

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | P | A | T | M | I | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 9 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 8 | 8 | 0 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 7 | 8 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2 | During initial Cycle 4 startup while increasing power to 40% full power, it was
0 3 | determined that the control rods were positioned in the restricted region of Technical
0 4 | Specification Figure 3.5-2A. The correct rod index limit curve which had been in-
0 5 | corporated into operating procedures as a Temporary Change Notice was not being used.
0 6 | A check of the rod index during power escalation revealed that the control rods had
0 7 | been in the Not Allowed region of T.S. Figure 3.5-2A for nine hours. This is a vio-
0 8 | lation of T.S. 3.5.2.5.b and is reportable per T.S. 6.9.2.A.(2) as violating (cont'd)

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | Z | Z | 11 | CAUSE CODE | A | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | A | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | C | O | N | R | O | D | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | Z | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 7 | 8 | 21 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 1 | 5 | 24 | 26 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 1 | 27 | 29 | REPORT TYPE | T | 30 | 31 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32
ACTION TAKEN | H | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | Z | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NRPD-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | N | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURE | D | 1 | 5 | 44

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
1 0 | This event was caused by the use of the rod index limit curve in the body of the
1 1 | procedure which was labeled for Cycle 4, 0-125 EFPD instead of the revised Cycle 4,
1 2 | 0-125 EFPD rod index limit curve which was attached to the front of the procedure as
1 3 | a Temporary Change Notice. The procedure had been revised due to extended Cycle 3
1 4 | operation which resulted in submitting an expedient set of T.S. figures to (cont'd)

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | C | 28 | % POWER | 0 | 4 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | NA | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Engineers noted computer alarm | 32

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | NA | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | NA | 36

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 39

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 41

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | NA | 43

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED | Y | 44 | DESCRIPTION | Weekly News Release | 45 | NRC USE ONLY

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Event Description and Probable Consequences (Continued)

a limiting condition for operation.

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (Continued)

allow operation of Cycle 4 from 0 to 125 EFPD. These expedient T.S. figures used a conservative analysis and, therefore, conservative operation in the Not Allowed region of Figure 3.5-2A did not reduce any safety margins. The shutdown margin during this event was 2.57% $\Delta K/K$. Immediate reactor coolant system boration was initiated to withdraw the control rods to the acceptable region. Steps in procedures that are changed by way of TCN's will be annotated with the TCN number so that the operators can readily identify the changes. TCN's will continue to be attached to the procedures until the TCN's are cancelled by a PCR or the temporary change is no longer needed. Administrative Procedure AP 1001, which controls TCN's, will be changed to include the above actions.

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