

October 10, 1979

PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVENT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PNO-II/79-1C

This preliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of an event of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance. The information presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by IE staff as of this date

FACILITY: Virginia Electric and Power Company  
North Anna Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-338  
Mineral, Virginia

SUBJECT: REACTOR TRIP AND SAFETY INJECTION

This supplements information previously submitted in PNO-II/79-1B.

Region II (Atlanta) has completed its investigation into the cause of the over-pressurization of the Volume Control Tank (VCT) and subsequent release of radioactive gases into the Auxiliary Building.

The investigation determined that the control switch for the VCT level control system was not defeated at the time of the incident. Overpressurization of the VCT was caused by lifting of the letdown line pressure relief valve, which discharges to the VCT, when letdown flow was automatically blocked due to a high level in the Boron Recovery System gas stripper. The high water level in the gas stripper was due to the high influx of water from the primary system when letdown flow was reestablished. The investigation also determined that due to volume of gas involved and the design of the radioactive waste handling system, the release of gas to the Auxiliary Building would not have been avoided or significantly lessened by proper connection of the vent line from the high level waste tanks. It appears that two items of noncompliance occurred, both relating to system modifications without safety evaluations required by 10 CFR 50.59. These modifications involve the periodic defeating of the VCT level control valve during operation and the vent line installation. In the former case, no evidence of defeating other control switches was identified. Both of these matters are being addressed in IE Circulars currently being prepared.

Continued media interest is expected. Region II does not plan to issue a press release; however, the investigation report is receiving priority attention.

The Commonwealth of Virginia is being kept informed of developments.

Region II (Atlanta) concluded its investigation at 5:00 p.m. on October 5, 1979.

Contact: C. Alderson, RII 242-5507; P. J. Kellogg, RII 242-5649

<u>Distribution:</u>	Transmitted H. St.	
Chairman Rendrie	Commissioner Bradford	S. J. Chilk, SECY
Commissioner Kennedy	Commissioner Ahearne	C. C. Kauterer, CA
Commissioner Gilinsky	ACRS	(For Distribution)
Transmitted: MNBB _____	P. Bldg. _____	IE:XOOS _____ (IE:EQ Dist.)
L. V. Gossick, EDO _____	H. R. Denton, NRR _____	
F. L. Ornstein, EDO _____	R. C. DeYoung, NRR _____	
J. J. Fouchard, PA _____	R. J. Mattson, NRR _____	Landow _____ (6 min./page)
N. M. Haller, MPA _____	D. Vassallo, NRR _____	J. J. Cummings, OIA
R. G. Ryan, OSP _____	D. Eisenhut, NRR _____	
H. K. Shapar, ELD _____	SS Bldg. _____	MAIL
	W. J. Dircks, NMSS _____	R. Minogue, SD
Other Regional Offices _____	S. Levine, RES _____	IE:XOOS
(Time)		

391210 751