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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS

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1	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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4	666TH MEETING
5	ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
6	(ACRS)
7	+ + + +
8	WEDNESDAY
9	SEPTEMBER 4, 2019
10	+ + + +
11	ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND
12	+ + + +
13	The Advisory Committee met at the Nuclear
14	Regulatory Commission, Two White Flint North,
15	Room T2B3, 11545 Rockville Pike, at 1:00 p.m., Peter
16	Riccardella, Chairman, presiding.
17	COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
18	PETER RICCARDELLA, Chairman
19	MATTHEW W. SUNSERI, Vice Chairman
20	JOY L. REMPE, Member-at-Large
21	RONALD G. BALLINGER, Member
22	DENNIS C. BLEY, Member
23	CHARLES H. BROWN, JR., Member
24	MICHAEL L. CORRADINI, Member
25	VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member

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1	WALTER L. KIRCHNER, Member	
2	JOSE MARCH-LEUBA, Member*	
3	DAVID PETTI, Member	
4	HAROLD B. RAY, Member	
5		
6		
7	DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:	
8	WEIDONG WANG	
9	KENT HOWARD	
10		
11	*Present via telephone	
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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (1:00 p.m.)3 CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: The meeting will 4 come to order. Today is the first day of the 666th 5 meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safequards. 6 I'm Pete Riccardella, ACRS Chairman. 7 The ACRS was established by the Atomic 8 9 Energy Act and is governed by the Federal Advisory Committee Act, FACA. 10 The ACRS section of U.S. NRC public 11 website provides information about the history of the 12 ACRS and provides FACA-related documents, such as 13 14 chapter, bylaws, Federal Register Notices meetings, letter reports, and transcripts of all full 15 subcommittee meetings, 16 including all 17 presented at the meetings. The committee provides its advice on 18

safety matters to the Commission through its publicly available letter reports. The Federal Register Notice announcing this meeting was published on August 6th and provides an agenda and instructions for interested parties to provide written documents or request opportunities to address the committee, as required by FACA.

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1 In accordance with FACA, there is 2 Designated Federal Official for today's meeting. 3 DFO for this meeting is Mr. Weidong Wang. 4 During today's meeting, the committee will 5 consider the following: Advanced Reactor SECY Policy Paper on Siting, Turkey Point Subsequent License 6 7 Renewal, and Preparation of ACRS Reports. There is a phone bridge line. To preclude 8 interruption of the meeting, the phone will be placed 9 in a listen-in mode during presentations and committee 10 discussion. 11 We have received no written comments or 12 requests to make oral statements from members of the 13 14 public regarding today's session. There will be an 15 opportunity for public comment, as we have set aside 10 minutes in the agenda for comments from members of 16 the public attending or listening to our meeting. 17 Written communications may be forwarded to 18 19 Mr. Weidong Wang, the Designated Federal Official. 20 A transcript of the open portions of the meeting is being kept, and it is requested that 21 the microphones, 22 speakers use of identify one themselves, and speak with sufficient clarity and 23 24 volume, so that they can be readily heard.

I would like to request that everybody

1 silence their cell phones or other devices that might make noise in the meeting. 2 3 And I also believe we have Member Jose March-Leuba on a private line calling in. 4 hurricane-bound in Florida, but he will 5 6 remotely. 7 Jose, are you there? 8 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes, I'm here. Thank 9 you. 10 CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Okay. Very good. So the first topic, as I mentioned, is 11 Advanced Reactor SECY Policy Paper on Siting, and I 12 would like to ask the Subcommittee Chairman, Dennis 13 14 Bley, to introduce the subject. 15 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. MEMBER BLEY: 16 And thanks to everyone for having the phones working 17 today. It's great. We had a subcommittee meeting a few weeks 18 19 ago, and most of the members were there. Some issues were raised, and I hope our presenters from the staff 20 will address some of those issues if they can. 21 At this point, I will turn the session 22 over to John Segala, NRO. 23 24 SEGALA: Thank you, Dr. Bley, Chairman Riccardella, and the other 25 thank you,

1 committee members, for the opportunity to present 2 today on this important topic of population-related 3 siting considerations for advanced reactors. 4 As you know, this is a topic that has a 5 long history. And as Dr. Bley said, we briefed the subcommittee meeting on August 23rd, and had a lot of 6 good discussions, and we're prepared today to answer 7 some of the committee/subcommittee's comments. 8 9 At the end of this meeting, we'll be 10 requesting a letter from the full committee on our draft Commission paper. 11 And with that, I'll turn it over to Bill 12 Reckley, a senior project manager in my branch. 13 14 MR. RECKLEY: Thanks, John. As John 15 mentioned, this paper is related to population-related 16 siting consideration. I just kind of want to stress that siting has a lot of different considerations, 17

MR. RECKLEY: Thanks, John. As John mentioned, this paper is related to population-related siting consideration. I just kind of want to stress that siting has a lot of different considerations, both on the site as a potential hazard to the reactor, and then of course the reactor as a potential hazard to the environment. And this paper is limited to a small slice of those issues, which is related to population around a site.

So the purpose of the paper is to provide the Commission with options and a recommendation on possible change to the guidance documents. I will get

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1 into some of this in a little more detail, but right from the beginning emphasize that we don't see at this 2 3 time a need to change regulations, but we think the 4 situation would benefit from revision to the guidance 5 documents; in particular, Regulatory Guide 4.7. So the paper is laid out with that 6 7 purpose, some background in terms of regulations and quidance, a discussion, which is largely a description 8 9 of the options, and then a specific recommendation from the staff to the Commission. 10 I have tried to collapse all of that in 11 terms of regulations and guidance onto this one graph. 12 And you can see up this -- up the left side are the 13 14 regulations that most of us are most familiar with, and that is 10 CFR 100.21, as it relates to defining 15 exclusion areas, low population zones, and population 16 center distances. 17 And just to summarize those circles, the 18 19 exclusionary boundary is defined actually within Part 50 and Part 52 as that distance at which an 20 individual would receive less than 25 rem in two 21 hours, the worst two hours of an accident. 22 23 MEMBER BLEY: Bill? 24 MR. RECKLEY: Yes.

MEMBER BLEY: You said this only focuses

on population, which is the outcome. But it's deeply involved with all of the other aspects that affect what the doses are going to be, which you can't ignore. And I'm going to express a little surprise, and you may have this covered later, one has to decide for which accidents they are going to calculate the doses, which really has to do with a lot more, including risk.

And I'm a little curious why you folks didn't have an option, maybe I'd call it 3A, that really tried to be risk-informed about the criteria that we use. And I don't know if you can plan to get to that later. If you do, that's just fine.

MR. RECKLEY: Yeah. I think in about two slides I'll try to address that. And if I don't succeed, you can continue with the question.

So, again, the standard definitions down the left side there, for the low population zone, which is the distance at which 25 rem would -- less than 25 rem to an individual for the duration of the accident, and then a low -- a population center distance, which is defined in the rules as being one-and-a-third times the radius of the low population zone. And that is the minimum distance to which a reactor could be in relation to a population center of

1	about 25,000 people.
2	Over on the right side, you have 10 CFR
3	100.21H, which is a vaguely worded rule.
4	MEMBER CORRADINI: Can I
5	MR. RECKLEY: Go ahead.
6	MEMBER CORRADINI: I want to repeat
7	something that I wrote down, but I could have it
8	wrong, from the subcommittee meeting. The definition
9	of a population center is a tad fuzzy.
10	MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
11	MEMBER CORRADINI: It's not precise, as I
12	remember you stating at the time.
13	MR. RECKLEY: Right.
14	MEMBER CORRADINI: True?
15	MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
16	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
17	MR. RECKLEY: Well, it is about 25,000.
18	MEMBER CORRADINI: Well, I guess the
19	boundary of where I draw where I count 25,000
20	people
21	MR. RECKLEY: It's a population boundary,
22	not a political boundary.
23	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
24	MR. RECKLEY: So you look for where the
25	actual population is. You map that out, and that's
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the distance to the population center, not necessarily 1 political boundary of a --2 you 3 incorporated town or a city limit. 4 MEMBER CORRADINI: So the centroid of 5 where the population rises to or near 25,000. 6 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. 7 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. 8 MEMBER BLEY: I'm sorry. You 9 "centroid," which implies the middle, and it's not. MR. RECKLEY: The edge of the population 10 boundary. 11 MEMBER CORRADINI: But if it's not the 12 political boundary, then I could have a farm, a dairy, 13 14 since I'm that part of the country, a dairy entity. And if I add up the 25,000, and the dairy farm is the 15 closest thing to 25,000, that's the boundary? 16 still struggling as to how I get the 25,000 if it's 17 not the center of it. 18 19 MR. RECKLEY: Right. It did -- take a case where you just draw where an actual population, 20 like a town where the residences start. So, in your 21 case, you would probably skip over the farm, right? 22 Skip over those couple hundred acres of the farm, even 23 24 if they're in the political boundary, and go to where

the actual residences, the suburban type, the actual

-- with some density of that population, draw a circle around it. This is very inexact.

MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. So that's all I was trying to get at. It's inexact, and it's a matter of judgment and conversation, not a clear -- it's not like a -- it's not like, you know, normal distribution I take the 595 of the population and it adds up to 25.

MR. RECKLEY: For that population center. Now, when we get to the next one, which is under 121H, where we're looking at population density, and that rule is also vaguely worded, it says located away from population centers in low population densities are preferred.

The way we meet that rule is through the guidance in Reg Guide 4.7 that looks at population density of 500 persons per square mile and everincreasing radius. So the first mile you couldn't have more than 1,571 people; in the second mile, 6,000; and it keeps going with those constraints until you get to the limit of 20 miles. We look at population density out to 20 miles, and the population within that 20-mile circle would have to be less than 628,000 people.

And so those things in combination are how you basically address some of the issues and some of

1	the vagueness that you're referring to.
2	MEMBER RAY: To respond to Mike again a
3	little bit, I just want to draw attention to the fact
4	we're talking about densely populated. And the farm
5	example you gave isn't an example of densely
6	populated.
7	MEMBER CORRADINI: But I could have I
8	could have I won't use a particular town that I am
9	aware of, but a town in the Midwest which has a
10	population of suburban or of houses, but then as I
11	move out I could have farms that are closely packed
12	but that are within the political boundary, but may
13	not be in the population center.
14	MEMBER RAY: They are not in in my
15	judgment, they are not in a densely populated center.
16	They are outside the densely populated center.
17	MR. RECKLEY: Right. Even though they
18	might be in the political boundary. Right.
19	MEMBER RAY: Or in between you and the
20	densely populated center.
21	MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
22	MEMBER RAY: For example.
23	MR. RECKLEY: Right.
24	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Bill, I'm sorry.
25	I wasn't able to attend the subcommittee meeting, but

1 these -- the 25 rem for the two other zones, that assumes what some accident under some design -- under 2 the design basis accident or something. 3 MR. RECKLEY: In the traditional sense, it 4 5 includes the Req Guide 1465, the alternate source 6 term, or before that the TID 14484. Source term, into 7 the containment, and then with the conditions of the 8 allowable leakage out of the containment, 9 traditional sense. 10 In a second, I will get to an alternative to that for advanced reactors. 11 CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Okay. Thank you. 12 MR. SEGALA: And I'd just like to add for 13 14 the Reg Guide, it has you project out the population 15 five years from the initial siting, and it also says, 16 you know, reactors should not be located at a site 17 where the population density is well in excess of the 500. So even -- it's a quidance document, so it's not 18 19 a strict acceptance criteria, 500. Keeping in mind that the 20 MR. RECKLEY: rule that we're enforcing says population --21 population density preferred. 22 It's an unusual rule, and it dates back to the fact that this siting 23 24 quidance and siting as a policy for the Commission

goes back to the beginning, really. This guidance was

first written in 1962.

So as we looked at it and interfaced with stakeholders, there were two issues that we identified with the planned uses of advanced reactors, and in particular small modular reactors, and the guidance as it was written, and called on us to assess whether we could change the guidance while maintaining appropriate public safety and conformance to the rules.

The first was the limitation of 500 persons per square mile out to 20 miles, and the second one -- policy issue was actually the same population density, but close in to a reactor site. So if you go back to the previous slide, you can see a potential use for small modular reactors or advanced reactors in general would be for remote areas.

And so take a remote area, a small town in Alaska, this would say -- the current guidance would say that population within the first mile couldn't exceed 1,500 people. The desire would be to have that reactor most likely closer to the town than a mile away, because the reason you want it there is that it currently has no grid.

The other area of concern was within DOE and other stakeholder interest was the possible use of

1 reactors to replace retiring fossil units. And they 2 might be closer to population centers than the 20-mile criteria or the 15-mile criteria would allow in terms 3 4 of populations within that circle being limited to 5 350,000 in the case of 15 miles. And so if a reactor can safely be put 6 7 somewhere, would it make sense to revise the siting 8 quidance to allow it? And that was the matter that we 9 were looking at. MEMBER BLEY: Bill, one thing that bothers 10 me about the right-hand side of this figure is when 11 you put total populations 12 in there, assuming a population density, and rings around the reactor, the 13 14 population is going to be off somewhere away from the 15 reactor. And in one direction, the population density could go quite high, where if you average it in rings 16 17 by miles away from the reactor, you could make it look very low. 18 19 And is this kind of setting up per mile Is that specified in the reg guide? 20 MR. RECKLEY: I think there is actually 21 some look by sector in addition to rings, to totally 22 avoid what you're saying. 23 24 MEMBER BLEY: Because you would really be

it would really be smooshing out the population

1 where it isn't and saying I have a low population density when --2 3 MR. RECKLEY: It is looked at in a little 4 more than just the consent agreements. 5 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. MR. RECKLEY: So with that as background, 6 some of the additional background and history relating 7 to siting is in an Oak Ridge report, and I gives the 8 9 ADAMS accession number there. 10 They also developed a possible approach, and I'll be talking about that in a second. 11 That's Option 2. 12 So the staff developed four options. 13 14 you can kind of get out of this conversation, there 15 are many ways that one could approach this. could have had many more four options, but we did 16 17 narrow it down to try to give the Commission an idea of different ways that this might be addressed. 18 19 So one of the things that we did do is look at the paper and some of the comments and some of 20 the discussion we had on August 23rd during the 21 subcommittee meeting. And we're -- in the background 22 there are some proposed changes that would summarize 23 24 what would we -- what we would put in the paper.

