

Facility: Braidwood		Exam Date: June 10-21, 2019												
Admin	JPMs	1 ADMIN Topic and K/A	2 LOD (1-5)	3 Attributes						4 Job Content		5 U/E/S	6 Explanation	
				I/C Focus	Cues	Critical Steps	Scope (N/B)	Overlap	Perf. Std.	Key	Minutia			Job Link
	A1: S-100	Conduct of Operations (2.1.20)	2											<p>NRC: This is an enhancement comment that is generic to <u>all</u> of the submitted JPMs regarding performance standards and task standards. NUREG-1021 Appendix C, section B.3, states that "the JPM must clearly identify the task standard (i.e. the predetermined qualitative or quantitative outcome) against which task performance will be measured." Form ES-301-7 details that "the task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step." While the submitted JPMs do include performance standards associated with individual JPM steps, the JPMs do not also include task standards that describe the expected outcomes/end states for the overall JPMs.</p> <p>Facility: Added a "task standard" row after the "this completes the JPM statement" as required.</p> <p>NRC: The aforementioned enhancement has been satisfactorily incorporated into all of the submitted JPMs.</p>
	A2: S-112	Conduct of Operations (2.1.43)	3											<p>NRC: The EFPH value listed in 1BwOSR 3.1.1.1-2 step F.1.b (13,000) does not match the value listed in performance step 1 of the JPM guide (11,000). Additionally, the "method used" block in step F.4.a is not checked as described in performance step 4 of the JPM guide.</p> <p>Facility: Changed EFPH in 1BwOSR to match (11,000 EFPH). Added marker for method used block in step F.4.a to reflect table used.</p> <p>NRC: The revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>
	A3: S-209	Equipment Control (2.2.42)	2											<p>NRC: This JPM appears to require extensive cueing on the part of the evaluator and sequential distribution of procedure handouts during its administration. From a logistical and efficiency standpoint, it is desirable to administer administrative JPMs to multiple individuals in a classroom format whenever practical. Requiring this degree of cueing and</p>

												<p>distribution of procedure handouts during the course of administering a JPM is not conducive to this approach. Additionally, it appears that it may be appropriate to provide the information currently contained in the cue following performance step 3 of the JPM guide in the initiating cue instead.</p> <p>Furthermore, based upon validation, modify the logic of performance step 6 to reflect that the first half of the listed "OR" statement cannot be accomplished, thereby requiring the second half of the statement to be performed in order to accomplish the critical step successfully.</p> <p>Facility: After discussion, this JPM will be conducted individually with the applicants. Initiating cue and performance step 6 both updated as requested.</p> <p>NRC: The revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>
A4: S-300	Radiation Control (2.3.6)	2									S	<p>"Free Look" Item</p> <p>NRC: This JPM lacks sufficient discriminatory validity. There are only two relatively simple errors that need to be identified in order to successfully complete this JPM in its present form. It would be appropriate to include the identification of an additional, more complex error in order to raise the JPM's discriminatory validity. Such an additional performance requirement would also provide a sounder basis for evaluating the applicants' understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. Additionally, the cue following step 1 includes that statement "if requested, provide a copy of 1BwOS RETS 2.2.B-1 to the examinee"; is there a reason why this reference could not be provided to the applicants along with the other materials at the beginning of the JPM?</p> <p>Facility: Modified to change errors in setpoint calculation and provide 1BwOS RETS 2.2.B-1 with other materials.</p> <p>NRC: Revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>
A5: S-413	Emergency Plan (2.4.38)	3			✘						S	<p>NRC: All critical steps/elements in this JPM are not properly identified. Specifically, in performance step 4 of the JPM guide, there are several elements that are inappropriately categorized as either being critical or not critical to completing the notification form. Refer the NEI 99-02 definition of "accurate" with regard to the notification of offsite authorities (located on pages 47-48 of the document). Consistent with this definition, the following changes will need to be made to the</p>

