

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

1 In the Matter of:

2 IE TMI INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW

3 of Mr. Dick Dubiel, Supervisor Radiation Protection and Chemistry Nuclear
4 Mr. John Hilbish
5 Mr. Gary Miller
6
7
8

9 Trailer #203
10 NRC Investigation Site
11 TMI Nuclear Power Plant
12 Middletown, Pennsylvania

13 April 12, 1979
14 (Date of Interview)

15 July 3, 1979
16 (Date Transcript Typed)

17 99
18 (Tape Number(s))
19
20
21

22 NRC PERSONNEL:
23 Bob Long
24
25

790529605

2002 345

1 Bob Long conversation at 3:25 on the 12th of April with Dick Dubiel,
2 John Hilbish and Gary Miller.

3
4 — Okay the morning it started, on March 28, I was down in the HP
5 lab, I had been called in first of all. Back up, I was called about
6 4:30 at home, told to come in, did not know any indication or have any
7 indication what the problem was other than we had turbine and reactor
8 trip in Unit 2. I immediately got up, got dressed, it took me about a
9 half hour so somewhere around 5:00 o'clock I came in, into the control
10 room of Unit 2 and was told by George Kunder that the, we had unusual
11 occurrences in the reactor building. He really did not describe to me
12 any details other than he was very interested in getting a reactor
13 building atmosphere sample and make preparations for a reactor building
14 entry. I got the technician, we went down, we tried to get a sample
15 off the HPR227, which is the reactor building atmosphere monitor, and
16 as we opened up the charcoal or the iodine monitor holding a charcoal
17 cartridge, a large amount of water came out. Immediately closed it
18 back up and with the amount of water in there my first thought was
19 that we had some type of a steam environment in the reactor building
20 atmosphere causing the condensation in the sample lines of water in
21 the monitor. So I called George and told him we did not, could not
22 get a sample off that monitor, it was full of water and he told me at
23 the time that we were running into problems with a boron sample. They
24 had run a boron and it came out a number of about 700 ppm, he wanted
25 me to check that because we first of all, we're running about 1050

1 while the plant was critical or at power just prior to the trip. ____

2 And they wanted to verify that we had, what our boron concentration
3 was so I immediately went over to the Unit 2 or Unit 1 HP Lab

4
5 ____ Is this yours?

6
7 ____ Yes.

8
9 ____ I didn't need it, I just looked at it.

10
11 ____ I went over to the HP Lab in Unit 1, got a, talked to the technician
12 that ran a sample and he said he felt pretty confident of the 700
13 number but since he had been on from 11:00 to 7:00 that night he was a
14 little bit tired and he thought maybe he did screw up. He wanted to
15 have someone else verify it. So I grabbed a second tech and I asked
16 each of them to run a sample, grab one, one sample, split it and each
17 of them run the analysis. They did that. They got about 400 ppm
18 each. I think there are about 5 ppm off on the two analyses.

19
20 ____ This is the kind of group we are going to assemble, right.

21
22 ____ This is all, yea

23
24 ____ You know
25

1 ___ I know you can't help it, you know a guy like me, I always get
2 nailed for these interviews on a day when I am being shoved around.

3
4 ___ I know.

5
6 ___ Then somebody makes a (profanity) tape and I never see it.

7
8 ___ You'll see this one.

9
10 ___ Okay, I am just telling you I am going to get to a point where I'm
11 going to stop talking to people.

12
13 ___ I understand.

14
15 ___ Okay, I'm... You can just (profanity) them right up the line,
16 second thing is somebody better, maybe they have, better put together
17 the documentation that exists for the notifications and things that
18 were made before it is gone.

19
20 ___ That's what I really need.

21
22 ___ The problem all going to have is we're going to get killed, that
23 day, hour by hour, I had so many (profanity) people on the phone with
24 me, looking for me, I was in the Lieutenant Governor's office.
25

1 ___ I know.

2
3 ___ And I know six months from now in some cool hearing room it's
4 going to sound like I don't know what I did and I don't. And yet I
5 know I didn't run the thing off the tracks.

6
7 ___ Right. I think that the thing that we don't have is maybe what
8 some one had put together for us because, chat chronology that you
9 have looked at is really talking about the reactor crisis.

10
11 ___ That's right.

12
13 ___ And DeCamp and Arnold and Herbein are saying, hey, we'll getting
14 pressure about did we notify people, how did we make a decision.

15
16 ___ Well guys like me and Seelinger get copies of some of this kind of
17 stuff you are making up now.

18
19 ___ Oh yea.

20
21 ___ Are you sure Herman going to give it to us.

22
23 ___ Yes.

1 ___ Without that I am going to make an issue of it, because Jesus
2 Christ, you know, it's the only thing I've got, I got to refamiliarize
3 myself with this stuff.

4
5 ___ Yea, I know.

6
7 ___ Here's the status of this thing here. We started review with the
8 but the VP and Herman last night, they said, hey, you got some conjectures
9 in here, we'll going to have to but they said take that out and only
10 give us stuff that you can actually document either from the control
11 room logs or from an interview, not something you infer and we're to
12 have that to them tomorrow afternoon and then it's to go on the street
13 as soon as they have said okay. And that's what we are working toward.

14
15 ___ Okay.

16
17 ___ And I just got direct orders from DeCamp that says I've got to
18 keep that contained...

19
20 ___ The way, the way I just talked to the NRC yesterday and today, why
21 don't you let me give my version of it in stages like I'll take you
22 from 4:00 to 8:00, and I won't go through the details of the trip but
23 I'll take you where I was from 4:00 to 8:00 and let them fill in till
24 8:00 o'clock and then go from 8:00 to 12:00.

25
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1 ___ Okay, but remember I am only trying to focus on, and I think it
2 will save all of your time, I am only trying to focus on the decision
3 to initiate site emergency, the decision to initiate general emergency,
4 what you based those on, when you did them as well as we can identify
5 that, who did them, who called who.

6
7 ___ Before we leave here we want a copy of these things.

8
9 ___ Well he's out, since I've got to go to an appointment here.

10
11 ___ Yes, this is George Seelinger, or Jim, Jim Seelinger, right.

