

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

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April 6, 1979

Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Region I  
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
631 Park Avenue  
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report Narrative Description

The following occurrence was reported to Mr. E. G. Greenman, Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement on March 23, 1979.

Reference: Docket Number 50-278  
Report No: LER 3-79-11/1T  
Report Date: April 6, 1979  
Occurrence Date: March 23, 1979  
Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station  
R.D. 1, Delta, PA 17314

Technical Specification Reference:

Technical Specification 3.7.A.2 states in part: "Primary containment integrity shall be maintained at all times when the reactor is critical or when the reactor temperature is above 212 degrees F....". Also, Technical Specification 3.7.A.3 states "If the primary containment integrity is breached when it is required by 3.7.A.2, that integrity shall be re-established within 24 hours or the reactor placed in a cold shutdown condition within 24 hours.

Description of the Event:

During a routine inspection of the drywell torus ventilation valves, the inflatable disk seals were found depressurized while the unit was in a startup mode. The modification to correct a seismic design deficiency with these containment isolation valves

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was completed during the outage preceding this startup (Re: LER 2-79-11/1T). The inflatable disk seals were discovered approximately 4 hours beyond the allowable Technical Specification limits provided in Sections 3.7.A.2 and 3.7.A.3. Corrective action to establish containment integrity was completed in approximately 40 minutes following discovery of this condition. The reactor water was above 212 degrees F after 9 a.m., 3/22/79 and criticality was established at 11:10 a.m., 3/22/79. The seal depressurization was discovered 12:30 p.m., 3/23/79 and corrected by 1:10 p.m., 3/23/79.

Consequences of Event:

Technical Specification 3.7.A.3 permits operation without primary containment integrity for 24 hours, therefore Tech. Spec. 3.7.A.2 and 3.7.A.3 were exceeded for approximately 4 hours due to procedural deficiency. The safety significance of this event is considerably reduced because reactor power during this period of time did not exceed approximately 2%.


Cause of Event:

The cause of this occurrence was a procedural deficiency in that the implementing procedures for this modification were not completed prior to startup, thus the control room operator was unaware that manual operation was required to inflate the seals.

Corrective Action:

Inflatable disk seals were pressurized within one hour after discovery. Procedures have been revised so that the containment isolation valve inflatable seals are included on the startup check-off list.

Yours truly,



M. J. Cooney  
Superintendent  
Generation Division-Nuclear

Attachment

cc Director, NRC - Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Mr. Norman M. Haller, NRC - Office of Management &  
Program Analysis