												<p>individual elements of performance step 4 of the JPM:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • “Utility Message No.” is <u>not</u> critical. • “5. Release Status: None” is critical. • “9. Utility Recommendation: None” is critical. • “Approved By: Signature” is <u>not</u> critical. <p>Additionally, based upon validation, modify the initiating cue to reflect only filling out the NARS form if applicable and relocate the cue for handing out the NARS form to after the EAL declaration. Facility: Revised as required. NRC: Revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>
Simulator / In-Plant JPMs	Safety Function and K/A											
a: SIM-102	1 / 001 A4.03	3									S	<p>NRC: Based upon validation, add an evaluator note regarding the expectation to withdraw control rods in 3 step increments. Facility: Evaluator note added. NRC: Revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>
b: SIM-224	2 / 013 A4.01	2									S	
c: C-301	3 / 010 A3.02	2									S	<p>Unit 2 Control Room JPM NRC: Provide a cue after performance step 2 in the JPM guide for a PZR pressure value and trend <u>prior</u> to taking manual control, similar to the cue that is currently listed after performance step 3. This is necessary due to the pressure indications on “Cue 2 ‘2PM05J” being too small to read with the necessary accuracy for the applicant to be able assess the current pressure value from the operable PZR pressure channels. Additionally, it may be desirable to use laser pointers to allow the applicant to indicate what their simulated actions on the control room panels would be (while still remaining a reasonable distance away from the controls themselves). Provided that the use of laser pointers in this manner within the control room would be consistent with station policies (and also that the facility has laser pointers available for use) it is requested that they be added to the “Materials” list on the JPM summary page and be provided by the facility.</p>

														Facility: Revised as recommended. Edited task standard to align with critical elements of the JPM. NRC: Revised JPM is satisfactory.
d: C-401Sa	4 / 035 A3.01	2											E	<p>“Free Look” Item Unit 2 Control Room JPM NRC: In the cue that precedes performance step 1 of the JPM guide, the second bulleted cue (for “2PM04J indications”) is incorrectly listed as also being “Cue 1”. Additionally, it may be desirable to use laser pointers to allow the applicant to indicate what their simulated actions on the control room panels would be (while still remaining a reasonable distance away from the controls themselves). Provided that the use of laser pointers in this manner within the control room would be consistent with station policies (and also that the facility has laser pointers available for use) it is requested that they be added to the “Materials” list on the JPM summary page and be provided by the facility. Facility: Revised JPM to re-sequence cue numbering in photos, Cue 1 is only the annunciator block 15, Cue 2 is 2PM04J indications, and Cue 3 is annunciator block 11. Added laser pointers to material list as requested. Edited task standard to align with critical elements of the JPM. NRC: Revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>
e: SIM-504	5 / 026 A4.01	2											S	
f: SIM-608a	6 / 064 A4.06	3											E S	<p>NRC: Based upon validation, performance step 4 of the JPM guide needs to be clarified so as to address the required sequence of critical steps for opening the output breaker prior to tripping the DG. Facility: Modified the sequence of actions in performance step 4 and edited the task standard to align with critical elements of the JPM. NRC: Revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>
g: SIM-711	7 / 073 A4.02	2											S	
h: IP-703	1 / EPE029 EA1.12	2											E S	<p>NRC: It is requested that the facility provide the basis for the 9-minute time critical duration that is specified in the JPM. Additionally, based upon validation, it is requested that the JPM be revised to include photos of the breaker indications inside of the covers for the reactor trip and bypass breakers (to preclude having to actually open the covers during administration of the JPM).</p>

														<p>Facility: The PRA time-sensitive actions document (BB-MISC-001) assumes a 10-minute response to shutdown the reactor during an ATWS. 9 minutes ensures the applicants can meet this limit. Photos of the breaker indications inside of the covers for the reactor trip and bypass breakers added as requested. NRC: Revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>
i: IP-200	2 / 013 A4.02	2											<p>ES NRC: It is requested that the JPM be revised to allow for performance on either unit in order to allow for flexibility in administration. Facility: JPM revised to allow for performance on either unit as requested. NRC: Revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>	
j: IP-806	8 / 086 A2.04	3											<p>ES NRC: It is requested that the JPM be revised to allow for performance on either unit in order to allow for flexibility in administration. Facility: JPM revised to allow for performance on either unit as requested. NRC: Revised JPM is satisfactory.</p>	

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring a comment and explain the issue in the space provided using the guide below.

