



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JUL 23 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: T. Ippolito, Chief, Operating Reactors Branch #3,
Division of Operating Reactors


FROM: G. Lainas, Chief, Plant Systems Branch, Division
of Operating Reactors

SUBJECT: EDWIN I. HATCH UNIT 1, REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL
INFORMATION DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE (TAC 10026)

Plant Name: Edwin I. Hatch, Unit 1
Docket No.: 50-321
Responsible Branch: ORB #3
Project Manager: D. Verrelli
Reviewing Branch: Plant Systems Branch
Status: Awaiting Information

In response to technical assistance request TAC 10026, the Plant Systems Branch has reviewed the licensee's submittal of July 22, 1977 and found that additional information is required in order to complete our review.

The attached request for additional information should be forwarded to the licensee as soon as possible with a request for response within 45 days.


G. Lainas, Chief
Plant Systems Branch
Division of Operating Reactors

Contact:
S. Rhow, X28077
C. Cleveland, EG&G

Enclosure:
As stated

7908270482

cc w/enclosure:

D. Eisenhut

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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1
DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE
(TAC 10026)

1. The NRC letter of June 2, 1977, position (1)(f) called for surveillance requirements for second level undervoltage monitors. Enclosure 2 of that letter provided Model Technical Specifications (MTS) to be followed as closely as possible. Modify your proposal to include a 12 hour channel check for these monitors.
2. In your submitted proposal for surveillance requirement 4.9.A.6.C, the load breakers are in test position. Your proposal also does not mention the ≥ 5 minute requirement of the MTS. It is the staff's position, as shown in Enclosure 2, 4.8.1.1.X.C, that the time requirement and actual loading of the buses should be performed. These tests will confirm that the voltage transients from starting large motors will not trip the emergency buses spuriously. Comply with this criteria or provide additional justification to support your present submittal.
3. Provide sufficient information (voltage drop analyses) to allow our independent verification that the undervoltage protection voltage setpoint and time delay selected will not cause spurious separation of safety buses from offsite power during all modes of plant operation (start-up, shutdown, power operation and accident condition) due to automatic or manual starting of large motors, bulk or sequential loading or automatic transfer of electrical loads. The analyses should include conditions when the safety buses are supplied power from the Unit Auxiliary Transformer, the start-up/reserve transformer or other available offsite connections and assuming the need for electrical power is initiated by an anticipated transient (e.g., unit trip) or an accident, whichever presents the largest load demand.