12
13 SEELINGER: I'll talk a little bit and I've got it to you a little
14 chronologically, I got called at a quarter to six, in the morning and
15 had been told that Unit 2 had tripped. I am the Unit 1 superintendent
16 and frankly just the fact that they tripped it was not totally unusual
17 sort of thing. Gary said that there was, that they were having some
18 kind of a problem with pressurizer level that didn't make it sound
19 like, at that point there were no real cause for abnormal amount of
20 alarm but he did say, you know, don't give Unit 2 any trouble about
21 steam, Unit 1 was hot at that time and we were recovering from a
22 refueling outage and the auxiliary boiler can only supply feedwater
23 heating to one of the two units at a time. So, I immediately got on
24 the phone and thought well we have a shift supervisor on both units
25 due to this circumstance so that I'll call the shift supervisor and

1 tell him, hey don't give Unit 2 any trouble. The steam goes to Unit
2 2. And so I tried to call him and he was in the Unit 2 control room.
3 I thought oh gawd he was over there so I can't reach him and I am not
4 going to bother them in the middle of this thing if they are having
5 problems. And so I waited ten more minutes and I knew my supervisor
6 of operations would be in by about that time, I tried to call again.
7 And I said yea he's in but he's over in Unit 2 and I thought oh my
8 gosh, you know, so they really do have some problems. So I thought
9 well I better go in and make sure that nobody gives Unit 2 any trouble
10 about getting steam. That was still my objective as I started out and
11 I got on sight at about a quarter to seven in the morning. And as I
12 went from the side pass between the security building and the front
13 doors for Unit 1 the word site emergency came over the public address
14 system, so it was between a quarter to seven and ten minutes to seven
15 the site emergency was declared. Cause I remember, I dumped my stuff
16 off at my office, and then I started running the other way, not because
17 I wanted to run the other way but I forgot to pick up my TLD and I
18 knew I was going to be, wherever I was going to be a long time, so I
19 figured I better have my TLD with me, so I went back to the security
20 center, got my TLD, ran to the Unit 1 control room, which is where I
21 am suppose to be, and also I had seen Joe Logan's car in the parking
22 lot, he's the Unit 2 superintendent, so I figured, (1) I knew was
23 probably the Unit 2 problem because Unit 2 was having a problem and
24 (2) I knew that the opposite unit superintendent is supposed to go and
25 take charge his respective control room, so I went to the Unit 1

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1 control room and from the Unit 1 control room started to try, and
2 here's where it is foggy, in terms of what we tried to do now. But we
3 pulled out the emergency plan, I remember that, started to follow the
4 emergency plan, and started to try to do some of the offsite communicating
5 and here's where it gets foggy as if whether we were doing that or
6 Unit 2 was totally doing that. In addition to that we broke out all
7 the isoplates and the area maps, and started trying to track the plume
8 as best we could. And establish in the necessary communications with
9 Unit 2 per the plan. Now that happened in relatively rapid fashion
10 and we were pretty set up and rolling with respect to that by, well we
11 were set up and rolling by essentially 7:00 o'clock, five after seven.

12
13 ____ Were you in Unit 1 at that time.

14
15 SEELINGER: I was in Unit 1. I don't know what time I got to Unit 2,
16 but somebody finally called me over there.

17
18 ____ I called you over there.

19
20 SEELINGER: You called me over there.

21
22 ____ I got here, I got called at a quarter of seven. I have been on
23 the phone since 4:00, I was suppose to go to Oyster Creek.

1 ___ Yea, John, Floyd's up there.

2
3 ___ He is up at the control room.

4
5 ___ He was.

6
7 ___ Okay.

8
9 ___ Hey, do you want me to call up there ahead of time.

10
11 ___ Give me one second.

12
13 SEELINGER: At any rate, I was in the Unit 1 control room about,
14 somewhere between a half hour and forty-five minutes, I think. An
15 Gary calls me over to Unit 2 and I was in Unit 1 alternated between
16 the two control rooms the remainder of the day. And the reason for
17 that was, that periodically I was in charge of the emergency contro'
18 station, the ECS, the first day, and Unit 2, when Unit 1 became uninhabitable,
19 the plots moved over to Unit 2 and then they moved back to Unit 1 when
20 Unit 1 became in habitable again. It was a matter of habitability
21 that first day. The, in the middle, this is very confused because the
22 events ran together something fierce, time wise, but I do remember
23 that we ended up evacuating the normal ECS, which was the HP point,
24 that went to the Unit 1 control room. Unit 1 control room had to be
25 evacuated as an ECS because everybody was in masks over there for

1 awhile. Then that moved over to the Unit 2 control room, eventually
2 we got back to the Unit 1 control room and I don't remember the time
3 frame. The, these,

4
5 — Are you using this...

6
7 SEELINGER: What, no, I was going to because it's about the only thing
8 factual that I had.

9
10 What I did, George Printer was in the Unit 2 control room and George
11 is probably one of the people that in my mind, I think you ought to be
12 talking to, to give you a feel for some of the scenerio but these are
13 the calls that George had made. You'll find that almost all of those
14 went from the point of site emergency just immediately - for arrangements

15
16 — Down to the general emergency.

17
18 SEELINGER: When did you go.

19
20 — I got called, I was on the phone from 4:00 o'clock on, Okay.
21 Somewhere around 6:00 o'clock I even had a conference call Herbein,
22 Lee Rogers, me and George Kunter who happened to be in the control
23 room. Quarter to seven, I had made the decision at that point not to
24 go to Oyster Creek. Is that thing on.
25

1 ___ Yea.

2
3 ___ OK. Quarter to seven, I got a call from Dan Shovlin, okay. In
4 between there I believe I called Seelinger,

5
6 SEELINGER: He called me at a quarter of seven.

7
8 ___ I called Joe, Dan Shovlin and I had sort of told them to get their
9 ass in here. Jim must have been on the way, Dan was on the way, Dan
10 got here before I did. I never got a chance to get a shower is the
11 reason I wasn't able to get in the car. And I really didn't realize
12 the magnitude of it, I was just trying to feel like I was, you know,
13 feel like an all person and start to work. Quarter to seven Dan
14 called me and Dan's not an operator. Dan said hey, there's radiation,
15 he said the sample room got's it. He said we got 1 R in the machine
16 shop, might have said hot machine shop, either way its some place I
17 didn't expect 1 R. Then I started getting my ass in gear to go to
18 work. By the time I got here, it was probably around five after
19 seven, roughly. When I got here they had apparently, had already
20 declared a site emergency and at that point in the Unit 1 control room
21 I think Seelinger was, and he was helping with that end of it and in
22 the Unit 2 control room there was Joe Logan, Dick Dubiel, Mike Ross,
23 George Kunder and Lee Rogers came in or he was there.
24
25

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1 ___ Excuse me, would Kunder have been the senior man, would he have

2
3 ___ He is the technical superintendent.

4
5 ___ Would he have been the one who declared the site emergency, probably.

6
7 ___ Probably but it could have

8
9 SEELINGER: Yea, I talked to George on the phone and I suspect that
10 George, George is the one who initially

11
12 ___ I believe Bill Zewe declared it. I believe Bill Zewe declared it
13 or had George declare it on the basis of the number of monitors in
14 alarm.