But there were three main items that I

took away anyway. One was to reinforce that this guidance is related to unplanned releases and accidents. There are rules in place for normal effluents, normal operations. That is continued to be controlled under those regulations such as 10 CFR Part 20.

Another question was on how Option 3 would be implemented, and this goes to what Dr. Bley was mentioning. What events do you look at? How are you getting a source term in order to calculate the dose for Option 3, which is the one that is based on an assessment of the individual dose at a distance.

And there's two possible approaches that we've talked about within the paper, and we tried to clarify a little bit with the footnote in the backup slides. The first is how we expect it to be pursued for those that are using the methodology described in draft Guide 1353 and NEI 18-04. That's the risk-informed approach that we brought before the committee six months ago or more.

And in that -- if the reactor -- the designer is using that methodology, they will develop a mechanistic source term for the event sequences. They will evaluate all of the event sequences in the categories of design and beyond design basis events,

1 and they will assess the offsite consequences. And that would be the dose coming out of 2 3 those two event categories that they would compare to the one rem in a month that we talk about under Option 4 5 And I'll get -- I know it's a little disjointed 6 here. 7 But another question that came up was the -- how multi-unit events are handed. And so that same 8 9 footnote we were able -- a different footnote, we were 10 able to describe that 1353 or NEI 18-04 is done by plant year. And so they are specifically looking at 11 multi-unit events or events that could affect more 12 than one radionuclide source in that event. 13 14 whether it be reactors or off-gas systems or whatever the source term might be. 15 So this is in the 16 MEMBER CORRADINI: current SECY that we saw? 17 MR. RECKLEY: It was hinted at in the 18 19 backup slide. The backup slide hopefully goes into a little more detail now. 20 MEMBER CORRADINI: In the footnotes, right 21 under Option 3, it was discussed there; did I miss it? 22 Well, only vaquely, 23 MR. RECKLEY: 24 Dr. Bley mentioned. It says --MEMBER CORRADINI: So let me now do -- my 25

1 hand calculation is if I have five of these, I have five plant-years for every real year. That's what you 2 3 just said to me. That if I have five of these 4 collocated and there's a multi-module site, I would --5 for every year passing I would take five plant-years as the frequency effect? 6 That's what I thought you used by the term "plant-year" in the assessment. 7 8 MR. RECKLEY: Really, the way that this 9 methodology works, you're looking at the probability 10 of an event at the plant. That could be a single-unit event or a multi-unit event. 11 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. So, in other 12 words, as some licensees might come in and calculate 13 14 what is with many on a site, many on a plant site, it would not be a module, but it would be a module times 15 some multiplier by some definable review procedure. 16 17 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay. Very good. 18 Ι 19 misunderstood. Thank you. MEMBER REMPE: Since he interrupted you, 20 I'm looking at page 21 of the backup slides. 21 get the -- that you have -- again, right now, you have 22 beyond -- design and beyond design basis events if 23 24 they use 1353. But if they use a different approach,

it looks like they don't have to consider beyond

1 design basis events. They only look at possible plant transients and accidents. 2 3 MR. RECKLEY: And what we're trying to 4 define there, and we got into this trouble in the 5 subcommittee meeting, and part of the problem is after 50 years no one agrees on the terminology, they would 6 7 do it the way they do it now. 8 So if you consider NUREG-1465 source term 9 as a design basis accident source term, then call it 10 a design basis accident source term. If you consider it to be a beyond design basis accident source term, 11 then consider it to be a beyond design basis accident 12 13 source term. 14 MEMBER CORRADINI: But it's a source term 15 with containment performance specified in -- or some 16 sort of performance measures that are considered to be 17 conservative. MR. RECKLEY: Yes. And a source term that 18 19 was considered to be conservative. MEMBER CORRADINI: Correct. 20 So it's essentially a non-light water equivalent of 1465 with 21 Reg Guide 1.183 attributes. 22 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. 23 24 MEMBER CORRADINI: Okav. MEMBER REMPE: So if I have a small micro 25

1 reactor and I don't want to try and do a PRA, I just want to do a maximum hypothetical release. Does that 2 mean -- can they argue and say that that's not within 3 4 our design basis? That's never going to happen. 5 they have to do a maximum hypothetical release? What will they do? 6 7 MR. RECKLEY: We're looking at that now. So it's a little clearer under the 1353 that they 8 9 would categorize it. If they want to propose an 10 alternative, and we mention this in a section of the draft guide, that if somebody wanted to use a maximum 11 hypothetical, they could do that, but that's really a 12 deviation from the quidance in NEI 18-04 and 1353. 13 14 So they are going to be coming in on their 15 own to justify that they have in that case identified the actual maximum hypothetical accident to use in the 16 17 proposal. So these aren't -- anyway, so they would 18 19 have to come in and justify that. MEMBER REMPE: It doesn't fall under 20 It's something different. 21 Option 3, then. forgotten -- it's been a while since I've read the 22 draft, so --23 24 RECKLEY: It could, if they could convince us that it was a maximum hypothetical. 25 That

would, in effect, bound the beyond design basis event 1 in DG-1353. And so they could -- they could use this 2 3 quidance if they can convince us that they actually 4 have identified the maximum hypothetical. 5 MEMBER CORRADINI: Can I reverse this? I have a particular design with a particular set of 6 7 analyses that say nothing rises above five times 10⁻⁷, one might have to infer some maximum credible accident 8 9 to at least decide what the distances are. What if I have Joe's reactor, and Joe's 10 reactor is so safe that they buy their analysis, show 11 that nothing rises on a frequency basis above five 12 times 10⁻⁷, with uncertainty, therefore, I have to --13 14 I have to define some maximum credible accident to 15 decide what the boundary is. 16 only talking the were reverse 17 direction. I'm thinking that this other direction is -- with inherent features of the design and the 18 19 passive design, I'm still going to have to identify something as to decide what the boundary is. 20 Let me just pass on the 21 MR. RECKLEY: hypothetical. Basically, you're saying if I can -- if 22 I can design a reactor that has basically no chance of 23 24 releasing the radioactive materials, or at least --

MEMBER CORRADINI:

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Frequency under 1353.

1	MR. RECKLEY: of below five times 10^{-7} .
2	MEMBER CORRADINI: Yeah. Because we have
3	some already that
4	MR. RECKLEY: I would hope that if
5	somebody is able to do that, we would say, "Great
6	job."
7	MS. CUBBAGE: So, Bill, what if you looked
8	at your Example 3 this is Amy Cubbage your
9	slide, it's less than one. Not Slide 3, it's Slide
10	12. I'm sorry.
11	MR. RECKLEY: Yeah. We'll get there under
12	that proposal, as to what the siting limitations would
13	be.
14	MEMBER CORRADINI: But back to Joy's
15	question, I want to make sure that we're clear. So
16	now at least in words in the revised SECY, there is a
17	path where the individual applicants could say we're
18	going to follow 1353 and those estimates for
19	mechanistic source term and frequency, et cetera, but
20	I can also take another path and write my own approach
21	to a new 1465 that has the appropriate attributes and
22	is conservative and bounds it.
23	MR. RECKLEY: Yes. We said we would
24	review that. But, again, that is going to be a
25	deviation, and we'll review it as a specific proposal.

1	MEMBER REMPE: And in that deviation, do
2	they get to stop at accidents, or do they need to go
3	to beyond design basis? Because the footnote to me
4	implies they don't have to go to beyond design basis.
5	They get to stop at accidents.
6	MR. RECKLEY: Well, keep in mind that the
7	light water methodology, with the stylized events and
8	the use of 1465, is light water reactor.
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: But what generated the
LO	1465 source term are severe accidents that are beyond
11	the design basis.
L2	MEMBER REMPE: Right.
L3	MEMBER CORRADINI: So I would assume in
L4	light way they would have to come up with a class of
L5	potential accidents that are beyond their design base,
L6	and then basically encapsulate with conservative
L7	calculations to be the equivalent of a 13
L8	MEMBER REMPE: Put Slide 21 up, if you
L9	would, just for a minute. This is the revised
20	MEMBER BLEY: I'd remind all of the
21	members we have only allotted an hour for this follow
22	up to the subcommittee.
23	MEMBER CORRADINI: Sorry.
24	MEMBER REMPE: That's what is kind of
25	bothering me, the mark-out of including design basis.

1 MR. RECKLEY: And the reason I marked that 2 out -- I can put it back in, to be honest. 3 I put it out -- struck it out was because it causes so 4 much confusion in what we do now, not in what we would 5 propose to do under 1353. The source term that we use, whether you 6 7 calculate it under 1465 or the old TID, is called different things by different people. And so that's 8 9 the concern. So what I tried to do was to strike out 10 the confusion and say, "Do it by NUREG-800, the 11 standard review plan, and do it by Reg Guide 1.183," 12 that defines how that is done, and try to avoid the 13 14 confusion of the terminology, because sometimes it's called maximum credible, sometimes it's called maximum 15 16 hypothetical, sometimes it's called design basis. 17 MS. CUBBAGE: And if you look at the sentence in question, striking the beyond design 18 19 basis, the words prior to that are talking about a wide range of potential accidents. 20 MR. RECKLEY: Right. 21 And that's not limited to 22 MS. CUBBAGE: 23 DBA. 24 MEMBER REMPE: Okav. And then the third bullet 25 MR. RECKLEY:

1 there is the rationale for option three that was We didn't change the paper. 2 discussed. 3 We maintained the basis as the existing 4 criterion on population density, 500 people per square 5 mile, the compatibility with the methodology in DG-1353, and that's where we're getting the one rem over 6 7 a month for the analysis of the event sequences, and engineering judgment for a multiplier that should take 8 9 that radius and multiply it by two. The --10 MEMBER BLEY: Bill, right there, owing you had the 30 days instead of --11 Instead of 96 hours. 12 MR. RECKLEY: -- 96 hours, I get how 13 MEMBER BLEY: 14 you're using 1353 to come up with the event sequences 15 What seems odd to me is, since we've to look at. looked at 1353 and you guys have developed it, which 16 17 is looking for a risk informed --MR. RECKLEY: Right. 18 19 MEMBER BLEY: -- approach, you could have followed on with a risk informed approach to the 20 but you've put in what smelled 21 criteria, 22 arbitrary criteria once again, and why? Again, as I said in the 23 MR. RECKLEY: 24 we could have come up with a lot different alternatives. 25

When we came up with option three, we were trying to look at what, the limitations designers were currently facing and whether we could come up with an option that would maintain safety, but give them the flexibility in siting, and after that, to stay as simple as we could.

And really, as simple as we could was to maintain the same criterion, 500 persons per square mile, and then to introduce, as you mentioned, which has got a risk informed element in it, the calculation of the consequences, the one rem over a month.

And then the way we did the multiplier, to be honest, I guess I can be honest, right, when we first proposed this to stakeholders, our proposal was two times the EPZ, and the reason it was two times the EPZ is because that's roughly how it works out now. The EPZ is 10 miles. We measure population density out to 20 miles, so it's two times the EPZ.

As we interfaced with stakeholders, we were convinced that linking it directly to the emergency planning arena was probably not wise, and so we withdrew the EPZ calculation and replaced it with the LMP one rem over a month calculation.

I understand it's similar and they're not unrelated, but it's a different parameter by a bit,

1	but we kept the two. We kept the factor of two.
2	And footnote seven in the draft that you
3	have says the result of that will be that the area in
4	which we look at population density will be roughly
5	equivalent or slightly greater than two times the EPZ
6	and that's because the EPZ is two rem, I mean one rem
7	in the worst 96 hours. The LMP criterion is one rem
8	over the month.
9	MEMBER CORRADINI: And the times two is
10	just a factor of safety?
11	MR. RECKLEY: Yes, and again, in the
12	beginning, it was tied to the current practice
13	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
14	MR. RECKLEY: and we just maintained
15	that.
16	MEMBER CORRADINI: So just to repeat the
17	subcommittee, so is the staff planning to do any
18	calculations to understand the technical basis of all
19	of these choices?
20	MR. RECKLEY: The difficulty is the
21	short answer is no, and the reason is there's too many
22	variables in play, and that's because a large part of
23	what we're trying to do is to introduce a sense of a
24	societal measure without defining a societal measure,
25	and if you wanted a calculation that would push us in

1	the direction of having to define some things in order
2	to back out what the appropriate number would be.
3	And so we thought about it and really
4	thought that it would be wiser just to pick a number.
5	If it comes across as engineering judgment, which, I
6	guess, in many parlances would also be synonymous with
7	arbitrary, that's where we are.
8	MEMBER CORRADINI: Okay.
9	MEMBER BLEY: Well, it's not always
10	arbitrary.
11	MR. RECKLEY: No.
12	MEMBER BLEY: To help you finish
13	MR. RECKLEY: Yes, we're going to go
14	through it.
15	MEMBER BLEY: when you get to option
16	two, since you don't favor option two
17	MR. RECKLEY: Yeah.
18	MEMBER BLEY: and nobody on the
19	Committee favors it, going through the details is very
20	plodding and slow.
21	MR. RECKLEY: Right, okay.
22	MEMBER BLEY: Just give the overview of
23	what it was trying to do.
24	MR. RECKLEY: Okay, I'll go quickly then
25	through the options. Option one is just the status

So we've talked about that already under what 1 quo. the current requirements are, so I'll skip through 2 3 that one. 4 The option two description is the best in 5 this slide in which a rough equivalent societal risk measure is defined as the area times the source term 6 7 factor times the people per square mile. Slide nine 8 gives the same example I used during the Subcommittee. 9 If you assume a proportional reduction in the area of contamination with the dose factor, which 10 would be roughly proportional to power level, you can 11 work through an example, as is given on this slide, 12 where instead of 1,200 square miles for a small 13 14 reactor, you would be facing a contamination area of 15 more like 63 square miles. 16 MEMBER BLEY: The bottom line is you're 17 scaling on power. MR. RECKLEY: Yes, in the paper, 18 19 proposed to take the source term factor and equate it to power level. Again, the whole thing is a rough --20 it generally holds, but it's not an exact correlation 21 if you try to back it out. 22 So some of the advantages, it's relatively 23 24 simply. Ιt does allow designs, attributes considered somewhat, primarily in the area of power. 25

Disadvantage listed there, will face some negative perceptions no matter what changes to siting criteria 2 3 we pursue. So going onto the recommended approach, 5

option three, again, the rules stay the same, so you maintain the exclusionary boundary and low population zone.

