(7-77)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

LER 79-29/3L

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | VTVYS1 (2) | 00-000000-00 (3) | 41111 (4) | (5)
7 8 9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58

CON'T
01 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 05000271 (7) | 110479 (8) | 120479 (9)
7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02
03 SEE ATTACHED SHEET
04
05
06
07
08
7 8 9 80

09 | SYSTEM CODE CD (11) | CAUSE CODE A (12) | CAUSE SUBCODE A (13) | COMPONENT CODE VALVEX (14) | COMP. SUBCODE F (15) | VALVE SUBCODE D (16)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20

(17) LER RO REPORT NUMBER [EVENT YEAR 79 | — | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 029 | / | OCCURRENCE CODE 03 | REPORT TYPE L | — | REVISION NO. 0]
21 22 23 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

ACTION TAKEN X (18) | FUTURE ACTION H (19) | EFFECT ON PLANT Z (20) | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z (21) | HOURS 0000 (22) | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y (23) | NPRD-4 FORM SUB. N (24) | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER N (25) | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER R344 (26)
33 34 35 36 37 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10
11 SEE ATTACHED SHEET
12
13
14
7 8 9 80

15 | FACILITY STATUS E (28) | % POWER 064 (29) | OTHER STATUS (30) NA | METHOD OF DISCOVERY B (31) | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) Review of records
7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80

16 | ACTIVITY RELEASED Z (33) | CONTENT OF RELEASE Z (34) | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) NA | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) NA
7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
17 | NUMBER 000 (37) | TYPE Z (38) | DESCRIPTION (39) NA
7 8 9 11 12 13 80

1529 114

PERSONNEL INJURIES
18 | NUMBER 000 (40) | DESCRIPTION (41) NA
7 8 9 11 12 80

7912110 402

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)
19 | TYPE Z (42) | DESCRIPTION NA
7 8 9 10 80

PUBLICITY
20 | ISSUED N (44) | DESCRIPTION (45) NA | NRC USE ONLY
7 8 9 10 68 69 80

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GPO 917-926

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

During routine surveillance testing of the Main Steam Isolation Valves, MSIV-80 B and MSIV-86 C were recorded to close in 2.5 seconds. Approximately two days later, during the Department Head review of the data, it was noted that the minimum required closure time is 3 seconds in accordance with Tech. Spec. Section 4.7.D.1.a.1. The second isolation valve was operable in each of the potentially degraded lines. The three second minimum closure time is significant only if all four main steam lines were simultaneously isolated. Based on the above, there were no potential consequences to the health and safety of the public.

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The cause of the occurrence was the operators failure to immediately recognize the potentially degraded condition of the two Main Steam Isolation Valves. In accordance with Tech. Spec. Section 3.7.D.1., the second valve in each of the degraded lines should have been isolated until corrective action was taken or the valves were confirmed to be operable. Upon review of the surveillance data, a power reduction was commenced for a controlled isolation of the affected lines. At the same time, the MSIV's were retimed. This retest proved that all the Main Steam Isolation Valve closure times were within the three to five second band as required by the Tech. Specs. and therefore no adjustments were necessary. Operators were reinstructed to more carefully review the appropriate acceptance criteria when evaluating the surveillance test results.