1. Check each JPM for appropriate administrative topic requirements (COO, EC, Rad, and EP) or safety function requirements and corresponding K/A. Mark in column 1. (ES-301, D.3 and D.4)
2. Determine the level of difficulty (LOD) using an established 1–5 rating scale. Levels 1 and 5 represent an inappropriate (low or high) discriminatory level for the license that is being tested. Mark in column 2 (Appendix D, C.1.f)
3. In column 3, “Attributes,” check the appropriate box when an attribute is **not met**:
 - The initial conditions and/or initiating cue is clear to ensure the operator understands the task and how to begin. (Appendix C, B.4)
 - The JPM contains appropriate cues that clearly indicate when they should be provided to the examinee. Cues are objective and not leading. (Appendix C, D.1)
 - All critical steps (elements) are properly identified.
 - The scope of the task is not too narrow (N) or too broad (B).
 - Excessive overlap does not occur with other parts of the operating test or written examination. (ES-301, D.1.a, and ES-301, D.2.a)
 - The task performance standard clearly describes the expected outcome (i.e., end state). Each performance step identifies a standard for successful completion of the step.
 - A valid marked up key was provided (e.g., graph interpretation, initialed steps for handouts).
4. For column 4, “Job Content,” check the appropriate box if the job content flaw **does not meet** the following elements:
 - Topics are linked to the job content (e.g., not a disguised task, task required in real job).
 - The JPM has meaningful performance requirements that will provide a legitimate basis for evaluating the applicant’s understanding and ability to safely operate the plant. (ES-301, D.2.c)
5. Based on the reviewer’s judgment, is the JPM as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 5.
6. In column 6, provide a brief description of any (U)nacceptable or (E)nhancement rating from column 5.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound JPM is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

Facility: Braidwood		Scenario: 1 (Note: "Free Look" Item)							Exam Date: June 10-21, 2019	
1 Event	2 Realism /Cred.	3 Required Actions	4 Verifiable actions	5 LOD	6 TS	7 CTs	8 Scen. Overlap	9 U/E/S	10 Explanation	
1: Swap stator water cooling (GC) pumps								S		
2: Loss of Instrument Bus 114								E S	<p>NRC: The scenario guide indicates that the SRO "may also enter Tech Spec 3.8.7 Condition A and Tech Spec 3.3.1 Condition A, D & E (some SROs may choose to enter these Tech Specs – this is cascading which is allowed, but not required per LCO 3.0.6)." However, unnecessary technical specification cascading is not acceptable from an evaluation standpoint and will normally be considered as an error under SRO Competency #6 ("Comply with and Use Technical Specifications). The expected applicant actions for this event will need to be adjusted to reflect only those technical specification entries that are required to be made by the applicant. Additionally, based upon validation, add detail to the D-2 regarding the expected application of LCO 3.0.6 for this event.</p> <p>Facility: Revised to remove optional tech spec entry for 3.8.7 (now listed as being conditional in nature) and added detail to the D-2 regarding the expected application of LCO 3.0.6.</p> <p>NRC: Revised event is satisfactory.</p>	
3: Master Pressurizer Level Controller (1LK-0459) output fails high								S		
4: 1B AF pump local alarm (Air Box Trip)					X			S		
5: 1D CD/CB pump trip with 1C CD/CB pump auto-start failure							X	S		
6: 1B FW pump trip with turbine runback								S		
7: Boric Acid Transfer Pump Trips during runback			X				X	E S	<p>NRC: The expected actions listed for the ATC applicant currently lack any verifiable actions for this event. If this is the case, then this event cannot be counted for malfunction credit for this applicant. However, if verifiable actions will be performed during this event, then they must be included in order to reflect the actual expected actions for the applicant. Refer to NUREG-1021 ES-301, Attachment 2.</p> <p>Facility: Added step to place the BA transfer pump in PTL as expected for the trip and per BwOP AB-23. Also included steps to re-align RMCS per BwOP CV-7.</p> <p>NRC: Revised event is satisfactory.</p>	
8: Inadvertent FWI / 1B SG feedline break / loss of heat sink						X		E S	<p>NRC: Based upon validation, add conditional actions for the verification of containment spray actuation should containment pressure warrant their performance.</p> <p>Facility: Conditional actions for verifications added to D-2.</p> <p>NRC: Revised event is satisfactory.</p>	