15
16 ___ Okay.

17
18 ___ That's what I was told here.

19
20 ___ Okay.

21
22 ___ When I got here we were obviously in an increasing radiation
23 situation monitors, every monitor was going off. The dome monitor was
24 beginning to register and I don't know what time it happened exactly,
25 my memory is that around seven twenty or seven twenty-five we passed

1 through 8R and I declared a general emergency and we, at the time that
2 I got to the control room, I got briefed and I got to the control
3 room, what I did, was I said all right I am in charge of the emergency,
4 I am the emergency director, I said Mike Ross you'll take care of the
5 plant I'll only talk to you about the plant, Dick Dubiel you run the
6 offsite and onsite thing, the interface with the State, and so forth,
7 and communicate with me. I told Joe Logan to get the plan out. I
8 told George Kunder to start the notifications as I remember, or get
9 them started. So right away, the way I run the drill here is I talk to
10 three or four senior guys and which is the way we run the drill and I
11 only talk to them. The operators probably didn't even know what I was
12 doing, I would guess. And that's the way it started. My memory is
13 that we had calls going to that whole bunch, the NRC, the State,
14 within that first ten to fifteen minutes from 7:00 o'clock on everybody
15 was called.

16
17 — Just so it gets on the tape, you know, maybe we should read it for
18 the tape. And this is reconstructed from the logs of the guys who did
19 the calling. 0650, site emergency declared.

20
21 — Excuse me Jim which logs, and are those still in the control room.

22
23 — I think this was still on the board up in the control room. John
24 did you look.
25

1 ___ It's still there this afternoon.

2
3 ___ It's still on the board when they called them in, these guys
4 reconstructed this essentially from them between looking at the board,
5 the times the notifications were made and these guys being the guys
6 that did the calling, remembering what they called, versus the times
7 on the board. Here's what they put together for us. 0650 site emergency
8 declared. 0702 unable to contact Pennsylvania Civil Defense Duty
9 Officer. 0704 NRC notified, no one there but secretary to beep Duty
10 Officer. Approximately 0705 attempt to notify Herbein.

11
12 ___ Excuse me, Jim can I stop you just a couple of places.

13
14 ___ Yea.

15
16 ___ Which NRC.

17
18 ___ That would have been King of Prussia, I am sure.

19
20 ___ Okay.

21
22 ___ Okay, 0705 attempted to notify Herbein, unable to contact him.
23 0709 ERDA RAP team notified. Approximately 0709 attempted to notify
24 lawyer, can't get him. 0710 notified KLingerman in Met Ed. 0713
25 called Radiation Management Corp. in Philadelphia Electric number,




1 answering service will forward number. 0715 notified Dauphin County
2 Civil Defense. Approximately 0715 notified Pennsylvania Bureau of
3 Health. 0717 York Haven notified, York Haven monitor on.



4
5
6 — Let me tell you what happened there in case it is not on there. I
7 knew the wind was blowing towards Goldsboro, I had a 10R projection at
8 Goldsboro, somewhere in the sequence we had the meter pulled and read
9 and we had the State Police Helicopter called and that should be in
10 there.

11
12 It may be as I read on, but I remember that the State Police Helicopter




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14 — And they were over there by 7:30.



15
16 — 0718 notified Pennsylvania State Police. Approximately 0720 attempted
17 to contact ANI, no answer. 0724 general emergency declared. Approximately
18 0730 called back the RAPP team, they will be dispatching a team to the
19 site. Approximately 0730 contacted State Police and notified general
20 emergency. Approximately 0735 notified ANI, no one there except for
21 operator, left message for them to call us and that it was important.
22 0738 recalled Radiation Management Corporation, Philadelphia Electric,
23 to tell them of the general emergency, they will forward message.
24 Approximately 0740 NRC returned call. They will be dispatching a team
25 to the site. Phone was held open so they could be in constant communication











**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**









**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**





**IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



1 with us. Approximately 0930 ANI returned the phone call and were
2 notified of the general emergency .

3
4 ___ Now I don't know whether it's on your thing or not

5
6 ___ The only person that is 0702, Director Keven Malloy was called.
7 This has been verified with Civil Defense. 0704 Civil Defense called
8 BRH.

9
10 ___ I verified this with BRH, this is Cegasas, today. 0707 Met Ed
11 again called Civil Defense.

12
13 ___ Okay.

14
15 ___ The reason that happened that many times was I couldn't get anybody
16 to tell me they had personally talked to Kevin Mulloy and I even had
17 Kunder called him at home.

18
19 ___ 0707 is when you asked, you told me that we had not got a call
20 back from BRH and I got on the phone and called Kevin Malloy. I
21 personally talked to him in the Civil Defense Office, told him to get
22 somebody from the BRH on the phone back to us, gave them the telephone
23 numbers, 6017 number, within ten minutes there was a phone call back
24 and from that point on we established an open line.
25

2003 001

1 ___ Okay I have one other note here and this is from George at home.
2 George said that at 0740 the BRH called back and Jeroski was talking,
3 George was on the phone with Jeroski and George gave him a run down of
4 the plant's status and we kept the open line just like you requested.

5
6 ___ Right, now I got the helicopter because the wind was blowing in
7 its worst condition to me like two mile an hour less, and that meant
8 that it would reach Goldsboro and we had the 10R projection that had
9 first been given to me which is based on a source term out of the
10 building, out of the monitor of the building, that I was in trouble.
11 So we sent the helicopter, the meter was read and had nothing, the
12 helicopter was over there and I don't know why there was none on
13 there. We ought to make sure that the logs of these state agencies
14 are a part of this documentation because they've got to show what I
15 did. I don't know if it has been done yet but these guys all keep
16 logs the Civil Defense keeps logs, the State Police keeps logs and
17 they do it normally. They do it in emergencies. They are not like us.
18 I know I had no readings over there. I had no readings and I had a
19 guy at the west shoreline too, with no readings.

20
21 ___ We had a guy out, between the screen houses on the west shore
22 which I believe

23
24 ___ Had a team dispatched in a car and had a team dispatched in a
25 helicopter, in the direction of the plume.

1 ___ The car would take approximately an hour to get over there.

2
3 ___ It was 7:30 in the morning, that's why I asked for a helicopter.
4 The helicopter came right away.

5
6 ___ I remember that.

7
8 ___ I don't know why that isn't in any of this, it's got to be in a
9 log somewhere but it was confirmed to me it was here, it was dispatched.