The guidance would be changed in Reg Guide 4.7 to call out that for plant designs that could show that the event sequence doses for plants that have event sequence doses that exceed one rem TEDE over a month beyond the site boundary, we would look at population density and we would look at it somewhat similar to what we do now, the population density of 500 persons per square mile, and we would look, as we just talked, over the radial distance equal twice the radius at which one rem was estimated.

MEMBER BLEY: Can I correct my earlier I went back and looked at 42 and 47, 4.7. They only do the averages over the rings. They don't do any sector thing in there, at least in the table I was looking at.

MR. RECKLEY: I'll look in mine actually. Is that what you look at, just the rings, or do you look at sectors, Rao or Michelle?

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1	MR. TAMMARA: My name is Rao Tammara. I
2	do the chapter two. Yeah, it is the rings.
3	MR. RECKLEY: Okay, I stand corrected.
4	I'm sorry.
5	MR. TAMMARA: The definition is you can go
6	to the total population divided by the area.
7	MEMBER BLEY: And that kind of says we're
8	averaging
9	MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
10	MEMBER BLEY: over all of these people
11	
12	MR. RECKLEY: Right.
13	MEMBER BLEY: too, so.
14	MEMBER PETTI: So, Bill, that last bullet
15	says "for event sequences greater than one rem." What
16	if the reactor has no event sequences greater than
17	one?
18	MR. RECKLEY: We'll get there in a second.
19	MEMBER PETTI: Okay, great.
20	MR. RECKLEY: Next slide. So you can look
21	at this option, and during the Subcommittee and on
22	this slide, I tried to boil it down to one slide, at
23	three cases.
24	One, you have event sequences with
25	significant doses approaching 25 rem offsite, in which
I	I and the second

case you'll have traditional exclusionary boundaries, low population zones, population center distances calculated per the rule.

In addition to that, whatever distance you calculate one rem over the month, you would look at 500 people per square mile out to twice that radius. So you have both the rule and the guidance affecting the total population and also the population center distance.

In the second, you have no event sequences with offsite doses approaching 25 rem, but you do have event sequences that are exceeding one rem over the month following an event. So with no doses of 25 rem, you have the low population zone collapse to the site boundary, but with event sequences that have doses over one rem, you're still going to look at population density and keep it less than 500 people per square mile out to twice the radius at which you calculate one rem.

Then in the third case under this option, you have no event sequences that exceed one rem at the site boundary, so the only thing that remains in play is the rule that says keep reactors away from densely populated centers of about 25,000 people.

So what we tried to show in the graph is

1	if you have a population center of 25,000, the reactor
2	would be outside that population center. If it's less
3	than 25,000, you could be within, and the reason we
4	were looking at it like this is going back to the
5	first problem statement.
6	We don't currently know of reactors who
7	are looking at remote siting, I mean remote areas,
8	isolated communities that would be serving a
9	population center of greater than 25,000, so this
10	would allow a reactor, if it could otherwise make the
11	safety case, to be within a small town in a remote
12	area.
13	MEMBER BLEY: You've dropped the
14	population density?
15	MR. RECKLEY: At that point, yes.
16	MEMBER BLEY: Because even though the
17	population center might be fewer than 25,000 people,
18	there could be a small area within it with really high
19	
20	MR. RECKLEY: That's right.
21	MEMBER BLEY: population density?
22	MR. RECKLEY: Right, but again, this is
23	limited to those reactors that could show no event
24	
	sequences where you exceed one rem

1	MR. RECKLEY: at the boundary.
2	MEMBER CORRADINI: So, can I so let's
3	go to NUREG 1537, non-power reactors. I can think of
4	some of the bigger ones of those that don't meet the
5	right-hand side of the lower one to the right, so am
6	I concerned?
7	In other words, the NIST reactor on the
8	Gaithersburg campus probably doesn't meet the bottom
9	one to the right unless I say that the campus itself
10	is a low population center. Is that what you said
11	over the phone? Did I
12	MR. RECKLEY: Yes, that you could look at
13	the campus again, it's a huge campus, and look at it
14	in the context of how far are you actually away from
15	a population, a dense population?
16	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Bill, what Mike brought
17	up, it was in my mind and I didn't work through this
18	in advance. Would this be consistent with the rule
19	for non-power reactors, research reactors and such?
20	In other words, would they collapse to the same
21	answer?
22	MEMBER BLEY: I'm not sure. I mean, we
23	did the NIST reactor
24	(Simultaneous speaking.)
25	MEMBER BLEY: We did the NIST reactor a

1	few years ago and they really had almost a nil source
2	term. I don't remember the details. I doubt that
3	MEMBER CORRADINI: But, except for the
4	Gaithersburg campus, they're in a population area that
5	would be greater than 25,000.
6	MEMBER BLEY: Yes.
7	MEMBER REMPE: But to meet it, Steve,
8	right
9	MR. LYNCH: Yeah.
10	MEMBER REMPE: pointed out the very
11	restrictive criteria, but I have another question I
12	want to ask after that, but go ahead and repeat what
13	you said at the meeting.
14	MR. LYNCH: Sure, yeah, I can. Yeah, this
15	is Steve Lynch. I'm currently the Acting Chief of the
16	Advanced Reactor Licensing Branch and I'm also working
17	with the Research and Test Reactors Licensing Branch.
18	As far as the siting of a NIST reactor,
19	yes, it is in a population center that may be greater
20	than 25,000, but one of the differences, at least
21	under its current licensing basis, is the more
22	restrictive dose at the site boundary.
23	I believe that NIST is licensed such that
24	the maximum dose at the site boundary is limited to
25	100 millirem, so I think that is one of the different

1 considerations with that facility to address consistency with the NPUF rule. 2 MEMBER CORRADINI: But if it were one rem 3 4 instead of 100, if it was a factor of 10 larger, would I really change anything? I understand what you're 5 saying, but it still doesn't change anything from a 6 health hazard standpoint. 7 MR. LYNCH: Could you clarify what you're 8 9 asking with the --10 MEMBER CORRADINI: What I'm saying is if the NIST reactor were to have done a calculation --11 I'm using them as a government example. I have other 12 examples that I could bring up. 13 But if it were, 14 instead of 0.1 rem, it was one rem at the boundary, it 15 still is not a health hazard, so it wouldn't require 16 evacuation, so --17 MR. LYNCH: Correct. MEMBER CORRADINI: -- it's equivalent. 18 19 It's an equivalent question. Correct, and I think that's 20 MR. LYNCH: where the NPUF rule comes in. So the 100 millirem was 21 a conservative number that, in the absence of accident 22 criteria 23 dose for non-power reactors in 24 regulations, facilities such as NIST had voluntarily used as their accident dose criteria. 25

1	With the NPUF rule, accident dose criteria
2	for research reactors will be set at one rem. And as
3	we were saying, if, at the site boundary, it's
4	demonstrated that, for the duration of an accident,
5	dose is at less than one rem, there would be no
6	offsite emergency planning needed.
7	MEMBER REMPE: So this ties into the
8	question I've been wanting to ask. During the
9	Subcommittee meeting, I believe the question was
10	raised on how do you do this calculation? Is it a
11	conservative calculation? Is it best estimate? And
12	I thought that some changes would be made to the draft
13	SECY to clarify what you wanted.
14	MR. RECKLEY: And again, that was what we
15	were trying to do with the change to the footnote, so
16	it you look at
17	MEMBER REMPE: But show me how that's
18	on page 21's footnote or which footnote? Maybe I
19	missed it.
20	MR. RECKLEY: Yes, basically on slide 21
21	that lays out two approaches as we had currently
22	identified.
23	MEMBER REMPE: Put the slide up there and
24	show me that it tells me to do conservative or best
25	estimate. I get the first part for 1353, but for a

different approach --

MR. RECKLEY: For 1353, you're going to be doing the design basis event or beyond design basis event best estimate calculations.

MEMBER REMPE: What about the applicant using a licensing approach different from that in 1353? How do I know that guy has to do a conservative calculation or a best estimate one?

MR. RECKLEY: For the other set that we can know how they do it, right, but there's a hypothetical that we don't know what they'll be proposing, so it's hard to address, but for the other ones that we know, which would be light water, small modular reactors, the option that they have is to use the existing guidance for light water reactors, which would be to use the source term out of NUREG 1465.

That's considered to be a conservative source term, but, so it's not taken, for example, like the advanced reactor approach in DG-1353, but it would be best estimate calculations, using best estimate calculations.

It would be the more traditional approach that you would find in the siting calculation in a current FSAR for a currently operating reactor. Those are the two that we know because we've seen them

before.

People can propose alternatives. A light water SMR could propose something similar to, but deviations from the guidance that's in 1465, and we've seen some of that where the guidance is used in some respects, but it's tweaked to reflect specific design details, specific release paths and filtering that might occur, that might not be in a traditional light water reactor containment.

In your case of the maximum hypothetical, they could propose that and we'd have to review it on its merits. I don't really have any specific guidance on how somebody would do a maximum hypothetical except for almost by definition, it's not best estimate because they're making up something that's intentionally conservative.

MEMBER BLEY: But your expected response to that question would have been the second insert you put up there, is that right?

MR. RECKLEY: Yes, well, only in that we didn't want to repeat a lot of the stuff from 1353 that describes how that's done and from that SECY paper. What we were adding, because that's where I thought the question was, was more what would a light water reactor, what would somebody that's not using

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1	1353 do?
2	And again, the easiest to describe is a
3	light water reactor approach, and then they always
4	have an option of proposing something on their own and
5	they would have to justify it on their own merits.
6	MEMBER REMPE: So I guess I was expecting
7	from the Subcommittee meeting that there would be
8	something about, that would say, "By the way, if you
9	have something that's not a light water reactor or not
10	the 1353 approach, we'd expect it to be darn
11	conservative," and I guess I don't see that here, but
12	maybe there's some other thing that gives them a clue.
13	MEMBER CORRADINI: What I'm hearing Bill
14	say is what's in blue is a conservative approach in
15	the light water world.
16	MR. RECKLEY: Right, they could propose
17	something.
18	MEMBER CORRADINI: And expecting an
19	equivalency in the non-light water world if something
20	comes up, and that's how they judge it.
21	MR. RECKLEY: Thank you, but it's going to
22	be a different source term than what's defined in
23	1465. You have different fuels, different

Cubbage again, that we're going to need to figure that

MS. CUBBAGE: And I might add, this is Amy

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1 out to do the other part of siting, to figure out do they meet the dose limits? Can they have a certain 2 3 And then this is just going to leverage that 4 same number. So the intent of this document wasn't to 5 define how every possible person is going to come up 6 7 with their source term, but given a certain source 8 term, how would we translate that into different 9 population density requirements? 10 know that's not satisfying to because it's kind of like, well, but separately, we 11 have activities ongoing to look at source term and 12 other matters, and I think it's pretty clear from the 13 14 LMT quidance how you would do it. It's clear from the 15 light water world how you would do it. If someone 16 wants to come up with a different approach, we'll just have to face that, and we'll need to figure that out 17 to give them a license regardless of this siting 18 19 issue. MEMBER BLEY: As you folks described, this 20 is a high level SECY. 21 MR. RECKLEY: 22 Yes. MEMBER BLEY: There's a lot of details for 23 24 implementation. MR. RECKLEY: That you'll see when we do 25

1 the Reg Guide. MEMBER BLEY: That's what I wanted to get 2 3 Your intent is to do a Reg Guide to support this 4 to cover --5 MR. RECKLEY: Yes. -- these details. 6 MEMBER BLEY: 7 MR. RECKLEY: This will be a change --8 MEMBER BLEY: Because it's either going to 9 work well or not depending on that guidance. MR. RECKLEY: Right, and so our plan and 10 what we call out in the paper is whatever option is 11 chosen, except for option one, which is status quo, it 12 would involve changing Regulatory Guide 4.7 to add 13 14 this as an alternative to the current approach of 500 15 persons per square mile out to 20 miles. 16 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 17 MR. RECKLEY: Moving on then to the last option, option four, I'll just briefly touch on it. 18 19 I don't believe there was a lot of support for this one either. This was to develop broader societal risk 20 21 measures. These are measures that would look at 22 potential doses to individuals and also population 23 24 doses. It would look at effects on economies, land

availability, displacement, decontamination costs,

1	broader societal costs, and this kind of approach has
2	been talked about for decades, and usually avoided for
3	some of the disadvantages there. It talks a lot of
4	time to develop.
5	It would be a significant change from the
6	current siting, kind of treated as an independent
7	element because both the design and the site would be
8	looked at together, and so depending on how you did
9	it, you could have a design that would be acceptable
10	for one site and not acceptable at another site as a
11	result of the societal measures.
12	MEMBER BLEY: As a you know, you
13	introduced this in the SECY as this is a really good
14	idea if you could implement it.
15	MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
16	MEMBER BLEY: The trouble is in
17	implementation.
18	MR. RECKLEY: Right.
19	MEMBER BLEY: We heard comments from
20	others that kind of focused on land contamination. We
21	had a meeting a couple of years ago on this issue of
22	societal risk, and especially because that was the big
23	thing that went
24	MR. RECKLEY: Right.
25	MEMBER BLEY: they had over in Japan.
	I and the second

1	We calculate, or we used to calculate land
2	contamination as part of the risk assessments. We
3	don't always report them, but we could.
4	You could have kind of a three prime
5	that's the way it is, but adds a land contamination
6	factor as a surrogate for possible societal risk
7	measures. I don't know how easy it would be to reach
8	agreement on what a criteria ought to be for that.
9	MEMBER KIRCHNER: I think, again, you'd
LO	have to first resolve the low dose issue, which has
L1	proven intractable for years and years despite
L2	evidence to the contrary.
L3	MR. RECKLEY: And we do use, when we do
L4	our regulatory analysis
15	MEMBER KIRCHNER: But with a criterion, a
16	cutoff somewhere.
L7	MEMBER BLEY: Right.
L8	MR. RECKLEY: And we point out
L9	MEMBER KIRCHNER: And that would
20	difficult.
21	MR. RECKLEY: We point out in the paper
22	that in terms of regulatory analyses that we do for,
23	like, rule changes, you can identify a delta, but it's
24	an existing situation, a plant modification that we
25	may require or not require.

