

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK: (1)

0 1 | 0 | H | D | B | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | N | P | F | - | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 30 57 CAT 58
 LICENSEE CODE LICENSE NUMBER LICENSE TYPE

CON'T
 0 1 | R | P | T | S | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | - | 0 | 3 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 7 | 9 | 9
7 8 60 61 66 69 74 75 80
 REPORT SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | Main Steam Safety Valve SP17B1 lifted early while the unit was at approximately 15%
 0 3 | power following a unit runback. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Tech-
 0 4 | nical Specification 3.7.1.1. The high flux trip setpoint had already been reduced to
 0 5 | <92.91% of rated thermal power due to an inoperable steam safety valve on A loop.
 0 6 | There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or station personnel. The
 0 7 | remaining operable valves have enough relieving capacity to serve their intended
 0 8 | function of relieving pressure if a unit trip would occur. (NP-33-79-34) 80

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE: C C (11) CAUSE CODE: X (12) CAUSE SUBCODE: X (13) COMPONENT CODE: V A L V E X (14) COMP. SUBCODE: P (15) VALVE SUBCODE: B (16)
 17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: 7 9 (21) EVENT YEAR: 7 9 (22) SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 3 2 (24, 26) OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3 (28, 29) REPORT TYPE: L (30) REVISION NO.: 0 (32)
 ACTION TAKEN: E (18) FUTURE ACTION: Z (19) EFFECT ON PLANT: B (20) SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z (21) HOURS: 0 0 1 (22) ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y (23) NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: Y (24) PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N (25) COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: D 2 4 3 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The apparent cause is not certain. The two 1050 psig and two 1070 psig safety valves
 1 1 | on each header were tested. Valves SP17A1/B1 (1050 psig) were found to be outside
 1 2 | the design setpoint. The valves were adjusted, tested, and declared operable at 2115
 1 3 | hours on 2/22/79. An evaluation to determine actual cause of the occurrence, and to
 1 4 | provide a resolution, is being performed. 80

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS: E (28) % POWER: 0 1 5 (29) OTHER STATUS: NA (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY: A (31) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Operator observation (32)

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED: Z (33) OF RELEASE: Z (34) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA (36)

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (37) TYPE: Z (38) DESCRIPTION: NA (39)

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER: 0 0 0 (40) DESCRIPTION: NA (41)

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE: Z (42) DESCRIPTION: NA (43)

2 0 | ISSUED: N (44) DESCRIPTION: NA (45)
 PUBLICITY: 7 9 0 3 2 7 0 5 5 1

NRC USE ONLY
 68 69
 419-259-5000, Ext. 250

TOLEDO ELIOTSON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-79-34

DATE OF EVENT: February 22, 1979

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Main Steam Safety Valve lifted early

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 416 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: A Main Steam Safety Valve (SP17B1) on B loop (Steam Generator 1-1) lifted early while the unit was at steady state condition at approximately 15% power following a unit runback.

This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.7.1.1 which requires the valves to be operable in Modes 1, 2, and 3. The Action Statement required the valve to be restored to operable status or the high flux trip setpoint be reduced within four hours, or the unit be in Hot Shutdown (Mode 4) within six hours and Cold Shutdown within thirty hours. The high flux trip setpoint had already been reduced to <92.91% of rated thermal power per Table 3.7-1 due to an inoperable valve on A loop (Steam Generator 1-2).

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The apparent cause is not certain. It may be due to changing ambient conditions and/or flow induced vibration at low power levels.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. The remaining operable valves have enough relieving capacity to serve their intended function of relieving pressure if a unit trip would occur.

Corrective Action: The two 1050 psig and two 1070 psig safety valves on each header were tested per Maintenance Work Order 79-1565 in order to determine the valve which lifted early. The first 1050 psig valve on each header (SP17A1/B1) were found to be outside of $\pm 1\%$ design setpoint. The valves were adjusted, tested, and declared operable at 2115 hours on February 22, 1979. The valves (SP17A3/A4/B2/B3/B4) were tested and found within $\pm 1\%$ design setpoint.

Company personnel are working with the vendor in evaluating the safety valves in order to determine actual cause of occurrence and provide a resolution.

Facility Change Requests 77-322 and 77-319 have been issued for implementation to install hoods on the main steam safety valve exhaust stacks for protection during

winter months and provide ventilation during the summer months. Both FCRs will help control ambient conditions. Temporary ventilation will be provided if ambient temperatures become excessive.

Failure Data: There have been three previously reported occurrences of incorrect safety valve lift setpoints. See Licensee Event Reports NP-33-77-117, NP-33-78-145, and NP-33-79-25.

LER #79-032