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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

December 4, 1979

Docket No. 50-348

Mr. Alan R. Barton
Senior Vice President
Alabama Power Company
Post Office Box 2641
Birmingham, Alabama 35291

Dear Mr. Barton:

As we advised you in our October 23, 1979 letter relating to containment purge and vent valve use at the Farley Nuclear Plant, our review of the long term issue is continuing. In order that our review of your long term proposals continue, you are requested to provide the additional information shown in the enclosure.

Please provide the requested information within 45 days of receipt of this letter.

Sincerely,

A. Schwencer, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #1
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:
Request for
Information

cc: w/enclosure
See next page

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cc: Ruble A. Thomas, Vice President
Southern Services, Inc.
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Birmingham, Alabama 35202

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212 W. Burdeshaw Street
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REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

FOR THE CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM FOR

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 1

DOCKET NO. 50-348

1. Provide a commitment that the main purge system (48 inch lines) would only be used for the reactor operational modes of cold shutdown and refueling (modes 5 and 6).

2. With regard to the containment mini-purge system:

   a. In response to Branch Technical Position (BTP) item 5.b, regarding the protection of structures and safety-related equipment located beyond the purge system isolation valves, your submittal dated February 5, 1979 stated that the radiological analysis was performed taking no credit for the purge filter. This response does not appear to fully address the concerns of BTP item 5.b.

      Provide a list of all structures and safety-related equipment that would be damaged or would suffer a loss of function from the environment created by the escaping air and steam. Discuss, in detail, the potential of the damaged structures to adversely affect safety-related equipment in the vicinity. Discuss the impact on safety due to the loss of function of safety-related equipment. Discuss all post-accident functions that are impacted.

   b. For the containment purge isolation valves, specify the differential pressure across the valve for which the maximum leak rate occurs. Provide test results (e.g., from vendor tests of leakage rate versus valve differential pressure) which support your conclusion.

3. With regard to the purge supply and exhaust duct covering (bird screen) discuss the design basis of the screen. In particular:

   a. Discuss the design basis for the sizing of the screen mesh pattern;

   b. Discuss the ability of the "bird screen" to withstand dynamic LOCA forces;

   c. Discuss the provisions taken to assure that the screen has been properly qualified (e.g., for seismic events); and

   d. Describe the routine procedures (e.g., inspections, etc.) that you use to assure that partial blockage of the screen by debris during normal operation does not affect the ability of the screen to remain in place and perform its function when subjected to LOCA forces.