LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1 8	W I P B H 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 5 5 EICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 57 CAT 58
0 1 7 8	REPORT L 0 5 0 0 0 2 6 6 7 1 1 0 7 7 9 8 1 1 2 1 7 9 9 SOURCE 60 60 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80
0 2	While filling the "A" steam generator secondary side with water to per-
0 3	form a secondary-to-primary leak test during the refueling outage, an
0 4	inadvertent dilution of the reactor coolant system (RCS) occurred as a
0 [5]	result of secondary-to-primary leakage from an open steam generator tube
0 6	falling into the primary outlet nozzle. At no time did the reactor
0 7	deviate from the refueling shutdown condition of 10 percent dk/k shut-
0 8 7 8	down. Boron conc. fell below 1800 ppm (min. conc. 1733) for 13 hours.
0 9	CODE SUBCODE S
	COMPONENT COMP
	CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
1 0	Stopped test, injected boron and sampled boron concentration. Drained
11	steam generator and stopped secondary-to-primary leakage. Continued
1 2	periodic boron injection and sampling. Throughout event, the count rate
1 3	was monitored visually on the source and intermediate range instruments
7 8	and recorders and audibly on the source range audio counter.
1 5	FACILITY STATUS SPOWER OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 DISCOVERY DE
	ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 Z 33 Z 34 N/A PERSONNEL EXPOSURES AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 N/A 44 45
1 7	NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
1 8	NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) O O O (40) N/A
1 9	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION Z (42) N/A
2 0	9 PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION 45 NRC USE ONLY 9 10 68 69 80 5
8	9 10 68 69 80 5 NAME OF PREPARER C. W. Fay PHONE: 414/277-2811

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. 79-019/01T-0

Wisconsin Electric Power Company Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Docket No. 50-266

While filling the "A" steam generator secondary side with water from the condensate storage tanks to perform a secondary-to-primary leak test during the Unit 1 refueling seven outage, an inadvertent dilution of the reactor coolant system (RCS) occurred as a result of secondary-to-primary leakage via two open ended (on secondary side) unplugged (on primary side) tubes. At no time did the reactor deviate from the refueling shu down condition; i. e., below 140°F and subcritical by at 1 ast 10% $\Delta k/k$.

The secondary-to-primary leakage resulted from a scheduling oversight of not plugging the cold leg side of two tubes, which had sections removed from the hot leg side earlier in the refueling for metallurgical testing, prior to initiating the leak test. The leak test was scheduled before explosive tube plugging to detect any leaking tubes previously determined to have defects per the eddy current inspection program or leaking plugs.

At 1100 hours on November 7, 1979, filling of the secondary side of the "A" steam generator commenced. At 1209 hours, it was noted that a jet of water from a leaking tube was coming out of the "A" steam generator primary outlet side manway. Secondary side filling was immediately stopped. Ten gallons of boric acid was injected into the reactor coolant system and a reactor coolant system boron sample was taken. It was determined shortly after discovery of the leakage that the source of the leakage was from the open ends of two steam generator tubes.

At 1300 hours, the results of the boron sample were received and indicated a boron concentration of 1938 ppm, an acceptable value.

At 1330 hours, the draining of the secondary side began but the secondary-to-primary leakage continued due to siphoning up over the U-bends.

At 1430 hours, the siphoning was stopped by injecting compressed air up the outlet side tube ends against the flow of water. During this operation it was discovered that the leakage from one of the tubes had been falling almost directly into the primary outlet nozzle and on into the reactor coolant system, while the leakage from the other tube had been falling almost directly out the open manway. Therefore, until the siphoning action of the tube over the outlet nozzle was stopped, dilution of the reactor coolant system continued.

At 1510 hours, a second boron sample of the reactor coolant system was requested.

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At 1525 hours, the results of the boron sample were received and indicated a boron concentration of 1755 ppm, below the 1800 ppm minimum required by Technical Specification 15.3.6.A(d). Sixty gallons of boric acid were injected into the reactor coolant system immediately and another boron sample was requested.

At 1540 hours, the results of the boron sample were received and indicated 1733 ppm, at which time an additional 100 gallons were injected and another boron sample was requested.

At 1615 hours, the boron concentration was determined to be 1852 ppm within specification.

At 0815 hours on November 8, 1979, a confirmatory boron sample results indicated 1863 ppm.

Throughout the event, the count rate was monitored visually on the source and intermediate range instruments and recorders and audibly on the source range audio counter. The count rate of 1.1 x 10^3 cps did not change throughout the event. The ability to add additional concentrated boric acid was available at all times.

This event resulted from an oversight in that actual equipment conditions were not fully evaluated when drawing up the schedule for leak testing the "A" steam generator. The routing of a copy of this licensee event report to personnel involved in outage scheduling will serve to alert them to the effects of such oversights and preclude the possibility of similar recurrences.

This event is reportable per Technical Specification 15.6.9.2.A.2 and 15.6.9.2.A.4.