CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

Line	Fields
0 1	LICENSEE CODE: N J O C P 1 (2) LICENSE NUMBER: 0 [illegible] - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) LICENSE TYPE: 4 1 1 1 1 (4) CAT: (5)
CON'T 0 1	REPORT SOURCE: L (6) DOCKET NUMBER: 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 9 (7) EVENT DATE: 0 9 1 4 7 9 (8) REPORT DATE: 1 0 1 0 7 9 (9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During normal operation, a worker discovered a leak in the area of the
0 3 (1-3) containment spray heat exchanger. Investigation reveased that a 3/4"
0 4 nipple connected between the water box and the relief valve on the service
0 5 water side was leaking. Additionally, slight leaks were discovered at
0 6 the point where the ΔP transmitter instrument lines tap off the ESW
0 7 outlet pipe on the (1-1) and (1-4) heat exchangers. Safety significance
0 8 is considered minimal since the exchangers were not inoperable.

Line	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	S B (11)	E (12)	D (13)	H T E X C H (14)	G (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 9	—	0 3 2	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Analysis of a failed nipple from a similar event revealed that the leaks
1 1 were caused by corrosion accelerated by galvanic action. The previous
1 2 analysis also recommended replacement with stainless steel nipples. In
1 3 addition to repairing the leaks with new nipples, the relief valve
1 4 nipples on the (1-1), (1-2) and (1-4) exchangers were replaced.

Line	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	0 9 8 (29)	NA	A (31)	Worker's observation.

Line	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

Line	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

Line	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

Line	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

1165 350

7910180419

PUBLICITY

Line	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	Y (44)	Weekly news release - October 16, 1979.	

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OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
Forked River, New Jersey 08731

Licensee Event Report
Reportable Occurrence No. 50-219/79-32/3L-0

Report Date

October 10, 1979

Occurrence Date

September 14, 1979

Identification of Occurrence

During the normal working day it was observed that both containment spray systems had developed small pipe leaks. This event is considered to be a reportable occurrence as defined in the Technical Specifications, paragraph 6.9.2.b.2.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

The plant was operating at steady state power.

Power:	Reactor, 1889.8 MWt
	Generator, 638 MWe
Flow:	Feedwater, 7.07×10^6 lb/hr
	Recirculation, 15.2×10^4 gpm
Stack Gas:	3.85×10^4 µci/sec

Description of Occurrence

On Friday, September 14, 1979, at approximately 11:30 a.m., a worker in the area of the (1-3) containment spray heat exchanger noticed water leaking. An investigation revealed that a 3/4" carbon steel threaded nipple connected between the water box and the relief valve on the service water side was leaking. Additionally, a slight leak was noticed at the point where the ΔP transmitter instrument line taps off the (1-1) containment spray heat exchanger emergency service water outlet pipe. At approximately 2:30 p.m., there was a similar leak discovered on the (1-4) containment spray heat exchanger at the point where the ΔP transmitter instrument line taps off the ESW outlet pipe.

1165 351

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

All three of the leaks were caused by corrosion accelerated by galvanic action between 90/10 CuNi and SA106 Grade B carbon steel.

Analysis of Occurrence

The containment spray cooling system consists of two independent cooling loops, each capable of removing fission product decay heat from the primary containment. The safety significance of this event is to be considered minimal since the containment spray systems were not inoperable. The leaks discovered would not prevent the equipment from performing its design function.

Corrective Action

Since this was not the first time this type of incident has occurred, analysis from a previous nipple failure resulted with a recommendation to change material selection for replacement nipples to 90/10 CuNi or stainless steel. In addition to repairing the three leaks with stainless steel nipples, the relief valve nipples on (1-1), (1-2), and (1-4) containment spray heat exchangers were changed on September 14, 1979, to stainless steel as a preventive measure. The ΔP transmitter instrument line nipples on (1-2) and (1-3) containment spray heat exchangers have been changed to stainless steel with approval from Generation Engineering. Also, an engineering request has been submitted to examine all lines connected to the containment spray heat exchangers to study material compatibility and make appropriate recommendations for a permanent solution.

Failure Data

Similar Events: RO No. 50-219/79-04/3L-0
RO No. 50-219/79-22/3L-0