NRC FORM 366
(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | N E F C S 1 (2) | 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)

7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T

0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 8 5 (7) | 0 3 2 1 7 9 (8) | 0 3 2 2 7 9 (9)

7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | During normal power operation while performing ST-ESF-2, Loop Safety injection valve

0 3 | HCV-311 failed to open from lockout relay actuation. The remaining loop injection

0 4 | valves remained operable (Tech. Spec. 2.3) See Abnormal Occurrence 74A-8, 75-23 and

0 5 | 76-14.

0 6 |

0 7 |

0 8 | 80

7 8 9

SYSTEM CODE | CAUSE CODE | CAUSE SUBCODE | COMPONENT CODE | COMP SUBCODE | VALVE SUBCODE

0 9 | S F (11) | E (12) | B (13) | C K T B R K (14) | E (15) | Z (16)

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

(17) LER RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | OCCURRENCE CODE | REPORT TYPE | REVISION NO.

7 9 | — | 0 0 8 | / | 0 3 | L | — | 0

21 22 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN | FUTURE ACTION | EFFECT ON PLANT | SHUTDOWN METHOD | HOURS (22) | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER

X (18) | Z (19) | Z (20) | Z (21) | 0 0 0 0 | Y (23) | N (24) | A (25) | G 0 8 0 (26)

33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | The General Electric type CR105X auxiliary interlock switch was found to be binding,

1 1 | thus preventing the valve from electrically driving open. This switch was cleaned

1 2 | and lubricated and tne valve cycled three times satisfactorily.

1 3 |

1 4 | 80

7 8 9

FACILITY STATUS | % POWER | OTHER STATUS (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)

1 5 | E (28) | 0 9 9 (29) | NA | B (31) | Surveillance Test

7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

ACTIVITY RELEASED | CONTENT OF RELEASE | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)

1 6 | Z (33) | Z (34) | NA | NA

7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: NUMBER | TYPE | DESCRIPTION (39)

1 7 | 0 0 0 (37) | Z (38) | NA

7 8 9 11 12 13 80

PERSONNEL INJURIES: NUMBER | DESCRIPTION (41)

1 8 | 0 0 0 (40) | NA

7 8 9 11 12 80

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: TYPE | DESCRIPTION (43)

1 9 | Z (42) | NA

7 8 9 10 80

PUBLICITY: ISSUED | DESCRIPTION (45)

2 0 | N (44) | NA

7 8 9 10 68 69 80

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NRC USE ONLY

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LER 79-008
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station Unit No. 1
Docket No. 05000285

Attachment No. 1

Safety Analysis

The Engineered Safeguards System is so designed that no single failure can jeopardize the safe shutdown of the plant if required. The safeguards system at Fort Calhoun Station is separated into two trains of systems either of which would provide adequate accident protection. The failure of a single high pressure loop valve does not degrade any of the safety analyses performed on Fort Calhoun Station No. 1.

During the time HCV-311 was inoperable, the remaining loop safety injection valves were considered operable and available to perform their design function.

Since the last failure of this type, (April 1976), the surveillance tests associated with the operational testing of all Safety Injection valves have been revised to electrically verify the operability of these valves. The failure to verify operability of HCV-311 was a result of operating HCV-311 to correct level in a safety injection tank during back shift hours. This problem will be resolved by verification of valve operability following each valve operation in accordance with the revised operating instruction.

It should be noted that during the 1978 Refueling Outage, the problems described in IE Bulletin 78-05 of this type of Aux. Interlock switch binding was resolved by removing and installing new plunger arms and overload relay insulation.

LER 79-008
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Attachment No. 2

Failure Data

This is the fourth failure of an auxiliary interlock switch on a safety injection valve, due to binding.