TOLEDO EDISON

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Docket No. 50-346

License No. NPF-3

Serial No. 516

June 18, 1979

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. Robert N. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Operating Reactors
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Reid:

During the June 8, 1979 NRC site visit to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, several questions were raised by your staff. Attached are the requested responses.

Yours very truly,

Lowell E. Roe

LER:TJM

cc:
Mr. Guy Vissing
Operating Reactors Branch No. 4
Division of Operating Reactors
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attachment

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Attachment 1

Response to Question Raised at
NRC Site Visit June 8, 1979
at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1

Question 1

In relation to the recent start up problem at Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 1, how do Davis-Besse operators handle procedural gaps?

Response

All procedural steps are followed as described in the appropriate test procedure. If the operator needs to do additional steps not provided by his procedure he must request a temporary modification as required by Administrative Procedure AD 1805. Section 7.3.4 of AD 1805 describes the form, requirements and review of a Temporary Modification request. Any such modification to a procedure must receive interim approval for implementation from two members of the station management staff. One of these staff members must hold a Senior Reactor Operator's License. Review and final approval by the Station Review Board is required within 14 days.

Question 2

Describe the performance effect of flow on the PORV as a result of the September 24, 1977 event.

Response

The actions taken to restore the PORV to service are described on page 41 of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Licensee Event Report Supplement NP-32-77-16 dated November 14, 1977. For flow effects, the valve only received seat & disc lapping.

Question 3

What is being done to preclude similar valving errors to those made in January 1979?

Response

Manual valves important to plant safety and operations are now controlled under the locked valve verification procedure described in item 5 of Toledo Edison's letter of April 11, 1979 (Serial No. 1-56). Motorized valves with controls located remote from the control room are being designed to have locked covers installed over their remote controls. Padlock control over the manual handwheels associated with these motorized valves have been installed and are controlled under the station's locked valve procedure as above.

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Question 4

What is being done to insure that construction activity cleanliness does not effect safety related valves similar to that of Licensee Event Report NP-33-79-03 of January 2, 1979?

Response

Changes are being proposed to Administrative Procedure AD 1844.05 to enhance station superivison of maintenance areas to identify potential cleanliness problems.

Question 5

What is being done to preclude similar problems exhibited when personnel traffic caused a misalignment of a panel switch to an intermediate position?

Response

All non-positive detent switches at the Davis-Besse facility have been identified and are being scheduled for replacement with positive control spring detented switches. Additionally, for those panels located in high traffic areas,personnel protection barriers are being installed in the interim to preclude inadvertant misalignment.

Question 6

Document the times when auxiliary feedwater system was controlled in manual.

Response

Attachment 2 lists ten events since January, 1978 in which the operator manually controlled steam generator level below its automatic setpoint. None of the events involved an SFAS actuation.

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Attachment 2

AFW Manual Control Events

Date of Event	Brief Description
January 6, 1978	SFRCS trip due to MFPT speed control trouble, reactor power manually reduced to 1% full power, see LER NP-33-78-06.
January 21, 1978	Manual reactor trip following tripping of both MFPs and SFRCS trip.
January 31, 1978	MSIVs inadvertantly closed, reactor tripped on high RCS pressure. SFRCS trip due to loss of MFPT.
March 1, 1978	SFRCS trip on high main feedwater - steam generator differential pressure. Reactor trip on RCS high pressure.
October 10, 1978	SFRCS trip due to MFPT speed control trouble. Reactor trip on low RCS pressure.
November 3, 1978	TP800.04 Natural Circulation Test.
January 12, 1979	Reactor trip on high flux/delta flux/flow trip of RPS. SFRCS trip due to steam generator low level. See LER NP-33-79-13.
January 14, 1979	TP800.25 Shutdown From Outside The Control Room Test.
January 15, 1979	TP800.26 Loss of Offsite Power Test.
February 22, 1979	Manual reactor trip following EHC system backup speed control circuit failure. SFRCS trip on main steam low pressure.

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