LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | I L Q A D 2 (2) | 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | | (5)
LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 5 (7) | 0 2 1 1 7 9 (8) | 0 3 0 6 7 9 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

While the shutdown cooling mode of RHRS was being taken off, suction isolation valve MO 2-1001-50 failed to close from the control room. The safety implications of this occurrence are minimal due to the fact the second isolation valve, MO 2-1001-47 in the shutdown cooling line is fully operable. Because the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.D.3 have been met, reactor power operation will be continued.

SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
S D (11)	E (12)	A (13)	V A L V O P (14)	A (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER

EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
7 9	—	0 0 4	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	B (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	L 2 0 0 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

An initial investigation indicated a component failure of the circuit breaker in the valve's motor control center. The MO 2-1001-50 valve was electrically taken out-of-service, closing the valve. During an outage when the valve can be appropriately operated and tested, the necessary repairs will be made.

FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
G (28)	0 0 0 (29)	NA	A (31)	Operational Event

ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE	DESCRIPTION
Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)
N (44)	NA

7903290035

NRC USE ONLY

NAME OF PREPARER G. Tietz PHONE: 309-654-2241, ext. 247

I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 79-04/03L-0

II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station

III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two

IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265

V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On February 11, 1979, Unit Two was in the REFUEL mode and the shutdown cooling mode of RHRS was operating. At 10:30 a.m., the control room operator was taking shutdown cooling off when he discovered that the suction valve, MO 2-1001-50, would not close from the control room. Upon notifying the Shift Engineer, it was decided to take the valve out-of-service by tripping the breaker and thus closing the valve. The second isolation valve, MO 2-1001-47 was also closed. There has been no previous occurrences of this nature involving the MO 2-1001-50 valve.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The safety implications of this occurrence are minimal due to the fact the second isolation valve, MO 2-1001-47, in the shutdown cooling suction line was fully operable at all times. Therefore, had a Group II isolation signal occurred the 47 valve would have isolated the line.

VII. CAUSE:

The initial investigation indicated that equipment failure was the probable cause of this occurrence. A contact in the valve breaker was not operating properly. During a future maintenance outage, a full investigation of the problem and the necessary repairs will be completed.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to take the valve out-of-service electrically, closing it. During a maintenance outage, when the valve can be appropriately operated and tested, the necessary repairs will be completed. Until that time, primary containment isolation is assured by the closure of MO-2-1001-50, and the operability of valve MO-2-1001-47.