When separated from enclosure 3 handle this document as UNCLASSIFIED
(Insert proper classification)

ENCLOSURE I

MEETING WITH

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY - GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES

THREE MILE ISLAND UNIT 1

July 17, 1972

SUMMARY

A meeting was held on July 17, 1972 in Bethesda during which the staff discussed with the applicant the following items:

1. Industrial Security Plan
2. Conduct of Operations and Radiation Emergency Plan
3. Initial Test and Operations
4. Administrative Control Technical Specifications

As a result of the meeting the applicant agreed to provide the requested additional information in the next amendment. The items remaining unresolved at this time are:

a. Security force staffing
b. Offsite protective measures
c. Plant staffing during initial operation

1. Industrial Security Plan

Basis for discussion was the applicant's draft revision of I.S.P. prepared as a result of our questions and comments expressed in a previous meeting (March 22, 1972). With the exception of staffing requirements, the I.S.P. is now acceptable.

2. Conduct of Operations and Radiation Emergency Plan

In Amendment 26 (May 1, 1972) the applicant had responded to our questions concerning Conduct of Operations. Three questions had not been adequately answered and were discussed in the meeting:

Offsite Protective Measures:

Applicant at present is negotiating with various state agencies to determine who has the authority and responsibility to declare an emergency that requires notification and possible evacuation of residents in the LPZ. The applicant believes that under no foreseeable circumstances would such steps have to be taken within less than about one hour after an accident. He will notify responsible authorities immediately after an accident or if the potential for an emergency does exist, he will supply this authority with his advice. However, the applicant believes that a shift foreman in charge of the facility can not declare such an emergency.

7910180644

Staffing during Initial Operation:

In the FSAR (page 12-1) the applicant states that the six designated supervisory personnel will obtain cold SRO licenses prior to fuel loading. The applicant stated in the meeting that two SRO's will staff each shift in addition to future RO's. We told him at least one more person qualified by training and experience but not necessarily licensed is required during the startup operation. The third person could be from the applicant's staff, the NSSS vendor's staff (B&W), or a consultant. The applicant will address our requirement in the next amendment. We also requested the applicant to provide more information in Section B on the qualifications and responsibilities of the licensed reactor operators.

Health Physics:

Normal health physics operation is conducted by radiation protection personnel (supervisor and two technicians) during the day shift. During the other two shifts, the auxiliary reactor operators will provide health physics coverage. The applicant will indicate this in the next amendment.

3. Initial Tests and Operations:

Section 13 of the FSAR was revised in Amendment 26 (May 1, 1972). We informed the applicant that their power escalation test program (Table 13-2) does not include the following essential tests which are listed in the "Guide for the Planning of Initial Startup Programs":

Loss of Offsite Power
Shutdown from Outside the Control Room
Natural Circulation Flow Tests
Generator Trip
Chemical and Radio-chemical Analysis
Effluents and Effluent Monitoring Systems
Dropped Rod
Pseudo Rod Ejection Test

We informed the applicant that the staff presently is considering issuing the above Guide with some revisions as part of the Federal Regulations.

4. Administrative Control Technical Specifications:

We had transmitted our questions regarding this subject to the applicant by letter on February 28, 1972. In the meeting, we discussed the applicant's proposed answers. Based on our preliminary review of these answers, we commented on two items:

When separated from enclosures handle this document as UNCLASSIFIED
(Insert proper classification)

Abnormal Occurrences (FSAR 15.1.8):

Applicant defines one of the abnormal occurrences as a plant condition which "Causes, as defined in 10 CFR 20, any uncontrolled or unplanned release of radioactive material from the site". We requested that the reference to 10 CFR 20 be deleted and "any significant uncontrolled ....." be substituted. Also the restriction "from the site" should be deleted (these changes were also made by Duke for Oconee 1). We explained to the applicant that such changes would cover as an abnormal occurrence e.g., a leaky drum containing radioactive waste on or offsite.

Access to High Radiation Area:

Applicant provided additional information regarding his proposed exception to 10 CFR 20 requiring a "control device" or "alarm signal" for high radiation areas. We informed the applicant that we will require, as an additional basis for the exception, a commitment that a high radiation work permit and an appropriate radiation monitoring device will be required for a person entering a high radiation area.

1486 109

When separated from enclosure 3 handle this document as [redacted]
(Insert proper classification)

ENCLOSURE II

ATTENDANCE LIST

Metropolitan Edison Company - General Public Utilities

J. R. Thorpe

D. H. Reppert

J. Kunkel

R. Russo

J. G. Herbein

J. L. Wise

AEC

R. Van Niel

D. F. Johnson

B. K. McLeod

H. Faulkner

H. Schierling

1486 110

ENCLOSURE NO. 3

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Industrial Security Plan

In the next revision the applicant will incorporate the following items:

-Location of seven TV cameras used for surveillance of plant perimeter (four low light level and three day light cameras) will be indicated in Figure 1.

-Visitor and employee parking lot outside of inner fence will be shown in Figures 1 and 2.

-Commitment to search vehicles and packages entering the inner fenced area when considered necessary.

-Commitment to test intrusion alarm and communication systems according to specified intervals.

-Written commitment to implement the I.S.P., to maintain records and to notify the AEC in case of threatened or actual sabotage.

The applicant provided the following additional information and explanation during discussion:

-Only the mainland gate on the permanent access bridge will be locked and controlled. The island gate of the bridge will normally be open.

-Direct confrontation between security force and potential intruders will be avoided. Instead local authorities will be notified immediately to cope with the situation.

-Shift foreman controls a master key used to gain admittance to any building, except the service building, and which also opens the various gates to the main plant area.

Staffing requirements for the security force were discussed in detail. The I.S.P. is based on an extensive alarm and surveillance system with continuous monitoring. One guard stationed in the security office in the service building will be on duty at all times. Once per shift he will inspect the plant perimeter. During this or any other required absence from the security office, the alarm system will be switched to the control room which maintains contact with the guard via portable radio equipment.

1486 111

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

We informed the applicant that at the present, two security guards per shift and a plant perimeter inspection twice per shift are the minimum requirements. However, more specific guidance is presently in preparation by an ANS subcommittee. Applicant believes that his extensive alarm and surveillance system is more reliable than an increased guard force and more frequent inspections.

With the exception of the security guard staffing requirements, the applicant's I.S.P. is acceptable.

1486 112