9: Turbine auto & manual trip failure								S	
10: 0B MCR Return Fan trip on SI								S	
11: 1A AF pump fails to start								S	
12: MMD repairs 1B AF pump air box trip and restores operability								S	<p>NRC: Based upon validation, delete this event and modify the D-2 for scenario termination after feed-and-bleed has been established.</p> <p>Facility: Event deleted and D-2 for scenario modified as discussed.</p>
12 11 Events	0	0	1		2	2	6	E	<p>“Free Look” Item</p> <p>NRC: The Form ES-301-4 quantitative attributes information submitted for this scenario reflect that the number of EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions for this scenario is “1”. With regard to how this value is determined, NUREG-1021 Appendix D, section C.2.f, states that “...the primary scram response procedure that serves as the entry point for the EOPs is not counted.” Based upon this, it appears that 1BwEP-0 has been inappropriately counted in determining this total and, therefore, that the number of EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions for this scenario is instead “0”. As previously noted during the review of the outline for this operating test, although this scenario does not meet the target quantitative attribute standard of 1-2 for this type of event, section C.2 also states that “the ranges are not absolute limitations; some scenarios may be an excellent evaluation tool but may not fit within the ranges.” Based upon the information available at this stage of review, the overall scenario appears to still provide an adequate evaluation tool, however, this will need to be confirmed during scenario validation.</p> <p>Facility: Edited ES-301-4 to “0” per comment.</p>

Facility: Braidwood		Scenario: 2					Exam Date: June 10-21, 2019			
1 Event	2 Realism/ Cred.	3 Required Actions	4 Verifiable actions	5 LOD	6 TS	7 CTs	8 Scen. Overlap	9 U/E/S	10 Explanation	
1. 1PR11J filter change					X			E	<p>NRC: Is the use of time compression intended during the simulated filter paper change? If so, then this should be included as an evaluator note in the scenario guide.</p> <p>Facility: Time compression is not utilized, this task normally takes 2-5 minutes for RP to complete per facility rep.</p>	
2. Inadvertent Phase B (train A only)						X		U S	<p>NRC: Restoration of CC flow to the RCP motor bearings may lead to an emergent critical task and should be listed as such in the scenario guide, including the identification of appropriate boundary criteria. Refer to NUREG-1021 Appendix D, sections D.1 and D.2. Specifically, the actions associated with the restoration of RCP CC flow appear to possess the following elements of a critical task:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Safety significance: failure to restore CC flow would lead to degrading RCP indications that would inevitably require a reactor trip to allow for the securing of RCPs. The avoidable reactor trip is safety significant. Additionally, the resultant RCP bearing damage that could occur due to a lack of cooling water would challenge the future availability of forced coolant flow in the RCS. • Initiating cue: indications of closure of specific Phase B valves. • Measurable performance standard: restoration of CC flow to RCP motor bearings prior to exceeding the boundary condition (currently 10 minutes per the scenario guide). • Performance feedback: degrading RCP indications (i.e. rising bearing temperatures) during the timespan of the critical task. <p>Additionally, based upon the potential for this event to lead to a plant trip prior to the major transient, it may be desirable to move this event to a later point in the scenario (i.e. after the current event 5). Furthermore, add a report to the crew that actuation of Phase B was caused by inadvertent contact with equipment in the field.</p> <p>Facility: Added critical task designation to restoration of CC to RCPs, moved event in the scenario timeline, and added a report to the crew that actuation of Phase B was caused by inadvertent contact with equipment in the field.</p> <p>NRC: Revised event is satisfactory.</p>	
3. Advanced Nuclear Dispatch (AND) order to lower load by 100 MWe at 4 MW/minute								S		
4. 1FT-414 RCS Loop flow Transmitter Failure.					X			S		

