	

CON'T

REPORT
SOURCE

L	6	0	5	0	0	0	2	9	7	0	2	1	9	7	9	8	0	3	0	5	7	9	9	
60	61	DOCKET NUMBER						68	69	EVENT DATE						74	75	REPORT DATE						80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During normal operation, the fire pump running alarm was received in the
03 Control Room. A leak was discovered and isolated which isolated the flo
04 w path to one yard hydrant subject to T.S. 3.7.10.1.b. This is the first
05 reportable event of this nature at this facility. Equipment was arrange
06 d to provide fire suppression coverage to the areas of the plant normall
07 y protected by the isolated hydrant. No adverse effects to the health or
08 safety of the public and plant personnel resulted from this event.

09		SYSTEM CODE A B		11	CAUSE CODE E		12	CAUSE SUBCODE B		13	COMPONENT CODE P I P E X X				14	COMP. SUBCODE C		15	VALVE SUBCODE Z		16	
7	8	9	10		11		12		13					18		19			20			
17		LER RO REPORT NUMBER		EVENT YEAR 7 9		21	22	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 0 6		24	26	OCCURRENCE CODE 9 9		28	29	REPORT TYPE T		30	REVISION NO. 0		32	
ACTION TAKEN		FUTURE ACTION		EFFECT ON PLANT		SHUTDOWN METHOD		HOURS		22	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED		23	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.		PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER		COMPONENT MANUFACTURER		26		
B	18	Z	19	Z	20	Z	21	0	0	0	0	Y	23	N	24	A	25	S	4	2	0	26
33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 The root cause of this event seems to have been an uneven external force
1 1 applied on the pipe by the trench fill. The resultant crack extended ar
1 2 ound approximately 2/3 of its circumference. The affected pipe is 8" cas
1 3 t iron, normally pressurized to 125 psig and was isolable. The crack wa
1 4 s sealed using a compression patch, pressure tested and backfilled.

8 9

FACILITY STATUS (28) 1 5 E

% POWER 1 0 0 (29)

OTHER STATUS (30) N/A

METHOD OF DISCOVERY (31) A

DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Fire Pump Running Panalarm

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

ACTIVITY CONTENT
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)
1 6 2 33 34 N/A 44

LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
N/A 45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES										
NUMBER			TYPE	DESCRIPTION						
1	0	0	0	(37) Z	(38)	(39) N/A				

PERSONNEL INJURIES		NUMBER		DESCRIPTION	
1	8	0	0	0	(40) N/A

		LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY		(43)
		TYPE	DESCRIPTION	
1	9	Z	(42) N/A	

PURITY															
ISSUED		DESCRIPTION													
2	0	N	(44)	N/A				7903080 3/2	NRC USE ONLY						
7	8	9	10						68	69	80				

NAME OF PREPARER Edwin L. May

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EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

During normal operation, at 1215 hours on February 19, 1979, the Fire Pump Running Alarm was received in the Control Room. Inspections were conducted throughout the plant to evaluate the authenticity of the alarm. It was determined that a fire condition did not exist and the auto start was the result of a leak in the fire suppression water system. A leak isolation process was conducted which revealed that the leak was in the 8 inch line between valves FS-V-641, FS-V-642 and FS-V-647. These valves were closed which isolated yard hydrant No. 15 and one of the two redundant lines which supply the turbine building fire suppression water. Equipment was arranged to provide fire suppression coverage to the areas of the plant normally protected by the isolated hydrant. Hoses and fittings were also available to supply water to hydrant No. 15 from another yard hydrant in order to use the isolated hydrant as a manifold.

The fire suppression system status was continually monitored during the leak. The pressure of the system never went below 100 psig nor did the second fire pump ever auto start. When the leak was isolated the remainder of the fire main and associated equipment was returned to normal. In the event of an actual fire condition the fire suppression system and equipment would have been capable of performing its intended functions. Based on the above discussion no adverse effects to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel resulted from this event.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The root cause of this event is suspected to have been an uneven external force applied to the pipe by the trench fill. It appears that some large stones used to backfill the trench worked their way down through the fine aggregate covering the pipe. As the ground froze deeper because of extended subzero temperatures the pressure buildup on the stones exerted a concentrated downward force on the top of the pipe causing it to crack. The fire main is constructed of 8 inch cast iron pipe. The fire loop is normally under 125 psig pressure and the affected section was isolable as previously described. The hairline crack extended around approximately 2/3 of the pipe circumference. A compression patch was installed around the crack and a pressure test conducted on the repair. The system was returned to normal at 1500 hours on February 27, 1979. With no further indications of leaks in the area the trench was backfilled on February 28, 1979. The large stones found in the trench were not used in the backfill. No further corrective actions are deemed as necessary at this date.