10
11 ___ Do we know where off hand maybe you do Dick, I don't, we had the
12 phone talkers, I continually remember that, the first couple of days,
13 trying to get the phone talkers to write down absolutely everything
14 they heard, because... I don't know what happened to Don Berry's Log.
15 I don't know.

16
17 ___ The one thing I can say is there was a box in the control room
18 that was put on the floor, that said all logs and everything went into
19 it. Now... I have a feeling that that's where the phone talkers log
20 and everything else probably ended up in there. Remember...

21
22 ___ There was only the boxes in the control room got to Brottin's
23 trailer.
24
25

2003 003

1 ___ Brotten's probably, there was nothing left in mine.

2
3 ___ And then those have been transfered over to in the trailer 26, at
4 the observation center.

5
6 ___ Somebody better look in there for any of these you got to look for
7 logs and phone talkers and things of this morning.

8
9 ___ Now, one other thing is, now you're talking about all this occurring
10 in the time from when I got here until a quarter till 8. Management
11 was notified and what I also had done around that same time, was I had
12 either, I had Logan going through the plans, telling me that everything
13 in the plan was met. That's why I aksed you to read the plan before
14 you came down here, because there were things going on, I'm sure, that
15 was confirmed to me that I don't remember. I would only have worried
16 about exceptions.

17
18 ___ And I was involved in that same action too.

19
20 ___ At the same time, when I first came in and got briefed on this, I
21 also realized that the situation we were in was one that I don't even
22 remember being trained on and that is, the pressurizer was solid, the
23 loops went steam bubbles in them and the pumps wouldn't run, and there
24 were attempts made to start the pumps somewhere in that scenerio, in
25 that same time frame, and we had like a 100 amps, we knew we were

1 running on less than water. That may have gone on before I got to the
2 control room.

3
4 — That's sequence is what the other guys have put together.

5
6 — That's right but I at that time, decided that once the emergency
7 drill was running and we had offsite and onsite things going on and
8 the ECS was moving and the State was moving then we turned our attention
9 to the plant, in an hour by hour fashion and I brought Seelinger to
10 Unit 2 because of his qualifications on Unit 2 being that he spent a
11 year as a technical superintendent down there, and that I had Lee
12 Rogers there and I had Seelinger and I had Ross and I had Logan helping
13 with the plan. What I basically did was every twenty to forty minutes
14 we met in a room back there and assessed where we were and where we
15 were going to go. And Dubiel handled his end of it with offsite,
16 onsite communications with the State, with Maggie and then I also at
17 the same time, there were calls from Herbein, there were calls from
18 Persippany, there were calls from Lynchburg, the whole thing got
19 compressed into a very pressurized almost break you type atmosphere.

20
21 — Did, do you use these check lists and are they initialed, are they
22 somewhere, You know.

23
24 — Perhaps you... check this over for a second.
25

2003 005

1 — This is out of the big volumes of the emergency procedures.

2
3 — No as a matter of fact there is changes, is this an up-to-date?

4
5 — It doesn't look like an up-to-date one.

6
7 — It is suppose to be, but it might not be.

8
9 — You also go to Washington to get out Unit 1 information on the
10 emergency plan. It ain't...

11
12 — I am sure that this is not the up-to-date plan. This checklist
13 is 1974.

14
15 — I'm positive. You've got to get current a copy of the two volumes
16 of the Emergency Plan.

17
18 — Okay. Where do I do that. I was...

19
20 — You've got to get it through Bill Parker, I would guess. Bill
21 Bolie trying to get ...

22
23 — This is what Bill Parker gave me.
24
25

2003 006

1 ___ That can't be right. What ...

2
3 ___ You know, I brought a copy. I didn't bring the whole two volumes.

4
5 ___ Yes. I know... What we're following was right out of Section II.
6 1670.2 ...

7
8 ___ That in there.

9
10 ___ 1670.3 which would be Site Emergency and General Emergency Procedures.

11
12 ___ But you didn't, you didn't follow the checklist.

13
14 ___ Whether or not anyone checked off all of the actions, they were
15 spelled as if there were a checklist.

16
17 ___ What we did do is, because I remember physically doing this, is I
18 went to the procedure, the heavy procedures essentially the Site
19 Emergency Procedure, there is very little difference between the Site
20 Emergency and the General Emergency Procedure, and I went through
21 this, item by item, and I read each item and then I verified by looking
22 around.

23
24 ___ This is 1670.2. Okay.
25

2003 007

1 ___ I went through that and I made sure that everything that was in
2 here was physically being done. Then I went over and I looked at
3 1670.3 and I periodically got distracted from this so I had somebody
4 pick it up when I was not there, a Senior Guard and I can't tell you
5 who it was right now because it changed. But, I physically made sure
6 that everything that was written down here was in fact being done, or
7 in progress. That's essentially how we did that. As far as the
8 offsite notifications goes, the fellows who made that call made it in
9 accordance with the, there's a thing in here...

10
11 ___ Telephone list.

12
13 ___ Yeah. Immediately in accordance with that.

14
15 ___ Yeah. That's...

16
17 ___ That's the one that we used. This is referenced information right
18 here...

19
20 ___ ___ Okay. You're gonna make a copy of that stuff for me.

21
22 I'll make a copy of this stuff, for you, that's right. But we used
23 1670.2 and 1670.3 to confirm where we were and to make sure we were
24 doing everything in accordance with that. I felt like, we had this
25 drill yearly and I guess I've been involved in about four of them now.

1 I ran the first one the year I was first on site. We usually come off
2 on the drill pretty well. We usually get some compliments on the
3 drill, particularly from a fellow by the name of Chick Gallina, who
4 used to be the primary inspector, and I felt like, as I saw us go
5 through the thing even though the pressure was intense, as Gary has
6 described. Our drilling had really paid off, I mean there was not, a
7 real element of confusion at all as far as the Emergency Plan was
8 concerned. We were carrying out the notifications as prescribed, we
9 were doing everything just completely as written down. We always
10 wondered if we ever had one of these things what we would do when the
11 wind blew from east to west, because transportation is terrible, to
12 the west shore from here. You have to go around. When Gary was just
13 right on top of that with his helicopter, you know what I mean, it was
14 during the rush hour and (unintelligible)... that really showed some
15 presence of mine, I thought I didn't realize he had done that last
16 thing. The helicopter thing, but boy that came.

17
18 — When I came through the license hearings in Unit 2, I realized the
19 vulnerability on the west shore in my own mind or what I felt to be
20 vulnerability. At ten after seven in the morning and I remember, I
21 went, we dry run the helicopter this year and it was there that morning.
22 I feel, and of course that would be very...