5. 1B CV pump shaft shear							X	S	<p>NRC: In the event that the Audit/Cert exam “spare” scenario is not used, then this event should also be counted for SRO TS event credit (e.g. an overlap concern for TS determinations would not exist in this case).</p> <p>Facility: Cert spare scenario not used. Updated D-1 and 301-5 to credit this event.</p>
6. 1FT-542 Fails Low over 15 minutes.								E S	<p>NRC: The verifiable actions for this event (1D FRV manual control) are incorrectly listed as being performed by the ATC (the D-1 correctly lists the BOP as receiving credit for this event).</p> <p>Facility: Changed ATC to BOP in event guide.</p> <p>NRC: Revised event is satisfactory.</p>
7. 1D RCP seal failure causing an RCS LOCA						X*		S	<p>NRC: Include a <u>conditional</u>* critical task for tripping RCPs if warranted by plant conditions during the SBLOCA (consistent with EOP requirements).</p> <p>Facility: Added tripping RCPs as a critical task as requested.</p> <p>NRC: Revised event is satisfactory.</p>
8. 1A SI pump fails to auto-start on SI with 1B SI pump tripped						X		S	
9. 1CV8100 fails to auto-close on Phase A with 1CV8112 failed open						X	X	S	
9 Events	0	0	0		2	3	5	E	

Facility: Braidwood		Scenario: 3					Exam Date: June 10-21, 2019			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Event	Realism/ Cred.	Required Actions	Verifiable actions	LOD	TS	CTs	Scen. Overlap	U/E/S	Explanation	
1. Realign feedwater to the Steam Generators								S		
2. Withdraw control rods to 2%-3% power								S		
3. Master Pressurizer Pressure Controller (1PK-0455A) setpoint fails high							X	S	NRC: Per prior discussions with the facility regarding the resolution of comments associated with the operating test outline review, it was understood that the classification of this event was to be updated on the associated D-1 form to reflect that the malfunction event type is an instrument (instead of a component). However, this change has not been made on the submitted D-1 for this scenario. Facility: Changed type from "C" to "I" for event 3.	
4. IRNI channel N-36 fails low (loss of detector voltage)					X			S		
5. 1CV8401A (1A letdown HX inlet valve) fails closed								S		
6. 1A Containment Chilled Water pump trip							X	S		
7. 1A SX pump trip with 1B SX pump failure to manually start			X		X		X	U S	NRC: This event appears to lack the verifiable action necessary to allow it to be credited as a component malfunction event for the BOP. Specifically, it appears that the board actions taken by the BOP in response to this event may be limited to attempting to start a pump that fails to start. Refer to the criteria of NUREG-1021 ES-301, section D.5.d, and ES-301 Attachment 2 regarding verifiable actions. Facility: Removed credit for BOP component failure, updated D-1 & ES-301-5 to reflect this change. NRC: Revised event is satisfactory.	
8. Uncontrolled depressurization of all Steam Generators						X		S		
9. Auto reactor trip failure with 1PM05J reactor trip switch failure						X		S		
9 Events	0	0	1		2	2	4	E	NRC: The Form ES-301-4 quantitative attributes information submitted for this scenario reflect that the number of EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions for this scenario is "2". With regard to how this value is determined, NUREG-1021 Appendix D, section C.2.f, states that "...the primary scram response procedure that serves as the entry point for the EOPs is not counted." Based upon this, it appears that 1BwEP-0 has been inappropriately counted in determining this total and, therefore, that the	

