



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

SEP 27 1979

Docket No. 50-546  
Docket No. 50-547

Public Service of Indiana  
ATTN: Dr. James Coughlin  
Vice President, Nuclear  
1000 East Main Street  
Plainfield, IN 46168

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 79-24 is forwarded to you for information. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

*James G. Keppler*  
James G. Keppler  
Director

Enclosure:  
IE Bulletin No. 79-24

cc w/encl:  
Mr. R. M. Brown, Construction  
Project Superintendent  
Central Files  
Director, NRR/DPM  
Director, NRR/DOR  
PDR  
Local PDR  
NSIC  
TIC  
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae  
Mr. Dave Martin, Office of  
the Attorney General

1099 112

7910040059  
Q

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

September 27, 1979

IE Bulletin No. 79-24

FROZEN LINES

Summary:

On January 3, 1979, an unusual event occurred at Davis-Besse, Unit 1. The event involved the freezing of the water in a portion of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system recirculation line that is common to both high pressure coolant injection pumps. The line was not thawed until January 5, 1979, and the event was not reported to NRC until March 12, 1979. In addition, over the past five years, there have been several events involving frozen instrument and sampling lines.

Description of Circumstances:

The condition was discovered on January 3, 1979, while the reactor was operating at approximately 96 percent power. During a monthly surveillance test of the HPCI pumps, there was no flow through the recirculation line from the pump discharge to the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST). Investigation revealed that water in a portion of the line exposed to the outside weather was frozen. This portion of the line to the BWST is common to both HPCI pumps. The line has redundant heat tracing (a heated wire to prevent freezing); it is insulated; and it has a low-temperature alarm system to warn of freezing conditions. Water in the line froze apparently because of prolonged sub-freezing temperatures and a defect in the insulation. There was no apparent malfunction of the heat tracing or temperature alarm circuits, although the temperature sensing elements are located in an area not exposed to the coldest temperature conditions.

This recirculation line serves two purposes: One is to provide a flow path for surveillance testing, and the other is to provide a minimum flow path to prevent possible damage to the pump in the event it is operated against a closed discharge valve or a reactor coolant system pressure greater than the maximum discharge pressure of the pump (approximately 1600 psig).

In the initial review of the event on January 3, 1979, the licensee concluded that the pumps were still operable with the recirculation line frozen. Therefore, no immediate action was taken to thaw the frozen section of the line. On January 5, 1979, the line was thawed and the surveillance test of the pumps was successfully completed.

DUPLICATE DOCUMENT

1099 113

Entire document previously entered  
into system under:

ANO

7908220114

No. of pages:

7