

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (1)

0 1 | 0 | H | D | B | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | N | P | F | - | 0 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T 0 1

REPORT SOURCE 60 L 61 0 5 0 - 0 3 4 6 7 1 1 3 0 7 8 8 1 2 2 7 7 8 9

DOCKET NUMBER 68 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | On 11/30/78, reactor power was raised to the power level cutoff (92%). Xenon "burn-

0 3 | out" continued to insert positive reactivity. Control rods were inserted to their

0 4 | allowable limit and boron injection commenced to add negative reactivity. Power in-

0 5 | creased to approximately 95% and xenon reactivity was declared to be greater than 10%

0 6 | from the equilibrium. The unit was returned to less than 92% power within 15

0 7 | minutes. Chemical analysis indicated no violation of fuel integrity occurred

0 8 | within the core. (NP-33-78-138)

0 9 | 7 8 9

SYSTEM CODE 9 R 10 C 11 CAUSE CODE 11 A 12 CAUSE SUBCODE 12 A 13 COMPONENT CODE 13 Z Z Z Z Z Z 14 VALVE SUBCODE 19 Z 20 Z 21

17 LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 21 7 22 8 23 - 24 1 1 8 25 26 27 / 28 0 3 29 OCCURRENCE CODE 30 L 31 - 32 0 33 ACTION TAKEN 33 H 34 Z 35 EFFECT ON PLANT 35 Z 36 SHUTDOWN METHOD 36 Z 37 0 38 HOURS 37 0 39 0 40 41 Y 42 N 43 Z 44 Z Z Z Z 47 26

18 FUTURE ACTION 19 REPORT TYPE 20 REVISION NO. 21 COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

22 ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED 23 NPRD-4 FORM SUB. 24 PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER 25

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The personnel involved failed to adequately anticipate the dynamics of the xenon tran-

1 1 | sient sufficiently in advance to permit proper reactivity control. Upon identification

1 2 | of exceeding the 10% equilibrium xenon requirements, negative reactivity was added

1 3 | until thermal power was within the power level cutoff value. The importance of anti-

1 4 | cipating transient plant responses has been discussed with the personnel involved.

1 5 | 7 8 9

FACILITY STATUS 7 F 8 9 10 11 12 13 % POWER 10 0 9 2 11 NA 12 OTHER STATUS 13 NA 14 METHOD OF DISCOVERY 15 A 16 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 17 Operator Observation 18

1 6 | 7 8 9

ACTIVITY CONTENT 7 Z 8 9 10 Z 11 NA 12 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 13 NA 14 LOCATION OF RELEASE 15 NA 16

1 7 | 7 8 9

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 7 0 8 0 9 0 10 11 Z 12 NA 13 DESCRIPTION 14 NA 15

1 8 | 7 8 9

PERSONNEL INJURIES 7 0 8 0 9 0 10 11 NA 12 DESCRIPTION 13 NA 14

1 9 | 7 8 9

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 7 Z 8 9 10 NA 11 TYPE 12 NA 13 DESCRIPTION 14 NA 15

2 0 | 7 8 9

PUBLICITY ISSUED 7 N 8 9 10 NA 11 DESCRIPTION 12 NA 13

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TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-78-138

DATE OF OCCURRENCE: November 30, 1978

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Power level cutoff exceeded with xenon reactivity and control rods not stabilized.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 1, with Power (MWT) = 2600, and Load (MWE) = 820.

Description of Occurrence: On November 30, 1978, at approximately 0700 hours during an up power maneuver, reactor thermal power was raised to 92% (power level cutoff). The accompanying xenon "burnout" from the up power maneuver continued to insert positive reactivity which was compensated for by inserting control rods and boron injection into the Reactor Coolant System. At approximately 0753 hours on November 30, 1978, the control rods reached their allowable insertion limit and thermal power increased to approximately 95%. At approximately 0815 hours on November 30, 1978, xenon reactivity was declared to be greater than 10% from the equilibrium value for rated thermal power. This placed the unit in the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.1.3.8, which requires thermal power be maintained below the power cutoff until xenon reactivity or control rod reactivity has stabilized.

The continued injection of boron into the Reactor Coolant System permitted reduction of thermal power to less than 92% at approximately 0830 hours. This removed the unit from the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.1.3.8.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: The cause of this occurrence is attributed to personnel error. The personnel involved failed to adequately anticipate the dynamics of the xenon transient associated with the increase in power. As a result, the relatively slow process of Reactor Coolant System boron injection was not initiated sufficiently in advance to permit proper reactivity control at the desired 92% level.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no threat to the health and safety of the public or to unit personnel. The unit was returned to less than 92% thermal power within approximately 15 minutes from the time xenon equilibrium conditions were declared to be in excess of the 10% equilibrium limit. Additionally, chemical analysis indicates no violation of fuel integrity occurred within the core.

Corrective Action: Upon identification of exceeding the 10% equilibrium xenon requirements boron injection was used to add negative reactivity and control rods were maintained at the insertion limit until thermal power was reduced to within the power level cutoff value.

The importance of maintaining proper plant control, particularly in anticipating transient plant responses, has been discussed with the personnel involved.

Failure Data: There have been no previous incidents involving the power level cutoff being exceeded.

LER #78-118