23
24 — I was able to tell within the first hour that there was nothing to
25 the west shore boundary, nothing in Goldsboro. Nothing.

1 ___ Right.

2
3 ___ That's all I worry about.

4
5 ___ You mentioned the 8 rem, is that one of the conditions...

6
7 ___ That's one of the general emergency conditions. There was about
8 three or four things in there for Site Emergency, 125 at the site.
9 That's so many times on the stack vent and 8R in the building and I,
10 and the building was going above 8R. That was the first thing that I
11 remember, that stack probably...

12
13 ___ What were the first specific action levels?

14
15 ___ The first one is the double monitor read screener reads greater
16 than 8R per hour.

17
18 ___ That the one that triggered.

19
20 ___ That's the one that triggered the General Emergency.

21
22 ___ Okay, not long after that, that went off scale. That's another
23 one, but, you know.

1 ___ Is that an alarm that's printed out anywhere so there might be a
2 record of the ...

3
4 ___ Yes, as a matter of fact it is on a strip chart, Don Ruthford had
5 copies of all the strip charts a couple days ago.

6
7 ___ I've got those too.

8
9 ___ One of the things I have never had is the benefit of looking at
10 any documentation to see whether any of the times I gave were anywhere
11 near accurate. Okay? So what I give I've told the NRC is to the best
12 of memory. Those hours went by, those 20 or 30 hours in a very fast
13 fashion, and when I woke up Thursday morning I couldn't remember any
14 of it. I was even, you know, I was at the Lt. Governor's office at 2
15 in the afternoon.

16
17 ___ See, I think you fellows have told me and this should be, ... be
18 able to let me tell them most of what I need is...

19
20 ___ (Unintelligible) I don't believe that if we hadn't had, I believe
21 the kind of capability we kept here, kept the State out of as much
22 trouble as anybody because we were able to man teams, to give them
23 advice, to put teams out, to respond, to tell people positively where
24 the readings were, before they ever came on with any kind of, the NRC
25 or anyone.

2003 011

1 ___ That's the other thing that I was going to ask you about. Is the
2 survey that was going on, did, that was something Dick was in charge
3 of? Getting people out

4
5 ___ On or off ...

6
7 (Unintelligible)

8
9 ___ On or off site teams. Radio communications to those teams. The
10 ECS, Dick is overall charge, remember there that's why we gotta look
11 for any ECS documentations. There was a guy in charge of the ECS,
12 probably Mulleavy...

13
14 ___ I was initially part of...

15
16 ___ You were initially. They have a whole, they get the isopress out

17
18 ___ What we were doing is, we were taking all the readings from the
19 radio, they were on slips of paper, and I can't even remember if that
20 was the first or the second day, but I started logging all those
21 readings down. Now, I have some of the early logs....

22
23 (Unintelligible)

1 ___ I have copies of some logs but they don't start till, the ones I
2 just saw started, I believe, at 1900 on the 28th.

3
4 ___ I wouldn't be surprised if that was log type...

5
6 ___ Yeah.

7
8 ___ It doesn't include the slips of paper...

9
10 ___ In the early hours of this event and through the afternoon, I
11 don't remember anything offsite (unintelligible)...

12
13 ___ One of the reasons for that...

14
15 ___ The wind stopped.

16
17 ___ The winds shifted _____... died

18
19 ___ Dead.

20
21 ___ Then it went ... swirled

22
23 ___ We had it on site. I was more worried about where people were
24 assembled. We moved people in assembly areas. And I discharged
25 people from the gates to go home because of the fact that the wind was
 stagnant and the control room weren't getting it.

1 ___ We had one indication of a reading which, as a matter of fact in
2 Goldsboro they had an indicate of an iodine level that was 10^{-8} , I
3 don't remember what the exact number was, it was 10^{-8} level which I
4 was very hesitant to believe because of the SAM-2. We immediately
5 made arrangements to get the sample flown up to the State, made arrangements
6 for the helicopter to take it to, I believe.... the Holy Spirit Hospital,
7 at Camp Hill....

8
9 ___ (Unintelligible)... I forgot all about that

10
11 ___ I was thinking of that earlier....

12
13 ___ It was that the Holy Spirit Hospital at Camp Hill and the state
14 picked it up there. They analyzed it and determined that it was less
15 than their MDA, which was extremely low. The levels at the fences
16 over here on the west shore, we did start seeing some levels. I don't
17 remember ...

18
19 ___ 6 mR, 6-7 mR at that pipe... that sort of thing. But nothing in
20 Goldsboro and then the wind died and shifted. It shifted east..., it
21 shifted south

22
23 (Unintelligible)...

1 ___ We had the helicopter who brought the guys back.

2
3 ___ We had readings being taken over at the observation center after a
4 while.

5
6 ___ The highest levels that I remember were in the evening of the
7 first day and they were taken north of the airport along either 230 or
8 283, north of the airport.

9
10 ___ Yeah.

11
12 ___ And there were readings as high as 12 or 13 mR/hr. There was a
13 school that's northeast of the Turnpike interchange, over there maybe
14 half a mile or three quarters of a mile...

15
16 ___ Yeah.

17
18 ___ Yeah, they're east of the interchange and that was at 12 or 13
19 mR/hr. And that was the highest offsite reading, I think, throughout
20 the entire...

21
22 ___ I guess, Gary, you've already identified it is a problem and it
23 may be that we needed to try to do something to get all of the notes
24 the people have together.
25

1 ___ Yeah. My problem is that...

2
3 ___ What I my job is data, management is to try to do get all the
4 stuff assembled, make sure we got it in a file and I've gotten a lot
5 of people working to do that. We didn't get it started probably soon
6 enough because some things were out there in the trailer and people
7 come and go and, but even now in this emergency thing, this may be the
8 most important one when you look at the offsite impact, how did we
9 handle....

10
11 ___ (Unintelligible)... I also encourage you to get people's notes...

12
13 ___ Yeah. I've already got that note...

14
15 ___ Because I think that they've got to show that there was constant
16 contact and there was constant communication, because there was. We
17 knew the conditions offsite for all day and where wind was blowing. I
18 never, in fact, that was after we got that under control, the hardest
19 part of this thing was the plant. And my fear that I couldn't get
20 this thing down.

21
22 ___ John can you pick any questions you want to aks these fellow.
23 (unintelligible)...

1 ___ I just want to go back to make sure of a few, a few things.
2 Quick, to straighten to my mind, as far as the General Emergency...
3 Looking at the plan, bang, what triggered it? On the, at 6:50,
4 approximately 6:50 a Site Emergency was declared. And again, there
5 are six action levels in the plan. A general comment I heard, I just
6 want to sure, what we really based that on, was essentially the section
7 that says a high alarm, the RMs in two separate buildings due to a
8 single event. I'm pinnin it what I heard the radiation monitors were
9 going...