1	You've got like a situation, then you can
2	assess, and we do consider these factors when we do
3	the regulatory analysis in the cost benefit
4	assessment. What gets difficult is when you don't
5	have a binary thing to compare.
6	Then as Walt was mentioning, you need to
7	come up with some other criteria and it's been very
8	elusive, and that is why we have not recommended this
9	option, although as Dr. Bley mentioned, if one could
10	do it, it would be the best measure of the actual
11	impact of a reactor on a particular community.
12	So it's just that we don't think it's
13	practical. So we recommend option three, and as John
14	mentioned, we would appreciate the insights of the
15	Committee on both the options and the recommendation.
16	MEMBER BLEY: Just as a matter of
17	discussion, a short one, I don't remember in the
18	environmental analysis that supports a license
19	application, they have at least an abbreviated form of
20	PRA. Do they do a land contamination calculation
21	there? Since nobody else knows either
22	MR. RECKLEY: We would
23	(Simultaneous speaking.)
24	MEMBER BLEY: we won't need to pursue
25	that one.

1	MR. RECKLEY: Okay, I don't know. I'll
2	look at Marty. Is it included in the SAMA/SAMDA
3	evaluations? It's not? Okay, so, no.
4	MEMBER BLEY: Thank you, and that was your
5	last slide.
6	MR. RECKLEY: Yes.
7	MEMBER BLEY: Anything from members of the
8	Committee? Mr. Chairman, back to you on time.
9	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Thank you, very
10	good. We have a very busy agenda this week, and so
11	I'm happy that people are staying on schedule. I
12	think we should continue with the second item, which
13	is the Turkey Point subsequent license renewal, and I
14	will turn the floor over to our Vice Chairman Matt
15	Sunseri.
16	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Thank you, Pete.
17	Maybe we'll just give it a second for the tables to
18	rearrange here.
19	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: That's fine.
20	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Okay. While you
21	all are getting your presentation up out, I'll go
22	ahead with some of the administrative stuff here.
23	All right. Thank you Mr. Chairman. This
24	is the the purpose of this part of the meeting
25	today is for Florida Power & Light Corporation, and

the NRC to brief the full Committee on subsequent
license renewal activities for the Turkey Point
Nuclear Generating Stations Three and Four.

A panel license review subcommittee
previously met on June 21, 2019 to discuss this

application. The subcommittee's objective was to focus on the safety aspects of this application and to formulate a proposed position and action for deliberation by the full Committee, which we will do

following the presentations today.

Due to separate and independent external relationships with structural integrity associates, Peter Riccardella and I are recusing ourselves from the deliberations on the topic of metal fatigue, class one components, environmentally assisted fatigue, and the leak before break analysis for Class One auxiliary piping as these topics relate to the Turkey Point subsequent license renewal application.

At this point I'd ask Meena Khanna of the Division of Materials and License Renewal if you have any remarks before we start?

MS. KHANNA: Okay, thank you. Thank you Chairman Riccardella, Mr. Sunseri and members of the ACRS. I am Meena Khanna, Acting Deputy Director of the Division of Materials License Renewal.

We sincerely appreciate the opportunity to today to present to the ACRS full committee, the results of the staff's safety review of the first application for subsequent license renewal, also known as Operation Beyond Sixty Years.

This application was submitted by Florida

This application was submitted by Florida

Power & Light Company for the Turkey Point Nuclear

Generating Station, Units Three and Four, located near

Homestead, Florida.

I'd like to note that we did have the opportunity to present the results of the staff's safety review of the Turkey Point SLRA to the ACRS subcommittee back on June 21.

Before I proceed any further, we would like to acknowledge the very challenging circumstances that the employees of Florida Power & Light and their families, as well as the residents of Florida and the Bahamas are experiencing as a result of Hurricane Dorian.

We understand that FPL is implementing its hurricane preparedness procedures to ensure the safety of their nuclear power plants, their personnel, and the public. As a result, some of the FPL members of the Turkey Point team are unable to attend this meeting in person today, but will be with us by phone.

We really appreciate those that have actually joined us under these circumstances. Our thoughts and prayers are with those that have been impacted by the storm.

By way of background, Turkey Point's Three and Four received approval for their initial renewed licenses from the NRC on June 6, 2002. The NRC review at that time was performed using guidance developed prior to the issuance of the Generic Aging Lessons Learned Report, or the GALL Report.

The NRC guidance for license renewal over the years has evolved through enhancements and improvements based on lessons learned from NRC license renewal reviews and from both domestic and international industry operating experience.

The GALL Report went through two revisions and additional interim staff guidance was issued following revision two. The guidance for subsequent license renewals contained in the GALL SLR Report built upon the previous guidance, and included additional focus and enhancements where necessary on aging management and time limited aging analysis for operation in the 60 to 80 year period.

In the staff's presentation today, you will hear about some of these specific SLR issues as

applied to the Turkey Point review.

The NRC Project Manager for Turkey Point subsequent license renewal application safety review is Ms. Lois James, here behind me. Mr. Billy Rogers, also a Senior PM on the Turkey Point project, will present an overview of the staff's safety review today.

Part of the management team that are here with me today include Mr. Eric Oesterle, Chief of the License Renewal Project Branch seated next to me. And in the audience are other DMLR and NRR technical branch chiefs as well as our staff.

In addition, we have several staff on the phone in case there are specific questions about the technical review. We also have on the phone Paula Cooper from Region II, who oversaw the facility inspections associated with the effectiveness of the Aging Management Programs implemented for initial license renewal, as well as other NRR staff who supported the review.

We look forward to a productive discussion today with the ACRS. And as always, look forward to addressing any questions that you may have.

At this time, I'd like to turn the presentation over to Mr. Bill Maher, FPL Senior

1 Licensing Director to introduce his team and commence 2 their presentation. Thank you. My name is Bill Maher, I'm 3 MR. MAHER: 4 Senior Licensing Director for Subsequent License 5 Renewal. Again, I'd like to echo the remarks of the NRC as far as being able to accommodate us, and the 6 7 flexibility of the Committee to actually have people 8 on the phone who are not able to make it as a result 9 of Hurricane Dorian. 10 It was an interesting flight up this There were some bumps, but we got along. 11 morning. And we actually made it. So, go to slide two. 12 So, what I'd like to do is to briefly 13 14 introduce, I already introduced myself. To my right 15 He's the Site Director for Turkey is Brian Stamp. 16 Point Three and Four. 17 And to my left I have Steve Hale from ENERCON who is our technical lead on one of the 18 19 contractors that we have working on the project, ENERCON. And Steve Franzone is on my staff, who is a 20 Licensing Manager associated with subsequent license 21 renewal. 22 I did want to at least preface this 23 24 particular presentation to show how we have satisfied the NRC requirements for subsequent license renewal. 25

1 the aging affects associated for subsequent license renewal are being effectively managed such 2 3 that the intended functions are being maintained. And like Brian will point out, how our 4 5 gains are being -- how we're being able to maintain those as we go through a period of subsequent, period 6 7 of observation. And I'll turn it over to Brian. MR. STAMP: Hi, good afternoon. Like Bill 8 9 stated, my name is Brian Stamp. I am the site -- like Bill said, I am Brian Stamp, Site Director at Turkey 10 Point. That means that I own the performance at 11 Turkey Point specifically, well as shared 12 as а oversight of the entire nuclear fleet. 13 14 Today on the slide we're looking at, I 15 want to talk briefly about our performance philosophy, 16 and specifically how it entails the sustainability. 17 The model that you're seeing is a model that our C&O put together to really describe what that 18 19 sustainability looks like. And before this, all of this comes from the philosophy that is governed by our 20 nuclear excellence model. 21 That nuclear excellence model has been 22 with us since 2008. And it has stayed the same for 23 24 all these years.

It has a list of core values as well as

core principals. The primary core value is around 1 deep respect for nuclear safety. 2 3 It also has a value of self improving 4 culture, learning organization, as well as a PDC. 5 the PDC model, prevention, detection, and correction which really describes how we want to spend 80 percent 6 7 of our time in that prevention and detection, and only 8 20 percent of our time in the actual correction. 9 That goes on down to a core principal that 10 really goes back to the sustainability and subsequent license renewal, which really is around the 11 effective long range planning of all the site 12 activities. 13 14 Now interestingly, the INPO organization 15 recently took our model with our C&O at the time, Mano Nazar, and created their own document called the INPO 16 17 19-3. And it's staying on the COB. While the words are a little different, 18 19 the output really is the same. It's really all about, how do we make sure that we retain the gains that 20 we've already got at the performance level we're at, 21 plus rigorously and aggressively build additional 22 23 margin? 24 You know, one of the big criteria that we use to make sure that we are doing both retaining and 25

building a margin, it comes out at 10 CFR 50, Appendix 1 2 B, the quality assurance program. 3 You know, in that program there's two or 4 three key activities. One being the design control. 5 You know, that design control really ensures that we make sure that the regulatory requirements as well as 6 7 our design basis requirements are rigorously reviewed. They are tested and monitored. 8 9 And then all the reviews and the testing 10 then get in turn put into our control documents. Whether that's a procedure or a document, that's used 11 in the field, like a drawing or a work order. 12 That's how that ensures that that design 13 14 is maintained. The regulatory basis 15 maintained. 16 other big part of that 17 corrective action program. That corrective action program, the implementation of that ensures that any 18 19 adverse conditions in quality are quickly identified, plus evaluated quickly, and/or the corrective actions 20 to prevent recurrence, put back into those 21 documents, again, the procedures that we use or the 22 design documents that we use to improve those. 23 24 The last part of that really is configuration control that comes out of the procedure 25

That configuration control is what we use to 1 make sure that the site is always in the 2 3 configuration as again, the design basis document as 4 well as the regulatory requirements say they should. 5 Now, all this goes back to, you know, this retaining the gains, the aggressively building the 6 7 margin. That is really built into our core business so that all of the, all of my direct reports have this 8 built into their daily work life, as well as all the 9 10 people below them. And then taking this back the 11 to subsequent license renewal, it really goes back to the 12 way that we are implementing the aging management 13 14 process and program to ensure that again, we have that 15 sustainability long term. With that, I'd like to turn it over to 16 17 Steve Franzone. 18 19 FRANZONE: Thank you Brian. My name is Steve Franzone. 20 afternoon. I am the Licensing Manager for the subsequent license renewal 21 project for Turkey Points Three and Four. 22 Slide four gives you an overview of the 23 24 location of Turkey Point Units Three and Four, which is at the location -- which is at the very southern 25

1 tip of the Florida mainland. The star in the center of the circle marks 2 the location of the site. It is located approximately 3 4 25 miles south of Miami. 5 The black dash circle represents the 50mile radius of the plant. 6 The closest cities are 7 Homestead and Florida City, which are approximately nine miles west of the site. 8 sandwiched between 9 The site is the 10 Everglades National Park and the Biscayne National The site has approximately 680 full time 11 Park. Go to slide five. employees. 12 This slide provides a view of the entire 13 14 site looking north. Biscayne Bay is on the right-hand 15 side of the photo. A little history about the site, site 16 17 construction started in 1965 by the Bechtel Power Corporation with two 400 megawatt coil plants, which 18 19 are Units One and Two. The construction permit for Turkey Point 20 was granted in 1967 for Units Three and Four. The 21 Nuclear Unit stated commercial operation in 1972 and 22 1973 respectively. 23 24 The cooling canal serves as our closed

circulating water system as it is -- and as the

1 plant's ultimate heat sink. The intake is on the right and the discharge is on the left. 2 3 see a better view in a few slides. 4 licensed thermal power is 2,644 5 megawatts thermal. At the top of the photo is Unit Five, which is an 1150 megawatt electric combined 6 7 cycle gas fired plant which went into commercial 8 operation in 2007. Unit One and Two have since -- have been 9 10 retired since this photo was taken. And the stacks of the units have been dismantled. 11 This slide presents the major events that 12 have occurred at the Turkey Point site. 13 You can see 14 the dates for the initial operating license. 15 In 1983 and 1984, the original steam 16 generators for both units were replaced. In fact, it 17 only the U-tube section which was actually replaced. 18 19 In 1991, the onsite electrical systems for both units were upgraded. And this included going 20 from two emergency diesel generators to four emergency 21 diesel generators, adding a spare battery, new digital 22 sequencers, redistribution and separation of loads. 23 24 And upgrading the RCS RCDs.

Other notable events in the plant history

_	Include surviving Hurricane Andrew in 1992, and the 5
2	percent uprate in 1995. We were not only a pre-GALL
3	plant, but we're also the first Westinghouse units to
4	receive a renewed license in 2002.
5	We replaced the reactor vessels in 2004
6	and '05. Finally, we received approval for an
7	extended power uprate, which included a 1.7 percent
8	measurement on certain recapture in 2012, and entered
9	into the period of extended operation for Unit Three,
LO	and of course Unit Four was 2013. At that point, the
L1	fuel enrichment was increased to 5 percent.
L2	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Excuse me, just a
L3	correction for the record. They replaced the reactor
L4	vessel heads, not the reactor vessels.
L5	MR. FRANZONE: Yes. Sorry. Good catch.
L6	MEMBER BLEY: Not that it's well, it
L7	might be relevant to this.
L8	MR. FRANZONE: It would be real hard.
L9	MEMBER BLEY: How did you do during
20	Andrew? Was there flooding there?
21	MR. FRANZONE: Do you want to take that
22	one?
23	MR. STAMP: No, actually there was no
24	flooding. I was actually onsite during Hurricane
25	Andrews. There was actually no flooding.
ļ	1

1	Andrew didn't have a lot of heavy rains
2	like the storm that just went through, Dorian.
3	MEMBER BLEY: Um-hum.
4	MR. STAMP: The I was in the control
5	room, and it was actually just like a simulator
6	scenario. The plant actually operated exactly like it
7	was designed.
8	Probably the best ever.
9	MEMBER BLEY: Interesting. And it didn't
10	I mean, it looks like it would have pumped water
11	into your intake area and flooded that.
12	But it didn't?
13	MR. STAMP: No. No, Andrew
14	MR. FRANZONE: I think it was closed.
15	MR. STAMP: I was just going to say,
16	Andrew was moving at a pretty good clip. If I
17	remember right, it was 10 or 12 miles an hour. So,
18	and it was a very small, condensed storm.
19	So, it actually passed over the site in
20	roughly three to four hours, the main part of that
21	storm.
22	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And did you lose
23	power?
24	MR. STAMP: Yeah. We lost all offsite
25	power. But again
I	

1	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: For how long?
2	MR. STAMP: Well, you're now you're
3	MR. HALE: About a week.
4	MR. STAMP: You're testing me.
5	MR. HALE: Yeah. We lost all the oh,
6	I'm sorry. Steve Hale, ENERCON. We lost all the
7	transmission lines going into the site.
8	They were restored within about a week.
9	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, did you operate
10	on the diesel generator for a week?
11	MR. HALE: Yes. Yes, we did.
12	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: That's what I know.
13	MR. HALE: It also highlighted some
14	challenges with regard to communications. Because a
15	lot of the communications were relying on cell towers
16	and things of this sort.
17	So, actually working with the NRC in the
18	region, we addressed some of the issues that fell out
19	of Hurricane Andrew with regards to communications.
20	You know, satellite phones, things like that, to
21	improve that response in case something like that
22	happened again.
23	MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Well, interesting
24	that you just added to do the generator the year
25	before that happened.

