



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

November 26, 1979

Docket No. 50-344

LICENSEE: Portland General Electric Company  
FACILITY: Trojan Nuclear Plant  
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 14, 1979 PHONE CONVERSATION REGARDING LESSONS  
LEARNED IMPLEMENTATION

During a phone conversation on November 14, 1979 the NRC Lessons Learned Implementation Team discussed with the licensee its October 17, 1979 response to our September 13, 1979 letter.

The team informed the licensee of those lessons learned items for which the licensee's proposed schedule for implementation is unacceptable. These items, along with the proposed and required completion dates, are listed in Enclosure 1.

The team informed the licensee of those items for which the proposed action does not appear to comply with the lessons learned requirement. These items and their associated deficiencies are listed in Enclosure 2.

The team also informed the licensee of those items for which further clarification of licensee's commitment is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the lessons learned requirements. These items and the associated team questions are listed in Enclosure 3.

Items 2.1.3.b (Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling) (procedures only), 2.1.7.a (AFW Initiation), 2.1.7.b (AFW Flow), and 2.1.9 (Accident and Transient Analysis) were not discussed since these items are being implemented by the Bulletins and Orders Task Force.

By letter dated October 30, 1979 we provided additional clarification of the lessons learned requirements to all licensees. We also requested that within 15 days, licensee justify proposed actions not in complete agreement with the staff's requirements and improve the implementation schedule where it differed from the staff's requirements. During this phone conversation we informed the licensee that those items listed in Enclosure 1 and 2 should be addressed in their response. In addition, the licensee agreed to provide the information requested in Enclosure 3 in its response to our October 30, 1979 letter or as soon thereafter as possible.

*Charles M. Trammell*  
Charles M. Trammell, Project Manager  
Operating Reactors Branch No. 1  
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures (3):  
As Stated

cc w/enclosures:  
See next page

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ENCLOSURE 1

TROJAN

ITEMS DO NOT MEET SCHEDULE

1. SECTION 2.1.4 - Containment Isolation Provisions

Modifications required to prevent loss of containment isolation upon reset of the containment isolation signal should be completed by January 1, 1980.

2. SECTION 2.1.6.a - Systems Integrity

Systems Integrity for High Radioactivity. The January 1, 1980 summary program description should include leak rate measurements.

3. SECTION 2.1.6.b - Shielding Review

Plant modifications are required to be completed by January 1, 1981.

4. SECTION 2.1.8.b - High Range Radiation Monitors

Equipment installation required by this section should be installed on or before January 1, 1981.

5. Containment Pressure and Containment Water Level Indication

Installation of containment pressure and water level monitors should be completed by January 1, 1981.

6. SECTION 2.1.3.a - Direct Valve Position

The direct valve position devices are required to be in place by January 1, 1980.

7. SECTION 2.1.3 (b) - Instrumentation of Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling

Trojan implementation schedule should be revised to provide the subcooling meter by January 1, 1980, as required by staff position.

8. SECTION 2.2.2.B - Onsite Technical Support Center

The January 1, 1981 schedule for completing the permanent support center is a required date, and PGE will be required to meet this date.

ENCLOSURE 2

TRJAN

PROPOSED ACTION DOES NOT APPEAR TO COMPLY WITH  
LESSONS LEARNED REQUIREMENTS

1. SECTION 2.1.8.b - High Range Radiation Monitors

Increased Range of Radiation Monitors. The proposed 300 micro Ci/cc range instrument is not adequate for the hydrogen vents system.

2. SECTION 2.2.1 (a) - Shift Supervisor Responsibilities

PGE stated that during certain accident situations, the shift supervisor may be required to leave the control room. This is contrary to staff position. Shift supervisor must remain in the control room at all times unless properly relieved.

3. SECTION 2.2.1 (c) - Shift Turnover Procedures

PGE states that technician and maintenance personnel do not need checklists, stating that the present maintenance request system is sufficient. The staff disagrees. At each shift turnover a checklist or log is required to be reviewed and signed by oncoming personnel so that documentation is provided that all shift personnel have reviewed plant status.

ENCLOSURE 3

TROJAN

CLARIFICATION OF LICENSEE'S POSITION IS NEEDED  
TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE

1. SECTION 2.1.4 - Containment Isolation Provisions

The bases for classifying each essential system should be provided by January 1, 1980.

2. SECTION 2.1.8.a - Post-Accident Sampling

The sample analysis capability should include determination of the hydrogen gas concentration in the containment atmosphere as well as determination of the dissolved gases (ie H<sub>2</sub>, O<sub>2</sub>) in the reactor coolant.

