

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0	1	I	L	D	R	S	2	2	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	-	0	0	3	4	1	1	1	1	4			5												
7	8	9						14						15						25						28						30						57		58	
		LICENSEE CODE												LICENSE NUMBER												LICENSE TYPE															

CON'T

REPORT SOURCE 01 60 61 0 5 0 0 0 2 3 7 7 68 69 0 5 0 2 7 9 74 75 8 0 5 3 0 7 9 80 9

EVENT: DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 During startup main turbine tripped on high water level. "B" yawway reference leg had
03 drained because of a leak on local pressure indication isolation valve. High Rx
04 pressure switches PS-263-55C and D were isolated to isolate leak. Since T.S. Table
05 3.1.1 requires 2 instrument channels per trip system, an orderly Rx shutdown was be-
06 gun immediately. Minimal safety significance since both trip systems were still oper-
07 able. No effect on public health or safety.

08 | _____ 80

09		SYSTEM CODE I A		11	CAUSE CODE E		12	CAUSE SUBCODE B		13	COMPONENT CODE V A L V E X					14	COMP. SUBCODE F		15	VALVE SUBCODE D		16																											
17		LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 7 9		21	EVENT YEAR 7 9		22	SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 2 7		24	OCCURRENCE CODE 0 3		28	REPORT TYPE L		30	REVISION NO. 0		32	ACTION TAKEN B		33	FUTURE ACTION Z		34	EFFECT ON PLANT C		35	SHUTDOWN METHOD Z		36	HOURS 0 0 0 0		37	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y		41	NPRO-4 FORM SUB. N		42	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N		43	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER G 0 8 0		44			47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 A packing leak was found on the isolation valve for PS-263-60B. The leak was isolated
1 1 which also isolated 263-55C and 55D (high reactor pressure), and yarway high side for
1 2 263-59B, 58A, 58B, 72B, and 72D. The packing was adjusted, tested, and the system
1 3 line up was returned to normal. All instruments returned to the proper range as the
reference leg filled.

7	8	9	FACILITY STATUS										OTHER STATUS (30)										METHOD OF DISCOVERY										DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)										80
1	5	C	28	0 0 2				29	N/A										A	31	Operator Observation										80												
7	8	9	ACTIVITY CONTENT										AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)										LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)										80										
RELEASED OF RELEASE			RELEA										N/A										N/A										80										
7	8	9	1	6	Z	33	2	34																					80														

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES									
NUMBER		TYPE		DESCRIPTION		(39)			
1	7	0	0	0	(37)	Z	(38)	N/A	

[illegible]

7 8 9 11 12 80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

TYPE DESCRIPTION

1 9 Z (42) N/A

7906050 269

7	8	9	10											80		
			PUBLCITY												NRC USE ONLY	
ISSUED			DESCRIPTION													
2	0	N	44	45	N/A											
7	8	9	10											6R	6Q	6D

10 P. Holland
NAME OF PREPARER _____

PHONE _____

NRC USE ONLY

68 69
X-421

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 79-027/03L-0
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY (CWE)
DRESDEN UNIT (ILDRS2)
DOCKET # 050-237

During startup on Unit 2 at 1918 on May 2, 1979, the main turbine tripped on high water level. It was discovered that a packing leak existed on the isolation valve for the local pressure indication, PS-263-60B. The "B" reference leg drained to an abnormally low level through the packing leak. This resulted in an upscale reading on all the yarways on instrument rack 2206. The "B" reference leg root valve was shut to isolate the leak which isolated the following components: PS-263-55C, 55D, LIS-263-58A, 58B, 72B, 72D, and LITS-263-59B. A control systems technician locally isolated PI-263-60B (local pressure indication) and PS-263-55D (reactor high pressure scram) via their common sensing line root valve. The "B" reference leg root valve was then opened and the reference leg filled. Since Tech. Spec. Table 3.1.1 requires two instrument channels per trip system, an orderly reactor shutdown was begun immediately. The packing was tightened and subjected to a hydro of 1000 psi. No leaks were discovered. The isolation valves for PS-263-55D and PI-263-60B were opened and the common sensing line root valve was opened, returning the system to normal. This event was of minimal safety significance, since one instrument channel per trip system was still capable of performing its intended function as designed. This was the first occurrence of this type on Unit 2. There was no effect on public health or safety.

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