1	MR. HALE: Yes. Very convenient. Yes.
2	(Laughter)
3	MR. FRANZONE: Yes. And the flood level
4	for the site is 20 foot minimum protection. And it
5	goes higher. And the surges were not that high.
6	And in fact they were very much in line
7	with what they had predicted back in the '70s, so.
8	All right. Are we ready to go on? Okay.
9	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Do you
10	MR. FRANZONE: Yes, sir?
11	MEMBER KIRCHNER: What's the current
12	operating status of the plant today?
13	MR. FRANZONE: Both units are at 100
14	percent power.
15	MEMBER KIRCHNER: They're still at 100
16	percent, okay.
17	MR. FRANZONE: Yes. We did not shut down
18	for this storm.
19	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. Thank you.
20	MR. FRANZONE: As you can see, the main
21	features here are the closed loop cooling canals.
22	This feature is unique to Turkey Point, and is
23	approximately 168 miles of cooling canal.
24	It is basically a giant radiator that you
25	can actually see from space. It not only provides the

1 normal cooling flow, so acts as the ultimate heat sink. 2 The red solid line is the site boundary. 3 4 Where the bright yellow solid line is, the exclusion 5 area boundary. To maintain the efficiency of this giant 6 7 radiator, the measures that we take include selective 8 dredging and clearing of the vegetation from the 9 berms. This insert, the insert provides location 10 of the major structures. And we'll discuss it on the 11 next slide in more detail. 12 As you can see here, it's an expanded view 13 14 of the insert from slide eight. To orient you, north is at the top of the slide. And just out of view is 15 the Unit Five, the combined site for natural gas unit. 16 We'll start from the left and go to the 17 right and just point out the major structures. 18 Then 19 if you have more questions. So first you'll see the switch yard. Next 20 will be the discharge structure. And then the turbine 21 building. 22 And then we have the containments, which 23 24 are post-tension containments. Sandwiched in between the containments is the control building. 25

1 comm and control building for both Units. 2 And then next again, is the OX building. 3 Again, it's common for both Units. Then next we'll 4 have the intake structure. 5 And finally, on the very right-hand side of the photo, you can see the independent spent fuel 6 7 storage facility. Any questions? I'll just go on. 8 Okay. Slide nine. FPL's made -- has made and continues to 9 10 make significant investments in the plant. This slide provides a listing of recent major modifications and 11 upgrades for the plant. 12 The timing of the submittal is important, 13 14 because when you take into account the ten-year window for the pre-SPEO inspections, we are in the five-year 15 planning window for major projects. 16 submittal is 17 Also, the important in achieving our goals of retaining gain and building 18 19 margin for Turkey Point, as we discussed on slide 20 three. Turkey Point has been an integral part of 21 Florida community for over 45 22 south Operation at Turkey Point, there are estimated to 23 generate nearly 1.7 billion dollars of total economic 24

25

output annually.

1 The plant staff has a long history of safe 2 operation, and are valued members of the community, 3 having volunteered over six thousand hours in support 4 of charitable organizations. 5 The continued operation of Turkey Point into a subsequent period of extended operation will 6 7 allow the plant workers and FPL to continue supporting 8 the local community. 9 MEMBER BLEY: Before you go. 10 MR. FRANZONE: Yes? MEMBER BLEY: Can you tell me about two of 11 The obsolescence projects and what 12 those items? happened to your containment spray piping? How come 13 you had to replace that? 14 15 MR. FRANZONE: You want to start with the 16 containment spray piping? 17 MR. STAMP: Yeah. The containment spray piping, we actually have --18 19 There we go, Brian. MR. FRANZONE: 20 MR. STAMP: So, the containment spray piping, we've actually started to replace some of that 21 piping. We started the last outage on one Unit where 22 we replaced the piping on the penetration into the 23 24 area that was susceptible to the corrosion. We're preparing for the upcoming outage in 25

1	the spring, and to do the similar on the second Unit.
2	And then the following fall, we're going to come back
3	and replace all the piping on the first Unit that we
4	did.
5	MEMBER BLEY: You did have extensive
6	corrosion then?
7	MR. STAMP: No. We did we did evaluate
8	the internals of the piping. The corrosion, I
9	wouldn't say it was extensive, but it was corrosion
LO	there.
11	But, you know, preemptively we did replace
L2	the piping. There was a, you know, it did have the
L3	corrosion on it. And we're going to do it.
L4	We're assuming that the same condition
L5	belongs on the other Unit. So we're going to replace
L6	the same piping on that.
L7	MEMBER BLEY: Okay.
L8	MR. HALE: We just need to explain the
L9	piping is carbon steel. Okay.
20	MEMBER BLEY: Yes. Okay.
21	MR. HALE: And by design, I don't think it
22	was originally thought that it would be exposed to the
23	boric acid on a regular basis. But, so the corrosion
24	was really had to do with carbon steel and boric acid
25	really.

1 MR. FRANZONE: Okay. And that second, your first question you had was on the obsolescence 2 project? 3 4 MEMBER BLEY: Um-hum. 5 MR. FRANZONE: Right. So, as you know, Turkey Point, and a lot of nuclear plants get older, 6 7 and so some of the components that we originally had 8 become obsolete. 9 So, we've done is, is what there's 10 basically a structured program. And we went through a whole laundry list of items that we ended up 11 replacing. 12 I'll give you an example, would be the OX 13 14 transformers were replaced as part of that. Control 15 Board, enunciation system was replaced. We replaced 16 the instrument air system. 17 We've replaced the vital MCC buckets. Because they needed that. ERDADS was replaced. 18 19 me see, some of the other ones. A significant portion of the fire protection system. 20 We replaced ICW, which are intake cooling 21 and component cooling water, which 22 is service water strainers. And we recoded simple, 23 recoded some of the internals of the tanks. 24 And then the rod position indication 25

1	system was also upgraded. And so, it's just an
2	ongoing effort that we have to make because these
3	plants are just getting older, and the parts are not
4	available.
5	MEMBER REMPE: So, on this slide, I don't
6	see anything about the steam generator replacements.
7	And they were done thoroughly
8	MR. FRANZONE: In 1983 and 1984. So, this
9	slide mainly is after the renewed license was issued
10	in 2002.
11	MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
12	MR. FRANZONE: Just trying to capture the
13	major ones.
14	MEMBER REMPE: How are the tubes behaving
15	with the replacement steam generators?
16	MR. FRANZONE: Very good. Unit Three is
17	only 2 percent plugged. And Unit Four is three-
18	quarters of a percent plugged.
19	So they're doing really good. We've taken
20	the lessons we had in the early '70s to heart. And
21	after that when we did replace the generators, we had
22	very tight chemistry controls, so.
23	MR. HALE: In fact, for extended power
24	uprate, the Committee here asked some questions about
25	the steam generators and performance after the

1	extended power uprate.
2	And they performed very well. We haven't
3	seen any degradation associated specifically for the
4	increase in power level.
5	MEMBER REMPE: Okay. Thank you.
6	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: What about your
7	instrument and control system? Did you do any
8	upgrades with that?
9	MR. FRANZONE: Instrument air?
10	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: No. I&C? Just
11	have you gone with a digital system more recently?
12	MR. STAMP: Yeah. For a lot of things.
13	For example, on all the feedwater controls, they have
14	all been transferred over to digital.
15	All of the modules that were originally in
16	place for all of the control systems, you know, that
17	inputted into the direct protection system, safeguard
18	system, have all been upgraded to newer models.
19	In fact, we're getting ready to go to a
20	third round of that, and to further upgrade those
21	again.
22	MR. HALE: And for the extended power
23	uprate for the turbine controls, we actually moved the
24	DEH system and digital controls on the turbine.
25	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Thank you.

1 MR. FRANZONE: Okay. If we go to slide 2 And as I've mentioned before, both Units are at Average station capacity factor 3 100 percent power. 4 for the last two years was 91.9 percent. 5 And unless there's no other questions, we'll go to the next slide. 6 Okay. The project team 7 -- we're on slide 11. 8 The project team has many years of both 9 Turkey Point experience license and renewal The multi-disciplined team consists of 10 experience. ENERCON as the lead preparer for the schedule, as well 11 as Westinghouse, Framatone, and Structural Integrity 12 Associates in supporting roles. 13 14 Also, the project team was supported by the next era FPL fleet and site program owners as well 15 various subject matter experts such as Chuck 16 Ramdeen, who is civil, and he's here today. And Scott 17 Boggs who is on the phone with us. And Maribel 18 19 Valdez, who is also here today. 20 Every aging management program for SLR was actually assigned a program owner to support a portion 21 of the application preparation and the NRC review. 22 The project team generated over 130 reports, which 23 24 supported the application in its review.

These reports will provide a way to ensure

that knowledge will be passed onto the personnel who 1 need it in the future. 2 The technical 3 leads for our project 4 partner, ENERCON are both former FPL employees with 5 almost 80 years of combined experience with FPL. Both developed the original license renewal application for 6 7 Turkey Point. 8 We have established an SLR/LR liaison 9 position now in order that we will be successful in 10 the transition to the subsequent period of extended operation. 11 Mr. Bob Tomonto, who could not be here 12 with us today, but he has almost 30 years of licensing 13 14 and engineering experience at Turkey Point. 15 Specifically, his last two jobs have been as 16 Turkey Point licensing manager, and as one of the 17 onsite design engineering managers. I will now turn the presentation over to 18 19 Steve Hale who is one of the ENERCON technical leads I just talked about. Again, thanks for giving us the 20 opportunity to present today. 21 Thanks Steve. Good afternoon. 22 MR. HALE: Sorry about that. Thanks Steve. Good afternoon, my 23 24 name is Steve Hale. And I work for ENERCON as one of the technical leads for the Turkey Point subsequent 25

license renewal project.

Previous to that, I worked for Florida

Power & Light for over 46 years. And held many

positions, including the engineering director at the

site.

I was directly involved with original license development for Turkey Point and St. Lucie, as well as the extended power uprates for Point Beach, St. Lucie, and Turkey Point. In fact, I actually made all the ACRS presentations for all those major licensing actions.

Just as a point of interest for original licenses for Turkey Point, the ACRS subcommittee was actually conducted at the site of Turkey Point. And we walked the committee, primarily because it was the first Westinghouse unit to go through license renewal.

For the subsequent license renewal application, we followed the guidance of NEI 17-01, which was developed specifically for subsequent license renewal. To ensure a quality application, we also reviewed REIs, REI responses for the last eight applications that went through, and incorporated those lessons learned.

We also conducted peer reviews with other SLRA participants, and as well NEI, and other industry

1 folks. One of the other activities we implemented was to have pre-meetings with the NRC on -- discussing 2 3 various technical topics. And we also had a punchlist from the staff 4 5 on specific technical issues we needed to address in 6 the application. Which we did. 7 Our approach going in was to comply with 8 NUREGS 2191 and 2192 to the greatest extent practical. 9 And I think we've been able to accomplish that. with the NRC 10 We alone have worked diligently to hold to the 18-month review schedule. 11 And with issue of the SER, with no open items or 12 confirmatory items in July, we were able to beat the 13 14 target schedule of 18 months. 15 MEMBER BLEY: Steve? 16 MR. HALE: Yes? MEMBER BLEY: I'm not sure if I've heard 17 other people say they've reviewed other REIs from 18 19 other applications. Did that help you very much? MR. HALE: Yes, very much so. Especially 20 the later ones. You know, some of the older ones, but 21 since River Bend and Waterford were fresh, --22 MEMBER BLEY: Um-hum. 23 24 MR. HALE: To say the least. And actually River Bend, they were trying to test the overall 25

1 process for subsequent licensing, --2 MEMBER BLEY: Yeah. 3 MR. HALE: As well as part of the River 4 Bend review. We thought it was important to look at 5 those. So you think you avoided 6 MEMBER BLEY: 7 some --We did. 8 MR. HALE: Yes. 9 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 10 MR. HALE: Next slide, Steve. Having been involved with both original license renewal 11 excellent subsequent license renewal, I have 12 an perspective as to what was involved in the integrated 13 14 plan assessment for both efforts. 15 And since the ACRS has reviewed every 16 license renewal application that has proceeded us, and Turkey Point is the first application for subsequent 17 license renewal, we thought the best way to present 18 19 the methodology was talk about the differences between what we saw for license renewal and subsequent license 20 renewal. 21 For scoping and screening, 22 there were minimal changes, because the criteria really hasn't 23 You have to address modes that have been 24 changed.

implemented or current licensing basis changes which

may have occurred.

And we did have to update our evaluation for (a)(2), which is the scoping criteria of non-safety, which can affect safety. And that's primarily due to the fact that guidance documents have been developed since we submitted originally. And we had to address that specific guidance.

As we moved into aging management reviews and aging management programs, you start to see the differences between subsequent license renewal and original license renewal.

Turkey Point, as has been mentioned previously, was a pre-GALL plant. And as a result our aging management reviews were based on available industry tools at the time.

With the issue of GALL Rev. 00, Rev. 01, Rev. 02, and the interim staff guidance documents as well as GALL SLR, the number of aging affects we had to address has expanded somewhat.

The most significant differences we saw in going to subsequent license renewal, was in the number of aging management programs.

Turkey Point currently has 28 aging management programs for original license renewal. And moving into SLR, we're going to have 50 aging

management programs.

