



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

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JUL 26 1979

Docket No. 50-358

Cincinnati Gas and Electric  
Company  
ATTN: Mr. Earl A. Borgmann  
Vice President  
Engineering Services  
and Electric Production  
139 East 4th Street  
Cincinnati, OH 45201

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 79-16 which requires action by you with regard to your reactor facility.

Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

*James G. Keppeler*  
James G. Keppeler  
Director

Enclosure: IE Bulletin  
No. 79-16

cc w/encl:  
Mr. J. R. Schott, Plant  
Superintendent  
Central Files  
Director, NRR/DPM  
Director, NRR/DOR  
PDR  
Local PDR  
NSIC  
TIC  
Harold W. Kohn, Power  
Siting Commission  
Citizens Against a Radioactive  
Environment  
Helen W. Evans, State of Ohio

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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555  
July 26, 1979

IE Bulletin No. 79-16

VITAL AREA ACCESS CONTROLS

Description of Circumstances:

An attempt to damage new fuel assemblies occurred recently at an operating nuclear reactor facility. During a routine fuel inspection, the licensee discovered that a chemical liquid had been poured over 62 of 64 new fuel assemblies. Analysis indicates that the chemical liquid was sodium hydroxide, a chemical stored and used onsite.

The licensee stores new fuel assemblies in dry storage wells on the same elevation as the spent fuel pool within the Fuel Building, a vital area. Access to the building is controlled by use of a coded keycard which electronically unlocks the alarmed personnel portals. The licensee issues coded keycards to both licensee and contractor personnel after the successful completion of a background screening program. In addition, licensee site management certifies monthly that each individual has the need for a coded keycard in order to perform required duties. Further access within this building is not limited by other barriers or controls.

As a result of this incident, an initial licensee audit determined that several hundred licensee and contractor personnel had access to this area during the period when the attempt to damage the fuel was made. The audit also revealed that one coded keycard reader at a vital area portal was inaccurately recording access data at the alarm station. Also discovered during this audit were indications of frequent "tailgating" on access through the portals. Tailgating occurs when more than one person passes through a portal on one person's authorized access. Their passage is therefore not recorded, and unauthorized persons could gain entry in this manner. Tailgating does not include authorized access controlled by an escort.

Discussion of Applicable Requirements:

10 CFR 73.55(a) requires the licensees to protect against industrial sabotage committed by an insider in any position. 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7) states that access to Vital Areas shall be positively controlled and limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and who require such access to perform their duties. Specific commitments implementing this regulation are described in each licensee's approved Security Plan.

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