



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
631 PARK AVENUE
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

Docket No. 50-334


SEP 27 1979

Duquesne Light Company
ATTN: Mr. C. N. Dunn
Vice President
Operations Division
435 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Bulletin 79-24 is forwarded to you for action. Written responses are required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,


Boyce H. Grier
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Bulletin No. 79-24
2. List of IE Bulletins Issued in the Last Six Months

cc w/encls:

F. Bissert, Technical Assistant Nuclear
R. Washabaugh, QA Manager
J. Werling, Station Superintendent
G. Moore, General Superintendent, Power Stations Department
J. J. Carey, Nuclear Technical Assistant
R. Martin, Nuclear Engineer

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ENCLOSURE 1

Accession No. 7908220114
SSINS No: 6820

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

IE Bulletin No. 79-24
Date: September 27, 1979
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FROZEN LINES

Summary:

On January 3, 1979, an unusual event occurred at Davis-Besse, Unit 1. The event involved the freezing of the water in a portion of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system recirculation line that is common to both high pressure coolant injection pumps. The line was not thawed until January 5, 1979, and the event was not reported to NRC until March 12, 1979. In addition, over the past five years, there have been several events involving frozen instrument and sampling lines.

Description of Circumstances:

The condition was discovered on January 3, 1979, while the reactor was operating at approximately 96 percent power. During a monthly surveillance test of the HPCI pumps, there was no flow through the recirculation line from the pump discharge to the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST). Investigation revealed that water in a portion of the line exposed to the outside weather was frozen. This portion of the line to the BWST is common to both HPCI pumps. The line has redundant heat tracing (a heated wire to prevent freezing); it is insulated; and it has a low-temperature alarm system to warn of freezing conditions. Water in the line froze apparently because of prolonged sub-freezing temperatures and a defect in the insulation. There was no apparent malfunction of the heat tracing or temperature alarm circuits, although the temperature sensing elements are located in an area not exposed to the coldest temperature conditions.

This recirculation line serves two purposes: One is to provide a flow path for surveillance testing, and the other is to provide a minimum flow path to prevent possible damage to the pump in the event it is operated against a closed discharge valve or a reactor coolant system pressure greater than the maximum discharge pressure of the pump (approximately 1600 psig).

In the initial review of the event on January 3, 1979, the licensee concluded that the pumps were still operable with no immediate action was taken to thaw the line. On January 5, 1979, the line was thawed and was successfully completed.

DUPLICATE DOCUMENT

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