NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

EXHIBIT A

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

| | | |

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Report No.: 50-302/79-009/03L-0

Facility: Crystal River Unit #3

Report Date: 15 February 1979

Occurrence Date: 24 January 1979

Identification Of Occurrence:

Regulating rod group 6 exceeded overlap contrary to Technical Specification 3.1.3.6.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Mode 1 power operation (100%)

Description of Occurrence:

At 1027, while performing Surveillance Procedure SP-110, Reactor Protective System Functional Testing, rod group six (6) dropped into the core from 97% withdrawn. Rod group seven (7) was immediately inserted to 0%. Investigation revealed that both the "A" and "B" AC power train breakers to group 6 were open. Further investigation determined that the "A" train breaker was inadvertently left open during the performance of Preventative Maintenance Procedure PM-126, Electrical Checks of CRD Power Train. PM-126 was completed just prior to the start of Surveillance Procedure SP-110. As per the instructions contained in SP-110, the I&C Technician opened the "B" train breaker being unaware of the open breaker in "A" train. This resulted in the loss of AC power to rod group 6. The breakers were restored to their required positions and rod withdrawal commenced at 1037.

Designation of Apparent Cause:

The cause of this event is attributed to "A" AC power train breaker being inadvertently left open at the completion of Preventive Maintenance Procedure PM-126.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Health and safety of the plant and general public was not endangered as rod group 6 moved in a safe shutdown direction.

Corrective Action:

An additional section to Preventive Maintenance Procedure PM-126 was added to assure system restoration prior to completion.

Failure Date:

No previous occurrences reported.

/rc