



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76012

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June 20, 1979

In Reply Refer To:

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
Docket Nos. 50-458/IE Information Notice No. 79-17
50-459/IE Information Notice No. 79-17

Gulf States Utilities
Attn: Dr. J. G. Weigand
General Manager,
Nuclear Projects
Post Office Box 2951
Beaumont, Texas 77704

Gentlemen:

This IE Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular or Bulletin will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Sincerely,


Karl V. Seyfrit
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Information Notice
No. 79-17
2. List of IE Information Notices
Issued in 1979

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

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Date: June 20, 1979
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SOURCE HOLDER ASSEMBLY DAMAGE FROM MISFIT BETWEEN ASSEMBLY AND REACTOR UPPER GRID PLATE

Description of Circumstances:

Recently, the NRC was informed of a problem at two Westinghouse PWR facilities resulting from an apparent misfit between secondary source holder assemblies and the reactor upper grid plate.

The misfit problem was first identified by Carolina Power & Light, licensee for H. B. Robinson Unit 2, who informed the NRC on May 6, 1979, of the circumstances. During the current refueling outage at H. B. Robinson 2, CP&L determined that two secondary source holder assemblies had been damaged during the previous refueling in February 1978, by a misfit between the assembly and the reactor upper grid plate. The misfit resulted from insufficient clearance (i.e. 1/2 to 3/4 inch) between the source holder assembly hub and the grid plate at the core locations containing thermocouple mixing vanes. This lack of sufficient clearance caused minor deformation of the upper grid plate components at the core location and of the source holder assemblies. The deformation also resulted in some bending of the fuel rods in the assembly, however, in no case did this bending result in fuel cladding perforation.

On May 16, 1979, the licensee of D. C. Cook Unit 1 informed the NRC that the present refueling outage would be extended 15 to 20 days to remove the reactor head, which had already been reinstalled following completion of refueling, to correct this misfit problem. They learned of the problem from Westinghouse. Subsequently, the licensee's inspection revealed that the source holder assembly hubs were in contact with the vanes. The source holder was removed from one assembly readily with no apparent damage, while in the other, the source holder was found stuck in the assembly. The problem was corrected prior to return to operations.

The secondary source assembly rods are normally inserted into rod cluster control assemblies and placed at symmetrical locations in the core. Each such assembly contains a symmetrical grouping of four secondary source rods and between zero and twenty burnable poison rods. Locations in the assembly not filled with a source or burnable poison rod contain a source holder assembly. Locations which contain thermocouple

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