I'd like to give you some specifics on those AMPs. So of the 50 AMPs, 14 are new, and 36 are existing. And when I say existing, that's just lining up what we do at the site with the GALL requirements.

For the 14 new AMPs, it's not as if we're not doing things under those aging management programs, they're just not under the umbrella of license renewal or specifically identifying that this is credited for our renewed license.

As noted, there were 11 aging management programs with exceptions to GALL. All of which had been reviewed by the NRC and accepted. Most have to do with specific design features or characteristics at Turkey Point that require taking the exception.

For plant specific AMPs, the new AMP has to do with the polymer high voltage insulators associated with the recovery path for the switch yard to station blackout.

It's plant specific because there currently is no GALL program for polymer insulators, high voltage insulators.

The other plant specific AMP is an existing AMP, which has been approved by the NRC, having to do with management of fatigue of the

1 pressurizer surge lines. Next slide. 2 With regard to commitments, there are 57 3 mostly on an AMP by AMP basis. And include the 4 required pre-SPEO inspections. These will be maintained separately for 5 clarity and to avoid confusion with commitments for 6 7 current license renewal. There are three license conditions as 8 9 noted here. One of which is replace the carbon steel piping inside containment, which we've already talked 10 about. 11 There will be a new chapter of the USFAR 12 specifically dedicated to subsequent license renewal. 13 14 This chapter will include a complete list of the 15 subsequent license renewal commitments. 16 Both Next Era, FPL, and ENERCON have 17 extensive experience with license renewal commitment management and implementation. And this will ensure 18 19 all actions will be completed per the schedule. 20 Additionally as Steve mentioned, a new SLRA liaison position has been created at Turkey 21 Point, which will be filled by a senior level, highly 22 qualified and experienced person. 23 24 Finally, moving onto time limited aging The effort for SLR involved the same 25 analysis.

1	detailed search of current licensing basis documents.
2	When compared to original license renewal,
3	some of the dispositions have changed from disposition
4	I and double II to triple III. And that's because
5	there are now GALL AMPs for certain TLAs like fatigue
6	that didn't exist previously.
7	We also updated the environmentally
8	assisted fatigue calculations because of some changes
9	to the guidance documents like NUREG 6909.
10	We did identify two new TLAs for
11	subsequent license renewal. One is for adopting leak
12	before break for non-primary loop RCS piping. And the
13	other involved the update of the reactor coolant pump
14	integrity analysis supporting Code Case N-481.
15	And that's really all I had to say. Any
16	questions?
17	MEMBER BLEY: Yeah, the new Chapter 17 SAR
18	is is that required? Or you just decided it was a
19	good idea?
20	MR. HALE: You're required to have an FS
21	UFSAR updated as part of the regulations with your
22	submittal.
23	MEMBER BLEY: Right. But the idea of
24	having a separate chapter on this was
25	MR. HALE: We thought it would be best.

1	You know, certainly when you think about the future
2	and the overall transition between the two, you know,
3	you can we're already making those plans.
4	But initially we felt it best to maintain
5	a separate UFSAR chapter.
6	MEMBER BLEY: You have any hints of others
7	in the industry that are likely to do that?
8	MR. HALE: We did have some dialog with
9	Exelon and Dominion. And I think they're pretty much
10	following a similar path.
11	MEMBER BLEY: Similar to you. Okay.
12	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: And what's the
13	status of your reactor vessel with regard to radiation
14	embrittlement? Anything interesting?
15	MR. HALE: The reactor vessel, we redid
16	all of the calculations for subsequent license
17	renewal. TTS is at about 264. Something like that.
18	We did have some components that fell
19	below the 50 foot pounds for upper shelf energy. That
20	actually occurred for Turkey Point in the '90s.
21	And so we had to have a specific EMA
22	analysis
23	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Okay.
24	MR. HALE: Addressing upper shelf energy.
25	But we updated that evaluation for original license

1	renewal. We updated it for extended power uprate.
2	And now we've updated it again for, when
3	I say we, it was Framatome actually did the analysis
4	for the the EMA analysis.
5	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: And what is your
6	total end of life fluence at the end of the of
7	renewal fee? The section renewal fee again?
8	MR. HALE: I will have to pull that value
9	up. I can get it to you.
10	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Okay. I'd like
11	that.
12	MR. HALE: We it's in the application
13	in Chapter 4.2. But, we can give you that.
14	MR. BOGGS: This is Scott Boggs. I'd be
15	happy to answer that for you.
16	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Okay. Yeah.
17	MR. BOGGS: The end of life fluence on the
18	vessel is 1.08 D to the 20th. And on the limiting
19	weld it's 9.86 D to the 19th.
20	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Thank you.
21	MR. BOGGS: And that includes significant
22	margins that we've included for fuel loading.
23	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Okay. Thank you.
24	MR. HALE: And that was also based on 72
25	EFPY.

1	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Um-hum.
2	MR. HALE: Which basically assumes the
3	plant runs at like 100 percent capacity factor from
4	here until the end of the plant life.
5	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Okay.
6	MR. HALE: So, there's margins inherently
7	built into the EFPY that was assumed for the fluence
8	calculations.
9	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Thank you.
LO	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: So any other
L1	this isn't the end of your presentation is it?
L2	MR. MAHER: No. It's not. So, we're on
L3	slide 17. So, again, I would like to thank the
L4	Committee.
L5	Even though Turkey Point is a predone
L6	plant for the first round of license renewal, we've
L7	adopted the SLR goal with minimal exceptions as Steve
L8	was talking about.
L9	In keeping with the sustainability that
20	Brian talked about earlier, the goal now is to focus
21	on building and maintaining margin to be able to get
22	to 80 years worth of operation.
23	We have a dedicated individual with
24	engineering and license experience that has a direct
25	report to Brian. And he'll oversee the remediation

that's taking place now, and the transition through 1 the subsequent period of operation. 2 like thank 3 Again, Ι'd to the ACRS 4 Committee for the opportunity to present to you. we'd like to thank the NRC staff associated with our 5 work in getting -- working through the areas that 6 7 needed to be reviewed so that we could be in this 8 position right now. 9 And I'll turn it over to Brian for any 10 closing remarks. MR. STAMP: Yes. So on behalf of Florida 11 Power & Light and Turkey Point, I would like to thank 12 the NRC for the thorough review our subsequent license 13 14 renewal application. 15 The many hours spent in this review will 16 give the public confidence in the continued operation 17 at Turkey Point. The process was very thoughtful. 18 19 predictable. Which gave us, as well as the rest of the industry, a clear path forward. 20 And again, we appreciate and recognize the 21 importance of this first of a kind licensing effort, 22 both for the industry as well as for ourselves, as it 23 24 establishes, you know, lessons learned and processes going forward. 25

1	Thank you very much.
2	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Thank you.
3	MEMBER KIRCHNER: May I ask a question?
4	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Sure. I was just
5	going to ask if there were any other questions.
6	MEMBER KIRCHNER: So, often margin is used
7	for increasing power. Is there a plan to do another
8	EPU for this plant? For Three or Four?
9	MR. MAHER: No. Not currently there is
10	not.
11	MEMBER KIRCHNER: Okay. Thank you.
12	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Members, any other
13	questions? And Jose, are you still out there? Do you
14	have a question for the group?
15	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm here. The
16	weather is improving a lot. But I don't have any
17	questions.
18	(Laughter)
19	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Okay. Well,
20	that's good to hear. Thank you.
21	All right. Well, I'll just close this
22	part and say I think this team did a fair
23	representation of what we heard during the
24	subcommittee week.
25	There was a little slightly different
l	I

1	group of people I would characterize as closer to the
2	day to day operations, which really inspired us that
3	the programs are being implemented in the way that Mr.
4	Stamp indicated here.
5	So, we appreciate your enduring the
6	hardship to be here during the week. And I know it's
7	a big commitment to be here when your plant is, you
8	know, just being missed by a hurricane. So, we thank
9	you for that.
10	We will now transition to the staff for
11	the staff presentation. So, Meena, if you could get
12	your team ready.
13	(Off mic comments)
14	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Whenever you're
15	ready, yes.
16	MR. ROGERS: Good morning Chairman
17	Riccardella, Mr. Sunseri and Members of the ACRS. My
18	name is
19	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Hold on. Can you
20	is your mic on?
21	MR. ROBERTS: Thank you. I'll start
22	again. Good morning Chairman Riccardella, Mr. Sunseri
23	and Members of the ACRS.
24	My name is Bill Rogers. I'm one of the
25	Project Managers for the safety review of the Turkey

1 Point Nuclear Generating Units Numbers Three and Four, 2 or Turkey Point subsequent license renewal application 3 or SLR for short, or SLRA. 4 As previously stated, we are here today to 5 discuss the NRC staff's safety review of the Turkey Point SLRA that is documented in the safety evaluation 6 7 report or SER, which was issued on July 19, 2019. And joining me here at the table today is 8 9 Angela Wu, a Safety Project Manager in the Division of Materials and License Renewal, or DMLR, who will be 10 assisting with the slides. 11 And the Turkey Point Lead Safety Project 12 Manager, Lois James. And she's a Senior Project 13 14 Manager also in DMLR. We have some in the audience, and joining 15 16 by phone are additional members of the technical staff 17 who participated in the review of the SLRA and conducted the audits. Next slide please. 18 19 We will begin the presentation with a general overview of the time line of the staff's 20 review. 21 The presentation will provide information 22 on the closure of the open items related to the buried 23 24 and underground piping and tanks program, which was

previously discussed in the meeting with the plant

license renewal subcommittee.

We will also discuss the disposition of the aging management programs, AMPs, relative to the guidance contained in the generic aging lessons learned subsequent license renewal report, the GALL SLR report.

And the staff's review of the SLRA and audit activities. We will also highlight several of the technical areas reviewed, which were unique to the subsequent license renewal review relative to the initial license renewal reviews.

And discuss the site specific license condition. And then I will close with the staff's safety conclusion. Okay. Next slide.

Turkey Point Units Three and Four were granted the original licenses in 1972 and 1973, which were set to expire in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Prior to the license expirations, the licensee, Florida Power & Light Company, or FPL, submitted the initial license renewal application for 40 to 60 years on September 11, 2000.

The staff met with the ACRS subcommittee on plant license renewal and full committee on both the safety evaluation report or SER with open items, and the safety evaluation report and issued the Units

1 Three and Four initial renewed licenses in 2002 with expiration dates of 2032 and 2033 respectively. 2 3 In January 2018, FPL submitted an SLRA for 4 Turkey Point Units Three and Four. The staff 5 performed its review of the SLRA, issued the SER of 6 open items, and presented the results of our review to 7 the ACRS subcommittee on plant license renewal on June 8 21, 2019. 9 Subsequently, the staff closed the open 10 item associated with the buried piping and issued the SER on July 19, 2019. Next slide, please. 11 mentioned, the staff previously 12 As identified one open item in the SER of open items 13 14 associated with the buried and underground piping and 15 tanks, an aging management program. 16 Specifically, the staff determined the additional regarding 17 need for information why additional inspections beyond those recommended in the 18 19 GALL SLR report were not included in for buried steel piping during the ten-year period prior to 20 subsequent period of extended operation. 21 FPL provided additional information to 22 address the staff's concerns. Including one, FPL 23 24 committed to install cathodic protection at least nine years prior to the subsequent period of extended 25

1 operation consistent with the GALL SLR report. FPL clarified that there was only one pipe 2 3 break. And it was due to excavation activities and 4 not age related degradation. 5 And third, FPL committed to perform the additional inspections beyond those recommended in the 6 7 GALL SLR report during the ten years period prior to 8 the subsequent period of extended operation. 9 So prior to the ARCS subcommittee meeting 10 on plant life renewal, the meeting was on July 21, FPL provided additional information to address the staff's 11 12 concerns. And that was documented in the SER of open 13 items. 14 On the basis of this information, the 15 staff determined that its concerns related to the open 16 items were resolved. And as a result, the staff was 17 able to present the open items as a resolved issued during the ACRS subcommittee meeting. Okay. 18 Next 19 slide, please. The SLR described a total of 49 AMPs. 20 SLRA described a total of 49 AMPs. Twelve new and 37 21 22 existing. This slide identifies the Applicant's 23 24 original SLRA disposition. You have the AMPs in the left column. And the final disposition documented in 25

1 the SER in the right column. 2 All of the AMPs were evaluated by the staff for consistency of the GALL SLR report, and to 3 4 ensure compliance with 10 CFR, Part 54. 5 As a result of the staff's review, the Applicant made several changes to the AMPs. 6 7 plant specific AMP was addressed to -- was added to address polymer high voltage insulators. 8 9 As an example of another change the SME Section 11, Subsection IWL AMP was changed from 10 existing with enhancements existing with 11 to enhancements and exceptions. Next slide, please. 12 On this slide I'd just like to 13 14 discuss a little of the staff's review and audit 15 activities which occurred to support the staff's evaluation. 16 17 The Turkey Point review is the first safety review performed by the staff using the GALL 18 19 SRP, or excuse me, GALL SLR, I mean, SRP/SLR quidance issued in 2017. 20 In developing the process for reviewing 21 staff identified several 22 and SLRA, the process efficiencies as compared to the safety review of 23 24 initial license renewal applications.

For example, one efficiency dealt with the

1 conduct of audits. Instead of one large and lengthy 2 onsite audit, the staff conducts two standard audits, 3 an operator experience audit, and an in-office audit. 4 This allows us to streamline the number of 5 staff traveling to the site. The majority of the activities and breakout discussions 6 audit 7 conducted in our office through the use of portals and telecommunications. 8 Also, onsite activities are performed on 9 an as needed basis. The necessity for an onsite audit 10 might be identified in the following manner: 11 During the performance of the operating 12 experience audit and the in-office audit, when it's 13 14 determined that onsite observations of material 15 conditions related to aging or -- excuse me, related to aging, or component locations and configurations 16 are required to complete the staff's review. 17 Or, when a complex technical issue is 18 identified such that communications and information 19 gathering would be more efficiently performed by an 20 onsite audit. 21 Turkey Point, during the two-week 22 experiencing audit, the staff performed an independent 23 24 review of plant specific operating experience

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degradation.

And it was documented in the Applicant's corrective action program database. And to provide insight into AMP effectiveness.

During the four-week in-office audit, the audit team focused on two areas, the scope and the screen review, and the review of AMPs, aging management review items or AMRs, and time limited aging analysis, or TLAAs and those reviews.