10
11 ___ My memory is that what their looking, talking to say...

12
13 ___ John, at around quarter to seven, twenty to seven, somewhere
14 there, just as the 7 to 3 shift was coming in I just had people coming
15 in the door. The alarm went off in the hot machine shop, there's a
16 gamma monitor back there. Mike Janouski and Pat Donnchie immediately
17 went back. I was right behind them when we walked, we got into the
18 area right by the machine shop and we were ready to go into the hot
19 machine shop when they noticed .hat, the dose rate meter in their
20 hand, was reading about 3 to 400 mR/hr as they just turned it towards
21 the sample line, you know, where they...

22
23 ___ I was just going to say that didn't affect that the fact that they
24 were taking boron samples...
25

1 ___ That was because of the letdown sample was purging, okay.

2
3 ___ Okay.

4
5 ___ Or it was on recirc and they, as they moved the thing up towards
6 the sample line, they, it went up over 1R per hour and they were still
7 several feet away from the sample line. We, they got the security
8 guard out, I appointed Janous ' in charge at the ECS until a supervisor
9 could get in because I hadn't seen any at that point. And I called
10 Kunder, gave Kunder that information, and before I could even get out
11 of the Unit 1 neutralizing tank, a Site Emergency was declared and the
12 siren was going off. Okay, so I think that that plus what was happening
13 in the Aux Building, I'm sure they got several gamma monitors over
14 there going off. Could very well went to that declaration.

15
16 ___ The one thing, just in going through these actions, which may keep
17 in my memory a little bit, I remember that we tried throughout the
18 morning to say things on the paging system. At times we probably
19 didn't say as much as in retro-spec, now we might say, but we, you
20 know, we just didn't frankly know totally what we had so we kept
21 trying to announce to people the places to go, what we thought we had
22 and we tried to do that every half hour or so, in keeping the people
23 out of the plant informed of how bad or how stable the situation was.
24 We did have the assembly and accountability, we did account for everybody,
25 we didn't release them after we had the accountability...

2003 018

1 ___ When was that done?

2

3 ___ John, I remember it is in the..., I would say 9:00 o'clock and I'd
4 be plus or minus...

5

6 ___ (Unitelligible) I'd ask Jim Stacey if he has any documentation of
7 that.

8

9 ___ But I do remember that we did assemble all the people and we had
10 assembly areas in the warehouse, in the auditorium, and in the turbine
11 building in Unit 2.

12

13 ___ Plus we sent people, we eventually sent people from the gates to
14 the observation center and put someone in charge at the observation
15 center, so we then knew where the people were and we knew where the
16 plume was.

17

18 ___ And, in fact, we had the observation center, I directed somebody
19 that was coming in, to go down from the observation center to the
20 north gate that morning and divert all traffic, all incoming traffic,
21 and this would have been the no later than 7:00 because the people,
22 the maintenance people come in and get there by 7:30. To divert
23 everybody to the observation center, so that was one of the first
24 things I did when I got to the Unit 1 control room, I remember that
25 now. We had the communications, most of the time our communications

1 was on the red and the white phone between the two control rooms till
2 we got the phones established. We had status boards at both control
3 rooms, on or off site teams.

4
5 ___ And Unit 1 was in a hot shutdown, following the refueling in
6 preparation for a startup of testing for the site, the Unit 1 was hot
7 conditions, but not power conditions.

8
9 ___ We also later on that day made the decision to keep Unit 1 where
10 it was. I decided that, based on the fact that it... We could have
11 taken more people than we had at that point and time to try and cool
12 it down, so we didn't want to try anything like that.

13
14 ___ That night was around midnight I got permission to cool down Unit
15 1, we did that on a, as manpower permitted basis the next day. That
16 decision was based on the fact that we felt that where we were was
17 would merit not going anywhere in Unit 1 at the time.

18
19 ___ I remember we had an emergency repair party, I remember I've seen
20 them in the control room a few times when we had to evacuate the...

21
22 ___ We had _____, was in charge of maintenance in the control room.
23 He moved all the maintenance people around, he made sure that who got
24 sent home and who was sent in where people we would need possibly so
25 Dan, even though I'm not aware of it, Dan would have kept the vital

1 discipline here, the vital supervisors here, and people by name that
2 he knew he might need.

3
4 ___ The repair parties or whatever else we would end up with. As we
5 went, I think that the Emergency Plan was run by the book.

6
7 ___ I do too.

8
9 ___ Was run the same way, I run the drill. Right down. I had a set
10 of emergency drill cards that I picked up. I have always kept them.
11 I had the whole emergency plan on two cards, and I got in there and I
12 did exac..., you know, I started that and my mind was right on it...

13
14 ___ Did you have those with you?

15
16 ___ Oh, yeah. I didn't need those cards, but they start your mind
17 thinking. Its hard to realize you're really doing this.

18
19 ___ I've been through one, not on a power plant, but, on a research
20 reactor and I, thats when that first day I saw you on Thursday, I told
21 you...

22
23 ___ Yeah, that what I...

1 ___ I know the feeling. Its...

2
3 ___ Then, to us, we had, I felt that Dick Dubiel had the Emergency
4 Plan part that he had where he began to get people like Sid Porter
5 involved, and he had onsite and offsite, he had Maggie on the phone.
6 That part of it was really under pretty good control. The part we
7 turned our attention to around 8:00, probably 8:30 on, except to make
8 sure of the other things, was the plan.

9
10 ___ Could you identify when somebody from NRC first appeared in the
11 control room?

12
13 ___ Some...

14
15 ___ Yes. I can't tell you the time, but there were five guys to show
16 up, the first ones that came there. They came to the Unit 1 control
17 room first, is where we sent them and I think that this note here, I
18 would say that they got there around 10:00 in the morning.

19
20 ___ We can tell that from the security guards.

21
22 ___ But it would have...

23
24 ___ That's why I want to you to get... the security records
25

1 ___ It would have been close to 10:00 in the morning until... We were
2 having respirator problems at that time because we were periodically
3 in and out of respirators and we had so many people in the Unit 2
4 control room that what we did with the NRC is we said that two of we
5 would take two of them over into the Unit 2 control room but we'll
6 leave the others in...

7
8 ___ We began to move the (unintelligible)... people outa there to Unit
9 1 so two of them we sent over in respirators and the others stayed in
10 Unit 1 control room without respirators.

11
12 ___ You need to get security on it, I believe there were a lot more of
13 them on site by afternoon.

