



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-369/79-35 and 50-370/79-21

Licensee: Duke Power Company
422 South Church Street
Charlotte, North Carolina 28242

Facility Name: McGuire Nuclear Station

Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370

License Nos. CPPR-83 and CPPR-84

Inspection at McGuire site near Charlotte, North Carolina and Corporate offices
in Charlotte, North Carolina

Inspector: *C. D. W. Farland for* 10-23-79
M. D. Hunt *for* Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: A. R. Herdt

Approved by: *C. D. W. Farland for* 10-23-79
J. C. Bryant, Section Chief, RCES Branch Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on September 26-28, 1979

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 16 inspector-hours onsite in the areas of control of fire stops, IE Bulletins and Circulars, construction status and noncompliances.

Results

Of the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

- *G. W. Grier, Project Engineer
- *J. R. Wells, Corporate QA Manager
- *E. B. Miller, Project Senior QA Engineer
- *M. S. Starnes, Construction QC
- *K. S. Kisida, QA Engineer, Electrical
- *G. B. Robinson, QA Engineer, Mechanical
- W. J. Foley, Jr., Principal Engineer, Electrical Division
- D. L. Canup, Design Engineer, Mechanical & Nuclear Division
- W. H. Bradley, QA Manager, Engineering
- J. M. Frye, Senior QA Supervisor
- F. E. Nash, QA Auditor
- W. O. Henry, QA Manager, Construction

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 28, 1979 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The licensee reported that during inspection of pipe hangers they have discovered nuts welded to the back of mounting plates to simulate an anchor bolt. They further stated that this condition appeared localized to only a few pipe hangers. They are investigating the matter and consider it part of the earlier reported CDR 369/79-22-02.

The licensee also advised the inspector that the environmental qualifications of equipment that could be subjected to conditions caused by pipe breaks is being evaluated. Should they determine that a deficiency exists they will report accordingly.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Open) Infraction 370/79-18-01, Modification to safety related motors without approved drawings. The inspector held discussions with the electrical engineering personnel regarding this item. The licensee advised the inspector that training sessions have been and will continue to be held to review engineering procedures.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items were not identified during this inspection.

1674 083

5. Independent Inspection Effort

The inspector examined several cable penetration fire stops. These fire stops are inspected by the criteria set forth in QA Procedure M-53, Fire Protection-Related System Installation Inspection. The inspector noted cases where the seal had been breached to install additional cables. A review of Construction Procedure #547 Procedure for the identification and release of penetrations requiring firestop installation, Instruction Serial No. 007, Breaching and repair of cable penetration fire stop installations, and records generated by these procedures indicated that the licensee has the methods for controlling the breaching and followup repair of cable penetration fire stops.

Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.

6. IE Bulletins (IEB) and IE Circulars (IEC)

(Closed) IEB 79-05, 79-05A, 79-05B, Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island and 79-06, 79-06A, 79-06B, Review of Operational Errors and System Misalignments Identified during the Three Mile Island Incident. The licensee acknowledged receipt of these bulletins which required no response.

(Closed) IEB 78-08, Radiation levels from Fuel Element Transfer Tubes. This bulletin did not require a response from the licensee.

(Closed) IEB 78-14 Deterioration of Buna-W components in ASCO solenoids. This bulletin applied to BWR's, no response is required.

(Closed) IEC 78-18 UL fire test. This circular was issued for information only.

(Closed) IEB 79-04, Incorrect weights for swing check valves manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation. The licensee advised RII in their May 29, 1979 letter that no valves manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation are in use at McGuire Nuclear Station.

(Closed) IEB 79-08, Events relevant to boiling water power reactors identified during Three Mile Island incident. This bulletin does not apply to this site.

(Closed) IEB 79-09 Failures of GE Type AK-2 circuit breaker in safety related systems. The licensee's letter to RII dated July 9, 1979 informed NRC that none of this type breaker is in use or planned for use at McGuire Nuclear Station.

(Closed) IEB 79-12 Short period scrams at BWR facilities. This bulletin does not apply to this site.

(Closed) IEC 79-02 Failure of 120V vital AC power supplies. The licensee has reviewed this circular and advised the inspector that after review of this circular they do not anticipate problems in this area.

(Closed) IEC 79-08, Attempted extortion - low enriched uranium. This circular does not apply to this site.

(Closed) IEC 79-10, Pipefittings manufactured from unacceptable material. The licensee reported no fittings of this type are used at McGuire.

(Closed) IEC 79-11, Design/construction interface problem. Duke Power Company designs and erects its own plants. A review of the interface between construction-design has been made to insure that controls are effective.

(Closed) IEC 79-12, Potential diesel generator turbocharger problem. The brand of diesel generator listed in the circular is not used at McGuire Station.

(Open) IEB 79-13, Cracking in feedwater system piping. Discussions were held with the licensee regarding the RT examination of feedwater and auxiliary feedwater nozzles at the steam generators. The licensee stated that the auxiliary feedwater nozzles will be radiographed using a sensitivity of 2T. RII will continue to followup.

7. Inspector Followup Items (IFI)

(Closed) IFI 369/78-26-02 & 370/78-12-03, Engineering assurance procedures. The inspector interviewed one auditor and reviewed the documentation for the training session to reinstruct the QA audit division on followup and verification of corrective actions before closing an audit finding.

(Closed) IFI 370/79-09-01, Warehouse No. 2 nonconforming area designation. The area has been caged off to provide segregation of nonconforming items. Further the welding rod storage has been moved from warehouse No. 2 to No. 4 where better control of large quantities of similar materials can be maintained.