

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:

(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | 1 | L | Q | A | D | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

0 1 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 7 | 9 | 9

0 2 | While performing monthly operability test, procedure QOS 7500-5, it was discovered  
0 3 | that the inlet air heater on the "A" Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) system was not  
0 4 | operating. The temperature switch was reset and the operability test was successfully  
0 5 | completed. The next day, the heater again failed and additional investigation of the  
0 6 | failure was begun. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.B.1.a, the  
0 7 | redundant SBGT System was operable during each of the above failures.

0 9 | S | C | 11 | E | 12 | E | 13 | I | N | S | T | R | U | 14 | S | 15 | Z | 16  
17 | 7 | 9 | 21 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 24 | 26 | 0 | 3 | 28 | 29 | L | 30 | 31 | 0 | 32  
E | 18 | Z | 19 | Z | 20 | Z | 21 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | 40 | Y | 23 | N | 24 | N | 25 | M | 2 | 3 | 5 | 26

1 0 | The cause of the failure was due to setpoint drift of flow switch 1/2-7541-8A. This  
1 1 | switch actuates the heater when flow is present in the SBGT train. The flow switch  
1 2 | was calibrated and the "A" SBGT was tested satisfactorily. The heater itself was  
1 3 | not failed.

1 5 | F | 28 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 29 | NA | 30 | B | 31 | Routine Test | 32  
1 6 | Z | 33 | Z | 34 | NA | 35 | NA | 36  
1 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | Z | 38 | NA | 39  
1 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | NA | 41  
1 9 | Z | 42 | NA | 43

2 0 | N | 44 | NA | 45  
7902140151 | M. Kooi  
309-654-2241, ext. 252

- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 79-01/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company  
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit Two
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-265
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On January 4, 1979, at 10:30 a.m., while performing the monthly operability test, procedure QOS 7500-5, it was discovered that the inlet air heater on "A" Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System was not operating. The "A" SBGT System was immediately declared inoperable. Since the operability test on "B" SBGT System had been completed just prior to this event, the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.B.1.a. were satisfied. Immediate investigation of the failure revealed that temperature switch 1/2-7541-11A in the heater control circuit had tripped. The switch was reset and the operability test on "A" SBGT System was successfully completed. At 1:00 p.m. the next day, "A" SBGT System was put on and the heater again failed to operate. An operability test on "B" SBGT System was subsequently completed and an investigation of the failure was begun.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

Both SBGT Systems had been proven operable on December 4, 1978. The redundant "B" SBGT System was operable during this occurrence. Also, the filters, demister, fan, and dampers for the "A" SBGT train were operable. Consequently no adverse safety implications were presented by this event.

VII. CAUSE

The cause of the failure was due to setpoint drift of flow switch 1/2-7541-8A. This switch actuates the "A" SBGT system heater when flow is present in the SBGT train. The flow switch had failed in the closed position, thus energizing the heater. Since no cooling flow was available, temperature switch 1/2-7541-11A then tripped the heater when the 200<sup>o</sup>F setpoint temperature was reached. When the temperature switch was reset and flow was initiated, the heater remained on until the air flow ceased and the temperature switch again tripped the heater due to high temperature. Flow switch 1/2-7541-8A is model number DA-5333 manufactured by Mercoïd Corp.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The flow switch was calibrated and the "A" SBGT was tested satisfactorily. Since this is the first failure of this type, thus corrective action is considered sufficient.