

May 18, 1979

TO: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region III

Attention: Tom Tambling

SUBJECT: Reportable Occurrence per Technical Specification 6.9.1.8.f

Davis-Besse Unit 1 - Mode 5 Power (MWT) = 0, Load (Gross MWE) = 0

At 1000 hours on May 18, 1979, it was determined a reportable event existed in that improper field installation of hydraulic snubbers during plant construction could have prevented the fulfillment of the functional requirements of systems required to cope with accidents analyzed in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

The following problems were identified with hydraulic snubbers during the conduct of Surveillance Test ST 5044.01, Inspection of Safety Related Snubbers:

- a) Snubbers had wrong cylinder vent and tube fittings installed which may not have allowed a proper seal, and permitted air in-leakage to degrade snubber performance. This was common to snubbers rebuilt in October-December, 1976 to replace non-ethylene-propylene seal materials.
- b) Fluid reservoirs were installed on three snubbers with improper orientations which may have rendered the reservoir inoperable and/or allowed air in-leakage.
- c) Installation of brackets mounting the local reservoirs were not per design and required removal of cap head body bolts which would have allowed air into the hydraulic cylinders and possibly disturbed the o-ring seals. This affected at least four snubbers.
- d) Five snubbers had non-ethylene-propylene seals.

To date, 68 of 97 hydraulic snubbers tested have failed the 18-month functional surveillance testing which verifies correct piston movement, lockup and bleed. Sixty-seven snubbers were sent to the vendor for test and repair, from which six were found acceptable. The predominant failure area was in bleed rate, which was attributed to excessive air in the cylinders. The current surveillance test acceptance criteria for bleed rate of 3-8 inches per minute is considered too restrictive by the vendor who recommends 0.5 - 10 inches per minute. An analysis

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
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by the architect/engineer is being conducted to resolve this test deficiency.

Tom Tambling of NRC Region III notified in person at 1030 hours on May 18, 1979.



Terry D. Murray
Station Superintendent
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
Toledo Edison Company

TDM/SMQ/ljk

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