Based on the operating experience audit and the in-office audit, the staff determined that it was necessary to perform an onsite audit and also a separate complex and technical issue audit.

The onsite audit reviewed documentation of aging management programs and directly observed material conditions of various structures and equipment.

The onsite complex technical issue audit reviewed appli -- the Applicant's proposed methods to manage the effects of aging of concrete and steel structural supports to irradiation, as well as the analysis results. The issue will -- this issue will be discussed further with the next slide.

Another efficiency that the staff implemented as part of its review of the SLRAs was to

no longer require the performance of inspection procedure IP 71002, the license renewal inspection. This inspection primarily focused on the adequacy of pre-implementation activities for AMPs.

However, for subsequent license renewal, the majority of aging management programs have already been implemented and in effect since the beginning of the 40 to 60 year period of extended operation. And therefore, are no longer in a pre-implementation phase.

Additionally, the 71002 include a scoping and screening evaluation that focused on the Applicant's activities relative to initially identifying non-safety related SOCs with a potential to affect safety-related SOCs, for inclusion of these non-safety related SOCs within scope.

For SLR required observations of non-safety related components with a potential to affect safety-related components, are performed by the technical review staff as part of the SLRA review, or during an onsite audit.

For Turkey Point, the staff's review was also informed by the results of the Region II initial license renewal inspection, IP 71003, phase four, which coincided with the SLRA review time line.

1	It should be noted that the phase four
2	inspection is related to the issuance of the initial
3	renewed license. And is independent of the SLRA
4	review.
5	MEMBER BLEY: Bill, can I interrupt you a
6	second?
7	MR. ROGERS: Yes, sure.
8	MEMBER BLEY: I was not at the
9	Subcommittee meeting and haven't discussed with you.
LO	The on first license renewal, many of us always
l1	found those inspection reports extremely informative.
L2	And, I haven't thought about this before
L3	right now. Your argument why you didn't need them
L4	now, you know, makes sense on the one hand. On the
L5	other hand, things would show up in those reports that
L6	you didn't really see any other way.
L7	I assume there are continuing inspections
L8	and on the AMPs and you had access to those reports,
L9	is that right?
20	MR. ROGERS: Yes, that's correct. And, I
21	was going to discuss this, I'll just go off the script
22	here for a second and just explain what occurred
23	during our review process.
24	So, as you mentioned, the next inspection
25	procedures, IP71-003, that has one to four phases.

1 And, the first two are post-licensing prior to PEO, to 2 initial PEO. And, the fourth one would occur during 3 the period of extended operation. 4 So, the Turkey Point IP71-003 Phase 4 5 coincided with our review. It was during the time line. 6 7 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 8 ROGERS: So, the -- actually, the 9 inspector that performed the -- led the inspection, Paula Cooper, Region II is on the telephone today. 10 But what we found is there are ongoing sets of 11 inspections that, for a period of time overlap the 12 initial review and the subsequent renewal. 13 14 So, while we found while the Phase 4 15 inspection is not -- does not have like a regulatory tie to this licensing action, the information's still 16 very useful to us. And, we had discussions during 17 both our audit of our onsite audit that we were 18 19 reviewing plant conditions, which are open issues figurations. We discussed that with the Regional 20 Inspector, Paula Cooper, during that time. 21 22 And, there has been some, you know, there's been back and forth on that. 23 24 I will say that when our auditors were

well, actually, both.

onsite,

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were

When

they

1 reviewing operating experience from the plant database, and when they were onsite, we had similar 2 3 observations. Now, the actions taken by the two parties 4 5 are somewhat different. Paula issued an inspection procedure that had some findings associated with it. 6 7 MEMBER BLEY: Okay. MR. ROGERS: We're in a licensing action, 8 9 and what we did is we used that information to 10 determine whether the aging management programs need to be augmented or enhanced in some fashion. 11 So, we both reacted to the same set of 12 information that was shared back and forth. 13 14 Relative to the firs points you made about 15 the 71-002 inspection --16 MEMBER BLEY: Yes? 17 MR. ROGERS: -- in pre-implementation, that inspection is more of a paper review for when you 18 19 review the AMPs. They're not implemented; there's not as much material to review. 20 So, for example, for this review, the new 21 Headquarters 22 reviewed by staff, programs essentially, it's the same manner that the inspectors 23 24 would have done it during the pre-implementation review. 25

1 The one difference that I think is also 2 notable, is when the inspectors were doing the (a) (2) 3 review, that (a)(2) portion of that 71-002 inspection 4 back in the first renewal, so there were three bodies 5 that looked at that. The inspectors would do an inspection. We had one division in NRR that would do 6 7 a review of that. And then, we had the License 8 Renewal Division look at it. So, all three parties 9 looked at it. And, as the Applicant indicated, there's 10 not been an extensive change in the results or 11 approach to then identify items in scope for non-12 safety effective safety. 13 14 However, I will note that when we did our onsite audit, one of the things that was looked at 15 during the onsite audit was (a)(2) related questions. 16 And, they were done by the Headquarters staff at that 17 time. So, we did take someone onsite to look at that. 18 19 MEMBER BLEY: Matt, did the Subcommittee have an opportunity to review with the Inspector any 20 of the things? The only reason I'm bringing it up is, 21 if not, we might want to go -- push on that for the 22 23 next one. 24 VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Yes, no, Paula was 25 here --

	30
1	MEMBER BLEY: Oh, okay.
2	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: in person and
3	
4	MEMBER BLEY: Very good.
5	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: made a
6	presentation.
7	MEMBER BLEY: I don't want to get her to
8	repeat what she said to the Subcommittee. I just
9	wanted to make sure we were involved in that. That's
10	great. Thank you.
11	And, thank you for that.
12	MR. ROGERS: Certainly.
13	MEMBER BLEY: Wonderful explanation.
14	MR. ROGERS: I will note, she's on the
15	telephone right now if you'd like to follow up with
16	any additional questions. She's on standby for that
17	purpose.
18	MEMBER BLEY: I haven't been through that
19	in the detail that would make that make sense to me
20	right now, so thank you.
21	MR. ROGERS: Okay, fine.
22	MEMBER BLEY: And, thanks to Paula.
23	MR. OESTERLE: So, this is Eric Oesterle.
24	I was just going to add that one of the
25	things that the staff committed to the ACRS was that

1	for the Subcommittee meetings and the Full Committee
2	meetings, that we would always bring a site
3	representative or a Regional Inspector to the meeting
4	to share their observations on the inspections they've
5	done for license renewal including observations on
6	material conditions of the plant.
7	And so, like Mr. Sunseri identified Paula
8	who did the inspection down at Turkey Point, she was
9	at the Subcommittee meeting and is available today.
10	And so, we will continue to do that for future ACRS
11	meetings on SLR.
12	MEMBER BLEY: Thanks, Eric. I think
13	that's really important.
14	MR. ROGERS: Sure, and thank you. Next
15	slide, please?
16	So, this slide just addresses two examples
17	of plant specific issues unique to subsequent license
18	renewal.
19	The staff performed a first of a kind
20	review of irradiated structural concrete and steel
21	located in containment. In this case, it was the
22	reactor pressure vessel support system.
23	The issue of impacts of high fluence
24	levels was identified as an area of interest and the
25	Commission staff's requirement memo on the performance

of subsequent license renewal reviews.

Currently, there is no generic resolution

for addressing high fluence level impacts on

structural systems and components.

The staff quidance developed for indicates subsequent license renewal all SLR applicants should perform a plant-specific review of fluence levels within containment, identify any potential impacts on structural components, and aging management program activities necessary.

In this case, the Applicant's evaluation of the impact of high fluence levels on the concrete portion of the RPV structural support system conclude that the effects of radiation would not impact the ability of the support system to perform its intended function.

In addition, the concrete components would continue to be periodically inspected during the performance of the structure's monitoring program.

The Applicant's evaluation of the steel portions of the RPV structural support system determined that the enhancements to the ASME Section 11 in service inspection of nuclear power plant components Subsection IWF AMP would be required.

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The Applicant enhanced the Section 11 IWF

AMP to require the inspection of all of the accessible surfaces of all six reactor vessel supports of each unit on a frequency of once every five years.

The Applicant had determined that these inspections would demonstrate to the effects of aging and the steel supports will be adequately managed so that the intended functions will be maintained during the subsequent period of extended operation.

The staff audited the Applicant's analyses and evaluations over a period of several weeks both at Turkey Point site and the additional facilities. The staff's review was a multi disciplined effort that included a team with expertise in fluence, materials, and structures.

The staff concluded with reasonable assurance that the Applicant had identified the potential aging effects and developed aging management programs that monitor the components conditions to identify the effects of aging prior to the loss of intended function.

Next, I'll discuss the staff's review of the newly identified material component combination, the polymer high voltage insulators, and as previously mentioned, this was not addressed in the GAL SLR

1 report and the material component combination had been first identified during the River Bend initial license 2 renewal application reviewed in 2018. 3 4 MEMBER BLEY: Are you planning that this 5 will make it into the GAL report in the next revision or how do we track this? 6 7 MR. ROGERS: So, what we're -- yes, what 8 we're doing at the moment in the part of our process 9 is we gather this type of information in the package internally to the division in addition with 10 lessons learned. And, then, there is an ongoing 11 discussion of whether or not revisions are necessary. 12 And, they either will take the form of Interim Staff 13 14 Guidance or revisions to the document. 15 I didn't ask the MEMBER BLEY: Okay. 16 Applicant the same question but I'll just ask you. 17 How did you and the Applicant, together, come up with what the right process is for inspecting these or 18 19 foreseeing them in the future? MR. ROGERS: Sure. 20 The -- well, Applicant determined what the process was. They took 21 their operating experience, they did an analysis and 22 evaluated these polymers. And, let me go back to my 23 24 notes for one moment.

They performed evaluation of the polymer

1	high voltage insulators and the evaluation considered
2	a loss of material, reduced insulation resistance to
3	the many mechanisms including wear, surface buildup of
4	contamination, and polymer degradation. Those were
5	the three primary things.
6	They put that into an aging management
7	program, had an evaluation of how they would address
8	these aging mechanisms. At that point, the staff
9	evaluates that and concluded that it met the
LO	requirements of managing the effects of aging.
L1	MEMBER BLEY: Okay, thanks. And, is there
L2	Interim Staff Guidance now on this for the next time
L3	it comes up?
L4	MR. ROGERS: Not at this point. I might
L5	ask Eric to address that thought.
L6	MR. OESTERLE: Thanks, Bill. This is Eric
L7	Oesterle.
L8	So, back in March we did have a we
L9	conducted a public meeting on SLR lessons learned
20	based on where we were with the NRC staff's review of
21	the three SLR application at that time.
22	And, one of the major focuses of that
23	meeting was looking at technical issues that were
24	identified as a result of these reviews that maybe
25	ripe for development of new guidance.

1	And so, those both remain on the table.
2	We committed to periodic engagements with industry on
3	these technical issues and others that come up. But
4	we haven't determined yet what's the right format, if
5	it's going to be an ISG on one or more issues combined
6	or are we going to do a revision to the GAL SLR report
7	and the SRP SLR documents wholesale.
8	But there is a commitment to have these
9	ongoing discussions on lessons learned and technical
10	issues that would rise to that level.
11	MEMBER BLEY: I'm not personally familiar
12	with these insulators. Is there enough experience
13	with them so far that we really have a good idea of
14	what kind of problems they might incur with aging?
15	And, that the proposed AMP, well, the accepted AMP is
16	the right thing to do?
17	MR. HALE: Hi, this is Steve Hale.
18	In development of the aging management
19	program of the polymers, we did have some historical
20	information regarding how these have performed.
21	Although they're relatively new.
22	We spent quite a bit of time with our
23	information and distribution department which is the
24	ones that are primarily involved with this.

The true benefit of the polymer insulators

1	is they're very resistant to, you know, collecting
2	salt spray and things like that.
3	MEMBER BLEY: That was a good thing.
4	MR. HALE: Yes, yes, exactly. So, you
5	know, in our discussions with D&B, you know, they were
6	able to give us the feedback on the types of aging
7	management we needed to perform on those insulators.
8	But they do find that they perform much better from
9	the, you know, collection of debris and things of that
10	sort.
11	MEMBER BLEY: thank you.
12	MR. HALE: Yes.
13	MR. ROGERS: There is one site specific
14	safety license condition that addresses FPL's one time
15	inspection AMP. The staff determined that the one
16	time inspection AMP did not address carbon steel
17	containment spray system piping as would be expected.
18	The Applicant indicated it plans to
19	replace the carbon steel piping in the containment
20	spray system inside containment with stainless steel
21	piping.
22	In addition, the Applicant had already
23	included this pipe replacement in site approved plant
24	improvement plan and has begun replacement.
25	MEMBER BLEY: And, again, I didn't ask

1 them, but how did they get boric acid in there? Did they actually start the spray accidently some time or 2 3 4 MR. OESTERLE: Leaky valves. 5 MEMBER BLEY: They -- okay. MR. ROGERS: So, rather than requiring the 6 7 Applicant to address the material environment and 8 aging effect, it wouldn't remain in the subsequent 9 period of extended operations. 10 The staff developed this license condition to ensure that the pipe would be replaced prior to 11 SPEL. 12 In conclusion, the staff finds that the 13 14 requirements of 10 CFR 54.29(a) have been met for the 15 subsequent license renewal of Turkey Point Units 3 and 16 that there is reasonable assurance of 17 operation of Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 during the subsequent period of extended operation. 18 19 That ends our presentation and we're available for additional questions. 20 VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Well, once, again, 21 I think I would add that you did a good job of 22 representing what went on the Subcommittee meeting. 23 24 I know it's hard to replicate, you know, a five hour

meeting in a short period of time like this. But we

1	do appreciate the high level review.			
2	I do want to offer the opportunity for			
3	your Region II representative to provide any remarks			
4	if she cares to. I think she was very impressive			
5	during the Subcommittee meetings, so I'd just offer			
6	that comment if Paula's out there.			
7	MS. JAMES: Paula? Paula? Paula Cooper?			
8	MEMBER REMPE: Is the line open so she can			
9				
LO	MS. JAMES: We have a separate line.			
11	MEMBER BLEY: It still might not be open.			
L2	He's checking on it now.			
L3	MS. JAMES: This is Lois James. I'm I			
L4	will go give her a quick call.			
L5	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Well, that's okay.			
L6	It was just a courtesy.			
L7	MS. JAMES: I'll see which line she's on.			
L8	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Yes, if there was			
L9	something, it's not I think we have all our			
20	questions answered.			
21	MS. JAMES: Okay.			
22	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: All right. So, at			
23	that point, we are done. Are there any other			
24	questions from the members?			
25	MEMBER BROWN: I have one. I had			

1 forgotten something on the buried piping. I'll look back at the old slides from the Subcommittee meeting. 2 3 In this one, your slide four identified 4 the second item was there had been breaks in the 5 piping that was a result, there was only, and that was due to an evacuation construction excavation activity. 6 7 But then, you noted several leaks, leaks 8 I take are not breaks, I presume there's a difference. 9 I mean, I think there's a difference. Okay. MS. JAMES: Yes, sir. This is Lois James. 10 MEMBER **BROWN:** And in the 11 then, 12 Subcommittee meeting, you indicated that there was a set of inspections, of the methodic protection systems 13 14 be installed within nine years prior to the additional twenty-year extended operation. 15 And, but then, you were going to monitor 16 17 the -- with inspections during that ten-year period prior to the end period also. 18 19 But then, you had two caveats in there. If the CP system looks like it's effective you do one 20 thing, if it's not, you do something else. That -- I 21 don't -- that was in the Subcommittee you. 22 You didn't bring that out so there's really a kind of a two sets 23 24 of operations that you're going to be doing inspection

wise, that's the way I read the Subcommittee.

