UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

TIC

JUN 27 1979

Docket No. 50-483
Docket No. 50-486

Union Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. John K. Bryan
Vice President - Nuclear
P. O. Box 149
St. Louis, MO 63166

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Circular No. 79-11, is forwarded to you for information. No written response to this Circular is required. If you require additional information regarding this subject, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

Glen W. Roy
for James G. Keppler
Director

Enclosure: IE Circular
No. 79-11

cc w/encl:
Mr. W. H. Weber, Manager,
Nuclear Construction
Central Files
Director, NRR/DPM
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Missouri Public Service
Commission

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION III

June 27, 1979

IE Circular No. 79-11

DESIGN/CONSTRUCTION INTERFACE PROBLEM

Description of Circumstances:

Apparent inadequate communication between nuclear steam supply system (NSSS), architect/engineer (A/E) and constructors have resulted in several cases where reactor vessels or the supports have been misoriented. The misorientation problems appear to occur at sites where dual reactor units are being constructed and one primary system layout is a mirror image of the other.

In 1975 TVA reported a misorientation problem with the Sequoyah Unit 2 reactor vessel. Westinghouse was the NSSS supplier and TVA provided their own A/E service.

In 1977 the Southern California Edison Company reported a reactor vessel misorientation at San Onofre Unit 2. Combustion Engineering was the NSSS supplier and Bechtel provided the A/E service.

In 1979 the Texas Utilities Generating Company reported a reactor vessel support system misorientation at Comanche Peak Unit 2. Westinghouse supplied the NSSS, Gibbs and Hill was the plant engineer and Brown and Root was the constructor.

Even though there appears to be minimal safety implications associated with the particular misorientation problems mentioned, repetition of the same type of errors suggests breakdowns in the design/construction interface relationships that could in turn lead to more significant safety problems.

Corrective preventive action is recommended for the following reasons:

- If the interface control system between the NSSS/AE/Construction is marginal or ineffective as evidenced by the misorientation of reactor vessels and their supports, it is possible that other safety related equipment may also be misoriented and/or mislocated. In some cases the errors may not be as obvious as a misoriented reactor vessel.

- This type of error can and has resulted in hardware modifications and could cause functional and/or structural changes that affect design and operating parameters.

- In translating NSSS design inform
the A/E may make changes to facil
plant. These translations may al

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ANO 7906200176

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