14
15 ___ Oh, there were. The first group, there were a group of five that
16 arrived at about 10:00

17
18 ___ The SWAT team, or whatever I call them, the SWAT team arrived or
19 the RAP team probably arrived, people like Brookhaven were on the
20 line, right?

21
22 ___ They responded great.

23
24 ___ The RAP team ... later that morning the helicopter, the aircraft
25 from RAP team, I don't remember a time, but it was either late in the

1 morning or early in the afternoon, they were flying overhead giving us
2 readings.

3
4 ____ Some of that kind of documentation gotta exist outside of our
5 organization. Because those kind of people keep logs as the normal
6 thing. I think that, you know, from there on we began to try assess
7 and figure out how to get the damn, you know, the data keep... Out
8 goal was to somehow to convince ourselves the core was covered, the
9 whole time from there on. The instrumentation that I had available
10 was not unconvincing but it wasn't proof positive. When I got to the
11 control room, TH was pegged high and TC was pegged low and the pressurizer
12 was solid, the pumps were off. I sent Ivan Porter out to get a computer
13 reading on the thermocouples and he got question marks. Then I sent
14 him down to the penetration and I got 200 degrees, 300 degree, no 2400
15 degrees. So, you know, we being, me and Lee Rogers, had called Lynchburg
16 pretty early. You. We sat in the room every hour trying to figure
17 out. First of all we tried to just keep the thing pumping water, all
18 we were doing was pumping that BWST to the electromatics in the floor,
19 nothing was changing. So, you know, we pumped 12 or 13 feet out of
20 the thing, and my fear was do we 50 feet out of the, it would still be
21 there and that thing's still hot and me no water. So, we, our goal
22 was to somehow get some circulation going...

23
24 ____ Alright.

1 ___ Either natural circulation with the steam generators or the
2 reactor coolant pump. Using a HP the whole time.

3
4 ___ We got the reactor coolant back, pump back in the neighborhood of
5 3:00 in the afternoon...

6
7 ___ It was after that...

8
9 ___ Was it after that?

10
11 ___ Because it was after I came back from the ...

12
13 (Unintelligible)...

14
15 ___ Probably 5:00, 5:30, my guess.

16
17 ___ The time sequence is just, anybody I talked to ...

18
19 ___ We ...

20
21 (Unintelligible)...

22
23 ___ My memory...

1 ___ Lose all sense of time.

2
3 ___ My memory is that we pumped against the electromatic at very high
4 pressures like 20, 2000, 1800, 2200, we topped HP injection against
5 the electromatic, we could have pumped against the codes, but we
6 assessed, we being this group assessed that, what we do is get the
7 same flow through the codes without being able to see pressure. We
8 pumped through there till around 11:00 in the morning at which time we
9 decided to take a shot at getting on core flood. The reason we took a
10 shot at core flood, now remember Lynchburg was on the phone, and
11 probably some people from Reading were on the phone, there was a lot
12 of good advice, but it was clear that it was my decision. We assessed
13 that if we could get down near core flood tanks and we saw them dump
14 on the core we could get assurance that the core had some water on it.
15 We couldn't tell that. We were scared that wasn't happening. Radiation
16 was all over the place, there was nothing, everything was off scale,
17 you got nothing, you have nothing in the core that tells you about
18 water level, you got no pressurizer levels that sits out the top, you
19 got no way of drawing the bubble, I didn't have any heaters, I didn't
20 have letdown, you had radiation in every room you went to, didn't even
21 have oil pumps for some of the RC pumps, couldn't get in some of the
22 rooms cause the readings were horrendous. At around 11:00, we started
23 down for core flood. We got down, if I remember to core flood and we
24 did that and I think we saw about a foot decrease in the core flood
25 tanks and at the same time the A loop responded for about the first

2003 026

1 time, that is the temperatures moved a little bit, and we then, I may
2 be wrong on the time, but it was somewhere in that sequence we ended
3 up trying to get TC or TH to respond. We knew TC was 240, we knew TH
4 was off scale, it didn't tell you nothing.

5
6 ___ The sequence of events there is based on the instrumentation so
7 that most of those things can be pinned down.

8
9 ___ Any other questions on that? On that emergency plan. I know you
10 guys are busy now. I don't want to take any more of your time. Do
11 you think I ought to try to talk to Kunder or wait awhile.

12
13 ___ No, I don't think you're gonna get anymore, personally.

14
15 ___ Just the first couple hours, Terry...

16
17 ___ I think that with

18
19 ___ The one thing else.... You might, that has probably got addressed
20 somehow is people, we isolated the B steam generator and we were
21 steaming off the A because we didn't have a vacuum timer. We lost
22 steam. We lost steam because, you know, there's no way of getting
23 steam. So, we had to go to the atmospheric, that was the big contention.
24 We were steaming out the A pipe, out the A atmospheric relief which
25 was our heat sink. As long as I at least steaming, I know it was

1 taking some heat off. It also, I think, we were taking readings up
2 near there.

3
4 — We took some readings up on the roof.

5
6 — We didn't have indications that, I was given that we were letting
7 anything out. Now, there's a lot of contention about the fact that I
8 was letting radioactive steam off. We were not steaming the B steam
9 generator, we were steaming because we had no vacuum, we were trying
10 to get the vacuum back. We had no steam, we had to get aux boilers
11 on, get them up, get them on. You know, Unit 1's hot and Unit 2's not
12 you can't supply both units so we lost steam, we had to come back, you
13 know, you went to a power condition in Unit 2 and no steam. Unit 2
14 was probably supplying Unit 1 with aux steam so you didn't have aux
15 boilers on when this started. Ok, so we didn't have steam, we had
16 vacuum, you had to steam the atmosphere, we were taking readings up
17 near there and we weren't getting anything. Now, there was, I was
18 told somewhere around noon to stop that steaming because of the pressure.
19 Then we did stop it. We drew a vaccum and stopped it.

20
21 — Because of the external pressure.

22
23 — Right.

1 ___ We were taking readings in that plume and we en't getting anything.

2
3 ___ As much as you could?

4
5 ___ We sampled before we steamed.

6
7 ___ Yes, we do.

8
9 ___ Okay.

10
11 ___ We sampled both steam generators and we confirmed that it was the
12 B steam generator that had the activity and that the A did not have
13 the activity.

14
15 ___ And in fact, we had a lines, we had lines crossed on the sample
16 list.

17
18 ___ Yeah. Because we had to go back and check them to make sure that
19 it was the B that had the activity....