25

1	I presume that's still in place? That			
2	didn't disappear between the Subcommittee and Full			
3	Committee meeting?			
4	MS. JAMES: This is Lois James.			
5				
	No, sir, that did not disappear. We were			
6	trying to give a high level overview of it, not get			
7	into that level of detail. But we do have Brian Allik			
8	on the phone.			
9	MEMBER BROWN: I just wanted to make sure			
10	there			
11	MS. JAMES: Yes.			
12	MEMBER BROWN: no that we didn't			
13	lose some			
14	MS. JAMES: That has not changed.			
15	MEMBER BROWN: consistency. That's all			
16	I was			
17	MS. JAMES: That has not changed.			
18	MEMBER BROWN: trying to make sure			
19	something hadn't changed.			
20	MS. JAMES: No, sir.			
21	MEMBER BROWN: Okay, that's all I had.			
22	Thank you.			
23	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Was there a			
24	question over here?			
25	MEMBER BROWN: No, nothing.			

1	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Anybody else?		
2	Jose, you have any comments you want to		
3	add or questions you want to ask?		
4	MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Nothing here.		
5	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: All right. So,		
6	now we will open the phone line for any public		
7	comments. And, while we're getting the phone lines		
8	open, we'll turn to the audience here. Is there		
9	anybody in the audience who would like to make a		
10	public comment, come to the microphone, state your		
11	name, and provide your comment.		
12	(NO RESPONSE)		
13	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Okay. So, there		
14	is no comments from the room. I'll turn to the phone		
15	line. If there's any members of the public listening		
16	in that would like to make a comment, now is the		
17	opportunity. State your name and provide your		
18	comment, please.		
19	MS. COOPER: This is Paula Cooper at		
20	Region II. Can anybody hear me?		
21	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Yes, Paula, we can		
22	hear you now.		
23	MS. COOPER: Awesome, because the staff		
24	line was busy and I couldn't get on, so I'm on the		
25	public line.		

1	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Oh, okay, all
2	right.
3	MS. COOPER: However, I don't have any
4	comments to add other than if you have any questions
5	for me, I am here. But I will say that Turkey Point
6	staff, and I don't want to make it seem like I am pro-
7	licensee, but they were very receptive to every
8	comment and observation that we gave them on the
9	inspection. And, I'm pretty confident that they're
LO	going to implement them appropriately.
L1	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: All right, well,
L2	thank you for that comment.
L3	Are there any other members of the public
L4	that would like to make a comment?
L5	(NO RESPONSE)
L6	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: All right. So, we
L7	know the line is open because Paula used it. So, if
L8	there's no other comments, we'll close the public
L9	line. And, Mr. Chairman, we turn the floor back to
20	you.
21	CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Okay.
22	VICE CHAIRMAN SUNSERI: Well, let me
23	I'm sorry, just one other point.
24	We do have a draft letter report prepared
25	with our recommendations from the Subcommittee that we
ļ	I and the second

1	will review in deliberation at your choice. Thank
2	you. CHAIRMAN RICCARDELLA: Yes, I think we'll
3	we have a lot to cover. And so, we'll take about
4	a 15 minute break, reconvene at 3:30 by that clock.
5	And, we have, by my count, five letters. There's one
6	I'd like to cover fairly rapidly. It's a revision to
7	a letter that we approved last meeting on a NuScale
8	report, on a NuScale topical report that I had some
9	we had some comments while we were at NuScale and we
10	concluded that those were substantive, not editorial.
11	And so, we're going to reconsider that.
12	And then, we have the two letters that
13	were from the topics that were today. And, I'd like
14	to at least go through at least have a read through
15	of both of those before we conclude today.
16	So, with that, we will adjourn and I guess
17	for the day or recess.
18	(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went
19	off the record at 3:17 p.m.)
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	



Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 Subsequent License Renewal

ACRS Full Committee Meeting September 04, 2019



Agenda

- Introductions (Bill Maher FPL Senior Licensing Director)
- Performance Philosophy and Sustainability (Brian Stamp – FPL Turkey Point Site Director)
- Turkey Point Site Information (Steve Franzone FPL Licensing Manager)
- Subsequent License Renewal (SLR) Project (Steve Hale ENERCON Technical Lead)
- Closing Remarks (Bill Maher FPL Senior Licensing Director)



Performance Philosophy and Sustainability

KEY ELEMENTS:

Retaining Gains (Sustaining Excellent Performance)

Aggressively Building Margin

ATTRIBUTES:

Active Leadership*


Highest Standards

Self-Improving Culture (Self-Aware/Self-Correcting)

Learning Organization

- *
 - 1. Model, teach, encourage proactive behaviors to perform at excellence level and desire to continuously improve
 - 2. Protecting core business and managing off-normal situations
 - 3. Exhibit excellent technical fundamentals
 - 4. Understand and manage cost drivers












Plant History


- Initial operating licenses issued
 - -- Unit 3 July 19, 1972

Unit 4 – April 10, 1973

- 1983-1984, replaced original steam generators
- 1991, upgraded on-site electrical system going from two emergency diesel generators (EDGs) to four EDGs
- 1992, Hurricane Andrew
- 1995, 5% power uprate, 2200 MWt to 2300 MWt
- June 6, 2002, received renewed operating licenses (first Westinghouse units)
- 2004-2005, replaced reactor vessel heads
- 2010, implemented alternate source term (AST) methodology
- 2012, 2013 implemented ~ 15% extended power uprate (EPU + MUR) 2300 MWt to 2644 MWt
- 2012, 2013, Unit 3 and 4 entered the period of extended operation (PEO)









Significant Plant Modifications Since Initial License Renewal

- Replaced reactor vessel heads
- Replaced main and auxiliary transformers
- Cooling canals rehabilitation
- Replaced cask crane structure and crane
- Obsolescence Projects
- Extended Power Uprate (EPU) related modifications
- In progress
 - -- Low pressure turbine rotor replacements
 - -- U3 & U4 Containment Spray piping replacement
 - -- Modifications and improvements to structures



Current Plant Status

- Plant Status
- 18 month fuel cycle
- Reactor oversight process (ROP) action matrix Column 1
- Last refueling outage
 - -- Unit 3, Fall 2018
 - -- Unit 4, Spring 2019
- Next refueling outage
 - -- Unit 3, Spring 2020
 - -- Unit 4, Fall 2020



Multi-year effort starting in 2015

- Completed Feasibility study in early 2016
- Application submitted and accepted in early 2018

FPL/ENERCON Team

- Multi-discipline team with significant nuclear experience, both on site and corporate
- Extensive license renewal experience, both licensing and implementation, including original License Renewal (LR) effort for Turkey Point (PTN)
- Extensive PTN specific engineering and licensing experience
- SLRA Liaison position staffed at site by senior, experienced person



Regulatory and Industry Guidance

- Used NEI 17-01 guidance
- Incorporated lessons learned from previous LRAs
- Conducted industry peer reviews
- Followed NUREG-2191 (GALL-SLR) and NUREG-2192 (SRP-SLR) to the greatest extent possible
- 18 month NRC review schedule (from April 2018)

Current Status

Final SER issued July 22nd, 2019, no open or confirmatory items



Integrated Plant Assessment – Overall approach similar to that of original LR

- Differences between LR and SLR
 - Scoping and screening
 - -- Minimal differences
 - -- Some updates required to address 10 CFR 54.4(a)(2)
 - Aging management reviews
 - -- PTN initial LR pre-GALL, additional aging effects required disposition based on NUREG-2191 (GALL-SLR)
 - Aging management programs (AMPs)
 - -- Significant differences
 - -- PTN initial LR pre-GALL, 28 AMPs
 - -- PTN SLR, 50 AMPs



50 AMPs

- 14 new AMPs
 - -- 12 consistent without exception
 - -- 1 consistent with enhancement
 - -- 1 plant-specific
- 36 existing AMPs (35 based on GALL)
 - -- 1 consistent with exception
 - -- 24 consistent with enhancements
 - -- 10 consistent with exceptions and enhancements
 - -- 1 plant-specific



Commitments

- 57 total
- Will be maintained separate from commitments for current LR
- 3 license conditions in SER:
 - -- Incorporate supplement into the UFSAR
 - Implement programs and complete activities described in the supplement prior to the subsequent period of extended operation (SPEO)
 - -- Replace containment spray piping inside containment

UFSAR

- New Chapter 17, maintained separate from current LR
- SLR commitments included in table in Chapter 17

Project Team has extensive experience with LR commitment management and implementation



Time-Limited Aging Analyses (TLAAs)

- Based on GALL AMPs for TLAAs, some TLAA dispositions shifted from (i) or (ii) to (iii)
- Updates required to environmentally assisted fatigue calculations due to changes in guidance documents
- Two new TLAAs for SLR
 - -- Leak-Before-Break analysis for non-primary loop reactor coolant piping
 - Pressurizer surge, residual heat removal and accumulator lines
 - -- Reactor coolant pump integrity analysis used to address Code Case N-481



Closing Remarks

- Manage aging effects to ensure intended functions are maintained
- Evaluated TLAAs with acceptable results
- Satisfied requirements for subsequent license renewal
- Retain gains and build margin for the future





Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Full Committee Meeting

Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 & 4
Subsequent License Renewal
Safety Evaluation Report (SER)

September 4, 2019

Bill Rogers, Senior Reactor Engineer Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation



Presentation Outline

- Overview of Safety Review of Turkey Point SLRA
- Closure of Open Item 3.0.3.1.7-1, Buried and Underground Piping and Tanks Program
- Aging Management Programs (AMPs)
- Staff Review and Audit Activities
- Examples of Plant-Specific Issues Unique to Subsequent License Renewal
- Site-Specific Safety License Condition
- Conclusion



Overview of Safety Review of Turkey Point SLRA

Unit	Initial	Initial License	Renewed	Expiration	Subsequent License
	License	Renewal	License	Date	Renewal Application
		Application			
3	07/19/1972	09/11/2000	06/06/2002	07/19/2032	01/31/2018
4	04/10/1973	09/11/2000	06/06/2002	04/10/2033	01/31/2018

- Application Submitted January 31, 2018
- Acceptance Determination April 26, 2018
- Safety Evaluation Report with Open Items May 21, 2019
- ACRS Subcommitee Meeting June 21, 2019
- Safety Evaluation Report July 19, 2019



Open Item 3.0.3.1.7-1, Buried and Underground Piping and Tanks Program

• <u>Issue</u>: Basis for why additional inspections, beyond those recommended in GALL-SLR AMP XI.M41, are appropriate for buried steel piping during the 10-year period prior to the subsequent period of extended operation (SPEO).

	Issue	Resolution
1	Cathodic protection (CP) not operational during the 10-year period prior to the SPEO. AMP XI.M41: CP is installed at least 5 years prior to the SPEO.	CP will be installed at least 9 years prior to the SPEO.
2	FPL stated in the SLRA that there have been breaks in buried piping at Turkey Point.	Only one pipe break - due to construction excavation activities; not age-related.
3	Staff noted that several leaks have occurred in buried steel piping.	FPL will conduct additional inspections in the 10-year period prior to the SPEO.



Aging Management Programs (AMPs) (AMPs)

Applicant's Original Disposition of AMPs

- 12 new programs
 - 12 consistent
- 37 existing programs
 - 3 consistent
 - 27 consistent with enhancements
 - 6 consistent with enhancements and exceptions
 - 1 plant specific

Final Disposition of AMPs in SER

- 14 new programs
 - 12 consistent
 - 1 consistent with enhancement
 - 1 plant specific
- 36 existing programs
 - 24 consistent with enhancements
 - 1 consistent with exceptions
 - 10 consistent with enhancements and exceptions
 - 1 plant specific



Staff Review and Audit Activities

Audit / Inspection	Dates	Location		
Operating Experience	May 7 – 18, 2018	Rockville, MD		
Audit	ML18183A445			
In-office Audit	June 18 – July 23, 2018	Rockville, MD		
	ML18230B482	,		
On-site Audits				
·Complex Technical	July 17 – October 17, 2018	Homestead, FL / Rockville, MD		
- '	ML19032A536			
∙On-Site	August 27 – 31, 2018	Hamastand El		
-OII-SILE	ML18341A024	Homestead, FL		



Examples of Plant Specific Issues Unique to Subsequent License Renewal

 Staff performed a first-of-a-kind review of irradiated structural concrete and steel located in containment

 Staff performed a review of polymers used in high voltage insulators not discussed in GALL-SLR Report



SER Section 3.0.3.1.4, One-Time Inspection

- Site-Specific Safety License Condition
 - Replace the portions of the carbon steel containment spray system piping inside containment that are exposed to treated borated water with stainless steel piping, which is not susceptible to loss of material in a treated borated water environment



Conclusion

• On the basis of its review of the SLRA, the staff finds that the requirements of 10 CFR 54.29(a) have been met for the subsequent license renewal of Turkey Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 3 and 4.