



JAMES S. GRANT

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May 15, 1979

Docket No. 50-346  
License No. NPF-3  
Serial No. 1-67

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Director, Region III  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

Dear Mr. Keppler:

This letter is to identify a change in the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 response to IE Bulletin 79-05B, item 4. Enclosed is page 4-1 that revises Toledo Edison's May 4, 1979 (Serial No. 1-65) transmittal.

The effect of the change is that Davis-Besse Unit 1 procedures will not now be modified to provide a manual reactor trip on low pressurizer level. This is a more proper response, because low pressurizer level is associated with underpressurization rather than overpressurization events. A reactor trip would only aggravate the problem during an underpressurization event as it removes the primary heat source; therefore, our current procedures calling for increasing reactor coolant makeup on decreasing level will be unaffected. The reactor core will continue to be protected by the low RC pressure trip as analyzed in the FSAR.

Yours very truly,

*J. S. Grant / JSG*

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JSG:TJM/pm  
enc.

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection  
Washington, D. C. 20555

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Item 4

Provide procedures and training to operating personnel for a prompt manual trip of the reactor for transients that result in a pressure increase in the reactor coolant system. These transients include:

- a. Loss of main feedwater
- b. Turbine trip
- c. Main Steam isolation Valve closure
- d. Loss of off-site power
- e. Low OTSG level
- f. Low pressurizer level

Response

A hard wired reactor trip on the loss of main feedwater and on a turbine trip will be installed prior to Mode 3 operation. Procedures will be prepared and the operators will be instructed to manually trip the reactor on the closure of the main steam line isolation valve, and on low steam generator levels, prior to Mode 3 operation. Procedures will be prepared and the operators will be trained to confirm that the reactor has automatically tripped upon a total loss of off-site power which has forced the Emergency Diesel Generators to start. However, if the main turbine-generator is isolated from the 345 KV transmission system and it is supplying the unit's house power (including reactor coolant pumps), then the reactor will not be manually tripped. If the reactor were tripped under this condition, the main turbine generator would also be tripped which would result in an unnecessary momentary loss of AC power, which would force the Emergency Diesel Generators to start. Also, this tripping would cause the loss of forced reactor coolant circulation.

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