3. SECTION 2.1.8.b - High Range Radiation Monitors

Detailed justification is needed for the 300 micro Ci/cc range instrument for the condensor air discharge; show that the range will not be exceeded with a ruptured SG tube and the NRC source term. Also justification is needed for the use of grab samples in the interim method of quantifying releases; a direct reading from a duct with a dedicated, shielded instrument would seem preferable. Also, a high range total radiation (or gamma) monitoring in-containment instrumentation is needed.

4. SECTION 2.1.8.c - Improved Iodine Instrumentation

The use of counting room (or alternate) equipment for noble gas discrimination does not seem practicable. An attached single channel analyzer is recommended for the short term and for the "first-cut" measurement. Capability for flushing the sampling cartridges with a clean gas and for counting in a low-background area should be provided by January 1, 1981.

5. SECTION 5 - Containment Pressure, Containment Water Level, Containment Hydrogen Indication

- a. Further information should be provided on the proposed installation of the wide range containment water level monitor in the reactor cavity. Installation of this monitor in the reactor cavity should give an accurate measure of containment water level from the top of the containment sump to the 600,000 gallon water level.
- b. The narrow range containment water level monitor should be capable of being periodically tested.
- c. Provide information demonstrating that the containment pressure, hydrogen concentration and wide range water level monitors meet the requirements of regulatory guide 1.97, including qualification, redundancy, and testability.

6. SECTION 2.1.3 (a) - Direct Indication of Power Operated Relief Valve and safety valve position

Trojan PORV position is indicated in the control room by limit switches. However, they are not alarmed as required by NRC position. The limit switches are seismically qualified but not environmentally qualified.

Pressurizer safety valves do not have valve position indication. PGE is considering which of two methods (limit switch or acoustic monitor) to use on the safety valves.

Meeting Summary for Portland General Electric Company

Docket Files

**NRC PDR**

Local PDR

OR&I Reading

NRR Reading

H. Denton

E. Case

D. Eisenhut

R. Tedesco

G. Zech

B. Grimes

W. Gammill

L. Shao

J. Miller

R. Vollmer

T. J. Carter

A. Schwencer

D. Ziemann

P. Check

G. Lainas

D. Crutchfield

B. Grimes

T. Ippolito

R. Reid

V. Noonan

G. Knighton

D. Brinkman

Project Manager

OELD

OI&E (3)

C. Parrish/P. Kreutzer

ACRS (16)

NRC Participants

NSIC

TERA

Licensee

Short Service List

J. Olshinski

J. Burdoin

J. Kerrigan

J. Anderson

C. Willis

Richard M. Sandvik, Esquire  
Frank W. Ostrander, Jr.  
Counsel for Oregon Dept. of  
Energy

500 Pacific Building  
520 S.W. Yamhill  
Portland, Oregon 97204

Mr. Stephen M. Willingham  
555 N. Tomahawk Drive  
Portland, Oregon 97217

Mr. Eugene Rosolie  
Coalition for Safe Power  
215 S.E. 9th Avenue  
Portland, Oregon 97214

Mr. John A. Kullberg  
Route One  
Box 250Q  
Sauvie Island, Oregon 97231

Ms. Nina Bell  
728 S.E. 26th Street  
Portland, Oregon 97214

Mr. H. H. Phillips  
Portland General Electric Company  
121 S.W. Salmon Street  
Portland, Oregon 97204

Warren Hastings, Esquire  
Counsel for Portland General  
Electric Company  
121 S.W. Salmon Street  
Portland, Oregon 97204

Mr. Jack W. Lentsch, Manager  
Generation Licensing and Analysis  
Portland General Electric Company  
121 S.W. Salmon Street  
Portland, Oregon 97204

Columbia County Courthouse  
Law Library, Circuit Court Room  
St. Helens, Oregon 97501

Director, Oregon Department of Energy  
Labor and Industries Building, Room 111  
Salem, Oregon 97310

Dr. Hugh D. Paxton  
1220 41st Street  
Los Alamos, New Mexico 87544

Michael Malmrose  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Trojan Nuclear Plant  
P. O. Box 0  
Rainier, Oregon 97048

Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom, Dean  
Division of Engineering,  
Architecture and Technology  
Oklahoma State University  
Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074

Maurice Axelrad, Esquire  
Lowenstein, Newman, Reis,  
Axelrad and Toll  
Suite 1214  
1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

Mr. David B. McCoy  
348 Hussey Lane  
Grants Pass, Oregon 97526

Ms. C. Gail Parson  
800 S.W. Green #6  
Portland, Oregon 97526

1522 289