UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-327/79-42

Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority
500A Chestnut Street
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

Facility Name: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

Docket No. 50-327

Licensee No. CPPR-72

Inspection at Sequoyah Site near Chattagoona, Tennessee

Inspector: _____ 8/22/79
W. T. Cottle — Date Signed

Approved by: _____ 8/22/79
H. C. Dance, Section Chief, RONS Branch — Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on July 5-27, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 32 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of followup on construction deficiency reports, storage of special nuclear material, fire prevention and and plant tour.

Results

Of the 4 areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

J. M. Ballentine, Plant Superintendent
W. T. Popp, Assistant Plant Superintendent
C. E. Cantrell, Assistant Plant Superintendent
W. E. Andrews, Quality Assurance Supervisor
W. M. Guinn, Operations Supervisor
W. H. Kinsey, Results Supervisor
J. M. McGriff, Maintenance Supervisor - Instrumentation
R. J. Kitts, Plant Health Physicist
R. S. Kaplan, Captain, Public Safety Services

Other licensee employees contacted included three technicians, two operators, two security force menbers, three plant engineering, three construction supervisors, two corporate licensing staff members, corporate regulatory staff member, and a shift engineer.

Other Organizations

M. Gouge, USNRC
B. McFarland, USNRC
T. Gibbons, USNRC
D. Montgomery, USNRC
G. Gibson, USNRC
P. McPhail, USNRC
W. Ruhlman, USNRC
T. Donat, USNRC
B. Moon, USNRC
S. Welch, USNRC

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized with the station superintendent and members of his staff on July 13 and 20, 1979.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

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5. Followup on Construction Deficiency Reports

The status of all outstanding construction deficiency reports (CDR's) for Unit 1 and 2 was reviewed in a meeting with representatives of licensee's Construction, Licensing, and Regulatory Staffs on July 12, 1979. Inspectors Gouge, McFarland and Gibbons participated in the review. Licensee's Regulatory Staff representative agreed to have the Resident Inspector added to the distribution list for all Sequoyah-related CDR correspondence sent to the NRC Region II Office. Licensee's Licensing Staff representative agreed that initial telephone reports on CDR's would be made to the Resident Inspector whenever possible.

Licensee representatives requested that NCR 78-2 and MEB 79-4 be re-evaluated as to their effect on Unit 1 and the requirement that they be completed prior to Unit 1 initial fuel loading. These items, previously designated as 327/78-38-07 and 327/79-12-10, will be reviewed by the Resident Inspector.

In response to a request from the Region II Office Staff, the inspector met with the maintenance supervisor - Instrumentaion on July 25, 1979, to evaluate the generic implications of that portion of NCR 9P which addressed corrosion of terminal blocks in Foxboro transmitters. A review of the plant correspondence file associated with NCR 9P indicated that the problem had been discussed with a Foxboro representative who had stated that there was a type of terminal block used on all Foxboro transmitters with a serial number less than 3,000,000 that produced corrosive chemicals when exposed to moisture. There have been at least five instances at Sequoyah where the transmitter terminal blocks were corrosive to the extent of causing instrument loop malfunctions. This information was forwarded to the Region II Office for their review.

6. Storage of Special Nuclear Material

The inspector reviewed the Special Nuclear Material licensee (SNM 1716) issued under 10 CFR 70 and the license application to identify environmental protection and physical fuel storage areas on July 20 and 24, 1979, the inspector verified the following:

a. All new fuel assembles were stored in either the spent fuel pool or the new fuel storage vault.

b. Protective covers were in-place on the spent fuel pool and new fuel storage vault.

c. Administrative control prohibiting the use of water fog or spray in the fuel storage areas were posted.

d. Administrative controls prohibiting the lifting of loads over the fuel storage areas were posted. Observation of crane operations in the area revealed no violations of these administrative controls.

e. The spent fuel pool and the new fuel storage vault were posted as "Regulated Areas" for radiological control purposes.

The inspector reviewed fuel storage maps, dated February 12, 1979, which indicated that twenty (20) assemblies were stored in the spent fuel pool and one hundred seventy-three (173) assemblies were stored in the new fuel storage vault. These maps were not verified by the inspector nor was the storage condition of individual assemblies reviewed due to the storage covers being in-place and preventing access to both storage areas.

The inspector reviewed security records to verify the following:

a. Security controls were established on May 7, 11, 21 and June 28, 1979, when the storage covers were removed from the fuel storage areas.

b. The plant Superintendent had approved an "Access to Fuel Floor" listing for the month of June, 1979.

c. Temporary instruction detection alarms were tested during May and June per surveillance instructions. Data was reviewed for May 23 and June 19.

d. Shift surveillance for the period July 15-19 was conducted to verify fire fighting equipment in-place, housekeeping measures were in order, fuel storage covers were in-place, no evidence of forced entry, selected intrusion alarms were tested.

The inspector noted that the SNM license expiration date was August 31, 1979. The Special Nuclear Materials Custodian showed the inspector's a letter dated July 5, 1979 to the Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, requesting an extension of SNM 1716 to January 1, 1980.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

7. Fire Prevention and Protection

The inspector reviewed the fire prevention and protection program currently in effect with the Fire Protection Engineer. Items discussed included provisions for inspection of fire protection equipment, surveillance of plant areas for fire hazards, schedule for third-party audits and inspections, and status of installation and testing of permanent fire detection and protection systems.

The inspector as a part of routine tours of the facility checked for fire hazards in vital areas including the control room and the cable spreading room, welding activities and other hot work in progress were spot checked

for adherence to fire prevention measures, and permanently installed fire protection equipment was inspected for damage.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

8. Plant Tours

The inspector toured accessible areas of Unit 1 on July 19 and 24. The following activities were observed/reviewed:

a. Housekeeping practices.
b. Protection of installed instrumentation.
c. Inplace storage of decay heat removal and containment spray pumps.
d. Ability to hear PA system announcements in plant areas.
e. Fire prevention/protection measures for hot work.
f. Posting of hold tags, caution tags and alteration tags.
g. Posting of status control tags on systems and components.
h. Shift personnel response to annunciators.
i. Measures to exclude foreign material from entry into clean systems.
j. Unit operator and shift engineer log books.
k. Condition of installed fire protection equipment.
l. General shift operating practices.

The following items were discussed with station management representatives:

a. Unapproved operating instructions were posted on the main control board and the upper head injection test panel.

b. Uncontrolled copies of plant drawings were found in the main control room and at numerous control panels in the auxiliary building.

c. Hold tags and caution tags were placed in such a manner that they covered indicator lights and instrument readouts on the main control board and local control panels.

d. Three non-safety related valve positioning switches were found held in the open position by rubber bands thus preventing the valves from responding to automatic signals.

The inspector did not observe the use of the unapproved operating procedures or uncontrolled drawings in any safety-related activities. Station management acknowledged these comments and indicated that corrective measures would be undertaken. These items will be reviewed in future inspections (327/79-42-01).

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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9. Independent Inspection Effort

The inspector attended the training courses required for unescorted access to the facility. The instructions to workers presented in the health

physics portion of the training appeared to adequately address the requirements of 10 CFR 19.12.

The inspector performed several orientation tours of the facility for his own plant familarization. This effort will be continued but will be focused on individual plant systems both for inspector familarization and to review the as-built plant configuration. General security practices were observed and discussion held with Public Safety Services management to point out potential problem areas with control of security picture badges and escorting of visitors. The inspector interfaced with other Region II inspectors as indicated in paragraph 1 during the course of their inspections.

No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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