20
21 ___ There was some early confusion both generators had it. And what
22 that confusion resolved to be was a switch of lines in the sampling
23 room. Now we pemanently, as I remember it, got the steam shut off in
24 the early afternoon. By 2:00, the steam was shut off. That time is
25 certainly not exact. It was very disarming to the public, in the

1 initial pressure was to stop that because you could see the steam
2 coming. The radiation was coming therefore, the radiation was coming
3 from the steam.

4
5 ___ Yeah. Well, this, let me get at least some initial system, those
6 notes will be extremely helpful...

7
8 ___ Let me...

9
10 ___ I think what, what I'm gonna do is just put together kind of a
11 brief review of the Emergency Plan and here's the way it was done.

12
13 ___ I think in terms...

14
15 ___ And so, I don't know, does anybody else have, did NRC ask you
16 about this kind of thing?

17
18 ___ Yes, they did yesterday.

19
20 ___ Did they? Okay.

21
22 I think in terms of the plan everything... that they...

23
24 ___ No one, I think, around here had time to focus on that kind of
25 thing. I was made suddenly that nobody had really asked about the
implementation...

1 ___ They introduced me to of those Commissioners and I just kindly to
2 tell them that the NRC not being notified was a real misnomer because
3 the, I showed him the board up there, I said, you see that. It says
4 NRC, I say, gotta talk to each other.

5
6 ___ Yeah. That ...

7
8 ___ That guy tried to explain to

9
10 (Unintelligible)...

11
12 ___ I said, well, I said I thinks irresponsible for the industry for
13 you to say things that of our organization.

14
15 ___ I do too.

16
17 ___ I think, myself, Gary, we did a better job with this, from a
18 standpoint, and this is a subjective comment, but we did a better job
19 with this than any of the drills we've ever run in terms of actually
20 handling it from an outside coordination and so forth. I mean, I
21 think everything was that we had ever practiced we did plus we had all
22 the adrenaline, in the thing being real.

23
24 ___ Yes.

1 ___ You know, and, you know there were a lot of asken faces around,
2 mine included, but I'll tell you, we didn't hesitate to know what
3 we're doing. That was very obvious. And our organization reflected
4 it, just like the drill. You came in, said you were in charge, you
5 talked to very few people, and I think they'll back you up...

6
7 ___ The atmosphere in the control room was never other than calm. It
8 may have been hany, but it was never excited.

9
10 ___ That's very true.

11
12 ___ The discussions we held were held, in the Shift Supervisor's
13 office. We came out, and that's all we did.

14
15 ___ The one thing different from this then any other drill we'd ever
16 run before is with the drills, you always exercise all the off site
17 portion, but in the you never have a permanent plant problem... after
18 we got all the off site stuff going, we dropped back to Jiminey
19 Christmas, we still have plant problem here that normally we're able
20 to assign to the Shift Foreman you know in the drills. And it, it
21 didn't distract our attention from the release to the public but
22 frankly, we still recognized it as our major problem.

23
24 ___ Our major concern was that the fuel didn't degrade anymore than it
25 had degraded from there on, and somehow, figure out how to prevent

1 that and how to stop this thing. I didn't really feel that we were
2 stopping it at that initial state. I was scared we'd run out of
3 water.

4
5 ___ I think the sequence is that yeah that's what you should have been
6 afraid of.

7
8 ___ And the pressure I was getting was you could just punch this
9 thing solid and I couldn't get this thing solid. You could have
10 pumped all day at that time, I'm convinced, without pumping water up
11 in the hot legs because you had to collapse them bubbles. You didn't
12 have a 4000 pound system. So you know, we, it was a hell of a scenario.

13
14 ___ Okay. I appreciate very much your time. I am sorry to bother
15 you...

16
17 ___ (Unintelligible)... No, if you need to come back

18
19 ___ I'll convey your concern here, I...

20
21 I think its really gonna be necessary for a guy, for the guys that I
22 had that were Senior in that control room that they give their scenario
23 that you put together, like I read the sequence of events. We need a
24 scenario for that day so we could all read through it, and first of
25 all comment on it.

1 ___ Yes.

2
3 ___ And second of all put in you mind because I'm certain if some of
4 us six months from now are gonna be sitting in a cool room somewhere
5 where somebody's smoking a cigar and they're gonna wanta dissect what
6 you did.

7
8 ___ Well, I think the guys who have been working on it have really
9 done a good job...

10
11 ___ Oh I don't have problem there, I'm saying this part of it here is
12 gonna be more important.

13
14 ___ Which?

15
16 ___ This part with the...

17
18 ___ Offsite stuff.

19
20 ___ And I really do.

21
22 ___ Can you, or one of you do it? Can you put out the inquiry about
23 any notes that anybody has, see that I get a copy.

1 ___ I'll see if I can trace some of that down...

2
3 ___ You know, in this case it has going into the permanent file. Any
4 time copy, the first thing I do is copy it you know, file, locked file
5 safe.

6
7 One thing I would recommend for any other plant, including Oyster
8 Creek if they don't have it, is somebody who is in the public relations
9 field be familiar with this emergency plan because, what I feel happened
10 was this emergency ran over a period of hours. This drill or this
11 event we had an emergency that started at 7:00 in the morning and it
12 was still going at 7:00 at night. We had people trying to talk to
13 outsiders, even my our managers didn't, didn't really know what I was
14 doing. We need a guy that's knowledgable of the events and a LOCA,
15 and a LOCA isn't easy that could talk to the press about what was
16 going on, you know if a Blane maybe would have known that I had to
17 call the Civil Defense... you know what I'm saying?

18
19 (Unintelligible)...

20
21 ___ Interesting thought because Dick Klingeman and I were doing just
22 what you were doing because Blane naturally, with the technical questions
23 coming in. Blanes group has to fail, open. Dick and I were manning
24 the phones until midnight that night and trying to help. At that
25 point in time those were not the questions that were being asked. Or

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1 even concerned with. Four days later they were, but those were not
2 the questions being asked or the possibility of those questions being
3 conveyed, Wednesday night, Thursday night, which, you know, both of us
4 there till midnight, on the phones with the press...

5
6 — The press went bananas.

7
8 — We took those little 15 minutes of video tape and the decay core
9 vaults, CBS reporter barged into the trailer, I didn't know who the
10 guy was. I had to push him out of the way to get by him to get to
11 another desk and I asked him, you know, can I help you? Where can I
12 get those tapes? I said, well that's the only one that exists, we're
13 not even sure what we're looking at. We had go to an operator to tell
14 us what we're seeing. "I want those tapes." And I said, you know, go
15 see a manager. And the guy went out and he went to see Keisch.
16 (Unintelligible). Or anybody he could get, apparently, that was
17 typical of what the reporters were doing, they just barged in...
18 Okay, thanks very much fellows.