U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FOOM 366 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 57 C VI AI NI AI SI 0 CON'T LG 3 8 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 0 0 C 2 0 8 8 0 9 REPORT 11 SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) During periodic testing in Mode 3 to verify main steam trip valve closure time, TV-0 2 MS101A failed to fully close from the Train B control room pushbutton within the required 0 3 5 second criterion. Because the closure time of the trip valve was acceptable using 0 4 the Train A pushbutton, the health and safety of the general public were not affected. 0 5 Reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. 0 6 0 7 COMPONENT CODE X 1 (14 IE 16 0 9 REVISION CCURRENCE REPORT DE 31 0 REPORT COMPONENT SUBMI LICH (25) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The cause of this discrepancy is not known. An airline check valve was disassembled 1 0 and inspected but no debris or binding was found. The check valve was then reassembled and retested from the Train B pushbutton which could in an acceptable clusure time of 4.8 seconds. 4 80 9 METHOD OF FACILIT OTHER STATUS 30 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) DISCO Surveilliance 80 NAMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) ELEASED NA 80 EXPOSURES PERSONNEL DESCRIPTION (39 0 i 80 1951 DESCRIPTION 41 334 0 40 80 OSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIP 42 800212070 PUBLICITY NAC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION 45 N(44) 55 69 NAME OF PREPARER W. R. Cartwright (703)-894-5151 PHONE -

Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station, Unit #1 Docket No. 50-338 Report No. LER 80-12/03L-0

Attachment: Page 1 of 1

Description of Event

On January 11, 1980, during periodic testing, main steam trip valve TV-MS101A failed to close within the required isolation time of 5 seconds from the Train B control room pushbutton. Closure time was measured at 5.2 seconds.

Probable Consequences of Occurrence

The consequences of this event were limited because the closure time for the transformer TV-MS101A was acceptable using the pushbutton for Train A. Also, because the Action statement of T.S. 3.7.1.5 was strictly adhered to, the health and safety of the general public were not affected. There are no generic implications associated with this occurrence.

Cause of Event

It is not known why it took TV-MS101A more than 5 seconds to fully close using the Train B pushbutton. Since a stop watch is presently used to measure the valve closure time, human error in the use of the stop watch could have affected the final test results.

Immediate Corrective Action

An airline check valve was disassembled and inspected for debris which might have accumulated and caused the valve disc to bind. During the inspection no problem was found and the valve was reassembled. TV-MS101A was then retested using the Train B pushbutton and the closure time was within acceptable limits (4.8 seconds).

Scheduled Corrective Action

No further actions are required.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions are required.