



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
631 PARK AVENUE  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

Docket Nos. 50-277  
50-278


JAN 21 1980

Philadelphia Electric Company  
ATTN: Mr. S. L. Daltroff  
Vice President  
Electric Production  
2301 Market Street  
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Bulletin No. 80-02 is forwarded to you for action. A written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

  
Boyce H. Grier  
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Bulletin No. 80-02
2. List of Recently Issued IE Bulletins

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cc w/encls:

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ENCLOSURE 1

UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SSINS No.: 6820  
Accession No.:  
7912190653

DUPLICATE

IE Bulletin No. 80-02  
Date: January 21, 1980  
Page 1 of 2

INADEQUATE QUALITY ASSURANCE FOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIED EQUIPMENT

Description of Circumstances:

The Marvin Engineering Company (MEC) of Inglewood, California was the subject of a special NRC inspection conducted on September 18-21, 1979 to evaluate their overall QA and QC programs which had come under severe criticism by a former Marvin Engineering employee. The special inspection was judged necessary since the Marvin Engineering Company was a known subcontractor and supplier to General Electric of BWR reactor internal feedwater spargers and feedwater thermal sleeves. The results of the NRC's inspection established that serious deficiencies exist in the implementation of the MEC quality assurance program relative to the manufacture of these components. During this inspection, twenty-seven deviations from applicable codes, and contractual and regulatory requirements were documented in the areas of material identification and control, process control, welding and nondestructive examination.

Corrective Action

The Marvin Engineering Company has been issued the NRC's detailed inspection report of the Company, and given 30 days to inform the NRC how the deviations discussed in the report will be corrected and preventive action taken.

Action To Be Taken

All BWR licensees and construction permit holders shall supply the following information within 90 days for operating plants and 120 days for plants under construction.

- 1.a. Have reactor feedwater spargers and thermal sleeves manufactured and/or fabricated by the Marvin Engineering Company been purchased and/or installed in your facility? Since Marvin Engineering is principally a subcontracting Company, determine if your equipment originated with the Marvin Company and was eventually supplied to your facility through another contractor/supplier.
- 1.b. Provide a description of this equipment to include its purchase date and its design function during both normal and accident conditions.

2. For each piece of identified equipment, provide the performance history associated with its usage. This should include the cause of any failures or malfunctions and the frequency of such events.
3. Provide information on the suppliers and receiver's QA/QC program in effect at the time of purchase. This information should be discussed in terms of it providing sufficient bases for judging that the integrity of the equipment is sufficient to permit plant operation during normal and accident conditions.

Approved by GAO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80. Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.

ENCLOSURE 2

IE Bulletin No. 80-02  
Date: January 21, 1980  
Page 1 of 1

RECENTLY ISSUED IE BULLETINS

Bulletin No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
79-17 (Rev. 1)	Pipe Cracks in Stagnant Borated Water Systems at PWR Plant	10/29/79	All PWRs with an Operating License (OL) (for Action). All other Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or Construction CP Permit (CP) (for Information)
79-25	Failures of Westinghouse BFD Relays in Safety-Related Systems	11/2/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP (for Action)
79-02 (Rev. 2)	Pipe Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Bolts	11/8/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
79-26	Boron Loss From BWR Control Blades	11/20/79	All BWR Power Reactor Facilities with an OL
79-27	Loss of Non-Class-1-E Instrumentation and Control Power System Bus During Operation	11/30/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL and those nearing Licensing (for Action) All Power Reactor Facilities with a CP (for Information).
79-28	Possible Malfunction of NAMCO Model EA180 Limit Switches at Elevated Temperatures	12/7/79	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
79-01B	Environmental Qualification of Class IE Equipment	1/14/80	All Power Reactors with an OL except SEP Plants
80-01	Operability of ADS Valve Pneumatic Supply	1/14/80	All BWRs with an OL

1920 330