										number of EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions for this scenario is instead "1". Facility: 1BwEP-2 and 1BwCA-2.1 were counted, corrected ES-301-4 as requested.
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Facility: Braidwood		Scenario: SPARE						Exam Date: June 10-21, 2019		
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Event	Realism/ Cred.	Required Actions	Verifiable actions	LOD	TS	CTs	Scen. Overlap	U/E/S	Explanation	
1. Swap Unit 1 SX pumps								S		
2. 1D high speed RCFC high vibration					X			S		
3. PZR pressure channel, 1PT-455, fails high					X		X	S		
4. Rod Control failure results in auto rod withdrawal								S		
5. 1CV112A diverts letdown flow to the HUT							X	S		
6. 1A GS Condenser Exhauster fan trip							X	S		
7. High RCS activity requiring plant shutdown					X			S		
8. 1A SGTR with loss of PZR pressure control						X		S	(note: 2 critical tasks in this event)	
9. 1AF013A breaker trips on SI						X		S		
9 Events	0	0	0		3	3	4	S		

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Use this table for each scenario for evaluation.

- 2 Check this box if the events are not related (e.g., seismic event followed by a pipe rupture) **OR** if the events do not obey the laws of physics and thermodynamics.
- 3, 4 In columns 3 and 4, check the box if there is **no** verifiable or required action, as applicable. Examples of required actions are as follows: (ES-301, D.5f)
 - opening, closing, and throttling valves
 - starting and stopping equipment
 - raising and lowering level, flow, and pressure
 - making decisions and giving directions
 - acknowledging or verifying key alarms and automatic actions (Uncomplicated events that require no operator action beyond this should **not** be included on the operating test unless they are necessary to set the stage for subsequent events. (Appendix D, B.3).)
- 5 Check this box if the level of difficulty is **not** appropriate.
- 6 Check this box if the event has a TS.
- 7 Check this box if the event has a critical task (CT). If the same CT covers more than one event, check the event where the CT started **only**.
- 8 Check this box if the event overlaps with another event on any of the last two NRC examinations. (Appendix D, C.1.f)
- 9 Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the event as written (U)nacceptable (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory? Mark the answer in column 9.
- 10 Record any explanations of the events here.

In the shaded boxes, sum the number of check marks in each column.

- In column 1, sum the number of events.
- In columns 2–4, record the total number of check marks for each column.
- In column 5, based on the reviewer's judgement, place a checkmark only if the scenario's LOD is not appropriate.
- In column 6, TS are required to be ≥ 2 for each scenario. (ES-301, D.5.d)
- In column 7, preidentified CTs should be ≥ 2 for each scenario. (Appendix D; ES-301, D.5.d; ES-301-4)
- In column 8, record the number of events not used on the two previous NRC initial licensing exams. A scenario is considered unsatisfactory if there is < 2 new events. (ES-301, D.5.b; Appendix D, C.1.f)
- In column 9, record whether the scenario as written (U)nacceptable, in need of (E)nhancement, or (S)atisfactory from column 11 of the simulator scenario table.

Facility: Braidwood								Exam Date: June 10-21, 2019	
Scenario	1 Event Totals	2 Events Unsat.	3 TS Total	4 TS Unsat.	5 CT Total	6 CT Unsat.	7 % Unsat. Scenario Elements	8 U/E/S	9 Explanation
1	12 11	4 0	2	4 0	2	0	0%	E	"Free Look" Item.
2	9	0	2	0	3	1	7.1%	E	
3	9	1	2	0	2	0	7.7%	E	
Spare	9	0	3	0	3	0	0%	S	

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Check or mark any item(s) requiring comment and explain the issue in the space provided.

1, 3, 5 For each simulator scenario, enter the **total** number of events (column 1), TS entries/actions (column 3), and CTs (column 5).

This number should match the respective scenario from the event-based scenario tables (the sum from columns 1, 6, and 7, respectively).

2, 4, 6 For each simulator scenario, evaluate each event, TS, and CT as (S)atisfactory, (E)nhance, or (U)nsatisfactory based on the following criteria:

- a. Events. Each event is described on a Form ES-D-2, including all switch manipulations, pertinent alarms, and verifiable actions. Event actions are balanced between at-the-controls and balance-of-plant applicants during the scenario. All event-related attributes on Form ES-301-4 are met. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory events in column 2.
- b. TS. A scenario includes at least two TS entries/actions across at least two different events. TS entries and actions are detailed on Form ES-D-2. Enter the total number of unsatisfactory TS entries/actions in column 4. (ES-301, D.5d)
- c. CT. Check that a scenario includes at least two preidentified CTs. This criterion is a target quantitative attribute, not an absolute minimum requirement. Check that each CT is explicitly bounded on Form ES-D-2 with measurable performance standards (see Appendix D). Enter the total number of unsatisfactory CTs in column 6.

