



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report No. 50-325/79-41

Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Facility: Brunswick

Docket No. 50-325

License No. DPR-71

Inspection at Region II Office

Inspector:

B. W. Riley

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11/21/79
Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: J. P. O'Reilly, Director, Region II
R. C. Lewis, Acting Chief, RONS Branch
P. J. Kellogg, Section Chief, RONS Branch

Approved by:

P. J. Kellogg
P. J. Kellogg, Section Chief, RONS Branch

6/21/79
Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on October 22, 1979

Areas Inspected

Management meeting to discuss the cause and corrective actions concerning the reactor trip on high steamline radiation on October 19, 1979. The meeting involved 12 inspector hours by 6 NRC inspectors.

Results

Within the areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.

1510 189

7912060 152

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

License Employees

Mr. A. C. Tollison, Jr., Plant Manager
Mr. J. M. Brown, Superintendent, Operations and Maintenance
Mr. C. F. Blackmon, Jr., Shift Specialist

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

3. Unresolved Items

No new unresolved items were identified during this inspection.

4. Management Meeting

A management meeting was held at the Region II Office on October 22, 1979, at the request of Region II. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss with the licensee the circumstances concerning the reactor trip on high radiation level on October 19, 1979.

The licensee presented their findings with respect to the cause of the trip and corrective actions that would be taken prior to returning the unit to service. These corrective actions included:

- a. Procedural changes for steamline high radiation trips (alarms) and reactor cleanup system operation.
- b. A special startup program which would carefully monitor operating parameters and compare them to previous data to assure no undetected equipment problems existed.
- c. Evaluate the need of a special test of the control rod drive system to detect any abnormalities caused by the resin intrusion.
- d. A review and upgrading of immediate reporting requirements/recommendations and the use of the "hot line".

Additionally, the licensee indicated a review of the present surveillance program on jet-pump riser safe ends would be reviewed considering the chemistry transient.