

**NORTHEAST UTILITIES**



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY  
THE HARTFORD ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY  
THE NEW HAVEN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY  
THE NEW BRITAIN ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY  
THE WATERBURY ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY  
THE WINDHAM ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY  
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(203) 666-6911

June 14, 1979  
MP-2- 4050

Mr. Boyce H. Grier  
Director, Region I  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference: Facility Operation License No. DPR-65  
Docket No. 50-336  
Reportable Occurrence RO-50-336/78-19/3X-2

Dear Mr. Grier:

This letter forwards update Licensee Event Report 78-19/3X-2 pursuant to Millstone Unit 2, Appendix A Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.7. The report concerns the inoperability of one of the two emergency diesel generators due to leaking injector pumps.

An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

J. F. Opeka  
Station Superintendent  
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

JFO/RAS:llm

Attachment: LER 78-19/3X-2

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (30)  
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, Washington, D.C. (3)

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ATTACHMENT

LER 78-019/03X-2  
Millstone Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-336

EVENT DESCRIPTION

While operating the 13U diesel for surveillance, a leaking injector pump was observed. In accordance with Technical Specification, Section 3.8.1.1, action statement (a), the 13U diesel was declared inoperable and the operability of the remaining A.C. sources was verified. The diesel is a Fairbanks - Morse Model 38TD8-1/8, and is rated at 2,750 kilowatts. The failed part was an injector pump valve cage, part number 116103127. A second failure of a valve cage occurred on 1/25/79:

CAUSE DESCRIPTION

An analysis of the discharge valve cages by the vendor, Fairbanks-Morse, revealed that the cause of the failures was elemental lead inclusions or stringers which ran longitudinally along the inside diameters of the valve cages. These inclusions resulted in stress risers at the surface of the valve cages. The stress concentration of the normal cyclic stress was sufficient to induce fatigue failure. The immediate corrective action was to replace the valve cages. Following the second failure all the discharge valve cages on the 13U diesel were visually inspected and no evidence of cracking was found. As permanent corrective action the vendor will upgrade his material inspections to preclude the use of any material for the manufacture of valve cages which shows the presence of lead inclusions.

JFO/RAS:11m

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