7 In column 7, calculate the percentage of unsatisfactory scenario elements: $\left(\frac{2 + 4 + 6}{1 + 3 + 5}\right) 100\%$

8 If the value in column 7 is > 20%, mark the scenario as (U)nsatisfactory in column 8. If column 7 is ≤ 20%, annotate with (E)nhancement or (S)atisfactory.

9 In column 9, explain each unsatisfactory event, TS, and CT. Editorial comments can also be added here.

Save initial review comments and detail subsequent comment resolution so that each exam-bound scenario is marked by a (S)atisfactory resolution on this form.

Site name: Braidwood

Exam Date: June 10-21, 2019

OPERATING TEST TOTALS

	Total	Total Unsat.	Total Edits	Total Sat.	% Unsat.	Explanation
Admin. JPMs	5	1	3	1		Admin JPM "A5" (S-413) was evaluated to be unsatisfactory due to the incorrect categorization of multiple critical elements.
Sim./In-Plant JPMs	10	0	4	6		
Scenarios	4	0	3	1		<p>NRC: The Forms ES-301-6 that have been submitted for the operating exam have not been completed correctly and will need to be resubmitted. Examples include listing SRO applicants for the "operate control boards" competency in scenarios where they are in neither the ATC nor BOP positions, as well as listing applicants for the "comply with and use TS" competency for scenarios where they are not in the SRO position. Additionally, the manner in which information is entered into the form is not consistent with how this form is normally prepared. It is recommended that the facility review previous examples of how ES-301-6 has been completed for past submittals.</p> <p>Facility: Corrected ES-301-6 as required.</p> <p>NRC: Revised Forms ES-301-6 are acceptable.</p> <p>NRC: Revised Forms ES-301-5 will need to be resubmitted to reflect recent changes in class composition (specifically, one fewer I-SRO applicant) that have occurred since the current version of these forms were received.</p> <p>Facility: Corrected ES-301-5 for crew composition.</p> <p>NRC: Revised Forms ES-301-5 are acceptable.</p>
Op. Test Totals:	19	1	10	8	5.3%	

Instructions for Completing This Table:

Update data for this table from quality reviews and totals in the previous tables and then calculate the percentage of total items that are unsatisfactory and give an explanation in the space provided.

- Enter the total number of items submitted for the operating test in the "Total" column. For example, if nine administrative JPMs were submitted, enter "9" in the "Total" items column for administrative JPMs. For scenarios, enter the total number of simulator scenarios.
- Enter the total number of (U)nsatisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the two JPMs column 5 and simulator scenarios column 8 in the previous tables. Provide an explanation in the space provided.
- Enter totals for (E)nhancements needed and (S)atisfactory JPMs and scenarios from the previous tables. This task is for tracking only.
- Total each column and enter the amounts in the "Op. Test Totals" row.
- Calculate the percentage of the operating test that is (U)nsatisfactory ($(\text{Op. Test Total Unsat.})/(\text{Op. Test Total})$) and place this value in the bolded "% Unsat." cell.

Refer to ES-501, E.3.a, to rate the overall operating test as follows:

- satisfactory, if the "Op. Test Total" "% Unsat." is $\leq 20\%$
- unsatisfactory, if "Op. Test Total" "% Unsat." is $> 20\%$

6.

Update this table and the tables above with post-exam changes if the "as-administered" operating test required content changes, including the following:

- The JPM performance standards were incorrect.
- The administrative JPM tasks/keys were incorrect.
- CTs were incorrect in the scenarios (not including postscenario critical tasks defined in Appendix D).
- The EOP strategy was incorrect in a scenario(s).
- TS entries/actions were determined to be incorrect in a scenario(s).