LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
CONTROL BLOCK:
$ \begin{array}{ c c c c c c } \hline 0 & 1 \\ \hline 7 & 8 \\ \hline 9 \\ \hline 1 \\ \hline $
CON'T SOURCE LO 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 5 7 1 2 1 9 7 9 8 0 1 1 4 8 0 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10
0 2 During a normal reactor startup while in condition 2, the RHR torus suction valve
0 3 F004C was found shut during a shift turnover. This valve being closed caused the
0 4 1C RHR pump to be inoperable in the LPCI mode. The valve motor on this valve had
0 5 but dout and the breaker was under clearance, thus removing position indication
0 6 from the control toom.
Technical Specification 3.5.3.2, 6.9.1.9b
O 9 10 A 12 A 13 V A L V E X V4 E 15 D 16 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 V A L V E X 14 E 15 D 16 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 V A L V E 19 20 16 SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. OCCURRENCE CODE REPORT TYPE NO.
$\begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $
CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) [1]0] The F004C valve was immediately opened. The operator had failed to have the valve
[1] manually returned to its correct position when shifting out of shutdown cooling.
The following actions have been or will be performed to prevent recurrence:
[1] (1) The operator involved was counselled by the Shift Operating Supervisor as to
[1]4] [the necessity to follow procedures and assure operability of all portions of (Cont'd)]
7 8 9 Power OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 1 5 C C 0 0 4 29 N/A A 31 Operator Surveillance 30 7 8 0 0 4 29 N/A 44 45 46 46 30
RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) 1 6 2 (33) 2 (34) N/A 10 7 8 9 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES 44 45 80
1 7 8 9 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0
1 A 1 A 1 B 1
1 9 Z 42 N/A 7 8 9 10 NRC USE ONLY
Issued Description (45) N/A 1784 012 LILILIA 7 8 9 80.5 69 80.5
NAME OF PREPARER A. C. Tollison, Jr. PHONE 919-457-9521
8001220522

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LER CONTINUATION -- RO# 1-79-113

Facility: BSEP Unit # 1

Event Date: 12-19-79

safety related systems.

- (2) This has been reviewed with all Shift Operating Supervisors by the Operations Manager.
- (3) All Shift Operating Supervisors will review this event with their personnel.
- (4) An Operating Instruction has been prepared to provide shift turnover check sheets for the control operator, the shift foreman, and the shift operating supervisor. This will help assure that unusual system conditions are detected.
- (5) A procedure will be developed to mark (tag) the control switch on the RTGB for all components where remote indication is lost due to a motor, breaker, or similar problem. The actual component will be similarly marked (tagged) to assure that the position and the indication correspond.
- (6) GP-1 has been revised to require a sign-off that shutdown cooling valves are in the proper position for a reactor startup.
- (7) GP-1 will be revised to require a sign-off that all ECCS valves which have motor or breaker problems have been physically checked for position prior to a reactor startup.

1784 013