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MAR 06 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: George W. Knighton, Chief, Environmental
Evaluation Branch, Division of Operating Reactors

THRU: G. Laines, Chief, Plant Systems Branch, Division
of Operating Reactors

FROM: Elinor G. Adensam, Section Leader B, Plant Systems
Branch, Division of Operating Reactors

SUBJECT: CONTAINMENT PURGE (TAC 10778)

In response to your memorandum, "Containment Purge," dated February 14, 1980, PSB agrees to supply EEB with: 1) a suitably conservative estimate of purge system isolation valve closure time; and 2) the amount of containment atmosphere released through the purge and vent isolation valves during the time required for them to close following a LOCA in accordance with BTP 6-4 and SRP 6.2.4. PSB has sent requests to all the licensees for the above information. In most cases, the responses to our requests are overdue.

In addition, you requested an estimate by PSB and EB, respectively, of the following:

1. The leakage through the containment purge isolation valves following the rapid isolation against the LOCA, and back pressure.
2. The probability that such isolation can be achieved within the above stated limits of isolation time and leakage.
3. Mass released through containment purge system if purge is in operation when LOCA initiates isolation by radiation detection or pressure rise, whichever is controlling.

We are unclear as to the purpose of your additional request under item 1. We would assume that once valve closure is reached you would revert to the LOCA dose model in R.G. 1.3 or 1.4 and use the tech spec containment leak rate limit for your analysis. At this time, we have no way of judging how much of that leakage rate will be through the containment purge valves. Also, we understand that you do not want the back pressure so will not plan to provide it to you.

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George W. Knighton

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We believe the request in the above item 2 is beyond the scope of BTP 8-4. It would not be appropriate to include such a probability evaluation of containment purge system isolation valve failure in this generic issue (G-24). We would suggest that EEB request the Probabilistic Analysis Staff, RES, to perform such an evaluation if they require this information but to do so outside the scope of B-24.

With regard to the above item 3, in order for us to compare the mass released through the containment purge system for containment isolation initiated by radiation detection or pressure rise, we will require EEB to provide us with the time at which radiation detection provides a containment isolation signal.

ISI
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