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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, SUITE 1000
ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76012

December 27, 1979

In Reply Refer To:

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
Docket No. STN 50-482/IE Information Notice No. 79-34

Kansas Gas & Electric Co.
Attn: Mr. Glenn L. Koester
Vice President-Operations
Post Office Box 208
Wichita, Kansas 67201

Gentlemen:

This IE Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If further NRC evaluations so indicate, an IE Circular or Bulletin will be issued to recommend or request specific licensee actions. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

Sincerely,


Karl V. Seyfrit
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Information Notice
No. 79-34
2. List of Recently Issued
IE Information Notices

cc: w/enclosures

Messrs. Nicholas A. Petrick, SNUPPS
D. T. McPhee, Kansas City Power and Light Company
Gerald Charnoff, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge
E. W. Creel, Kansas Gas and Electric Company

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

SSINS No.: 6870
Accession No.:
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DUPLICATE

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Date: December 27, 1979
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INADEQUATE DESIGN OF SAFETY-RELATED HEAT EXCHANGERS

Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) submitted an initial 50.55(e) report on October 25, 1979, that identified defects in the four Containment Spray (CS) heat exchangers at the Sequoyah facility.

The heat exchanger tube bundles were damaged by excessive vibrations of the tubes against each other. These vibrations were caused by a support arrangement that allows excessive unsupported tube lengths. The large amplitude tube vibration has resulted in reductions in wall thickness and some tube leakage. The CS heat exchangers at Sequoyah had only been in operation for a short period of time prior to the failure being detected.

These heat exchangers were manufactured by Industrial Process Engineers, Inc., (IPE), a vendor now out of business. The Component Cooling Water (CCW) heat exchangers at the Sequoyah facility were also made by IPE. TVA has identified some reduction in wall thickness and minor tube leakage in the CCW heat exchangers. The licensee plans to plug the damaged tubes on the CS heat exchangers and "stake" (support) the tube bundles to prevent further damage. Further corrective action is under review by the licensee. The following data applies to the CS heat exchangers:

Manufacturer:	Industrial Process Engineers, Inc.
Type:	CFU (Special)
Size:	55-342
Serials:	6662-1; 6662-2 6663-1; 6663-2

This Information Notice is provided as an early notification of a possibly significant matter that is still under review by the NRC staff. It is expected that recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities. No specific action or response is requested at this time. If NRC evaluations so indicate, further licensee actions may be requested or required.

No written response to this Information Notice is required. If you have any questions regarding this matter please contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

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December 27, 1979

LISTING OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued To
79-28	Overloading of Structural Elements Due to Pipe Support	11/16/79	All power reactor facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP)
79-29	Loss of NonSafety-Related Reactor Coolant System Instrumentation During Operating	11/16/79	All power reactor facilities holding Operating Licenses (OLs) or Construction Permits (CPs)
79-30	Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance, 10 CFR Part 21.	12/6/79	All power reactor facilities holding Operating Licenses (OLs) and Construction Permits (CPs) and vendors inspectors inspected by LCVIP
79-31	Use of Incorrect Amplified Response Spectra (ARS)	12/13/79	All power reactor facilities holding Operating Licenses (OLs) and Construction Permits (CPs)
79-32	Separation of Electrical Cables for HPCI and ADS	12/21/79	All power reactor facilities holding Operating Licenses (OL) and Construction Permits (CPs)
79-33	Improper Closure of Primary Containment Access Hatches	12/21/79	All power reactor facilities holding Operating Licenses (OL) and Construction Permits (CPs)

Enclosure

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