NRC FORM 366 (7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | G A E I H 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | (5)
LICENSEE CODE | LICENSE NUMBER | LICENSE TYPE | CAT

CON'T 0 1 REPORT SOURCE L (6) 0 5 0 0 0 3 2 1 (7) 1 2 1 1 7 9 (8) 1 2 1 9 7 9 (9)
DOCKET NUMBER | EVENT DATE | REPORT DATE

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 During steady state power operation, an observation of the RHR "B" Loop Heat Exchanger
0 3 Pressure Indicator E11-R606B by a licensed operator in the control room showed that
0 4 the heat exchanger was being pressurized. Investigation showed that if the LPCI out-
0 5 board injection valve E11-F017B was closed, then the pressurization of the heat ex-
0 6 changer would cease. Thus, the LPCI Containment isolation valve E11-F015B was det-
0 7 ermined to be leaking. A similar event occurred on the RHR "A" loop: Refer to RO
0 8 report number 50-321/1979-012. There were no effects upon (continued)

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	C F (11)	E (12)	B (13)	V A L V E X (14)	E (15)	D (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 9	—	1 0 0	/	0 3	L	—	0

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	X (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	0 0 0 0	Y (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	C 2 5 6 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Initial corrective action was to close the E11-F017B valve and to declare the RHR "B"
1 1 Loop inoperable. Later, it was decided that it was permissible to operate with the
1 2 E11-F017B valve closed and still be able to consider the "B" Loop operable: the
1 3 E11-F015B valve was to be repaired the next cold shutdown. On 12-15-79, the unit was
1 4 placed in cold shutdown due to a ground problem in the main generator. (continued)

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	0 9 9 (29)	NA	A (31)	Observation by Licensed Personnel

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 0 0 (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

1657 150

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

7912310 430

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

POOR ORIGINAL

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	N (44)	NA	

NAME OF PREPARER C. L. Coggin, Supt. Plt. Eng. Serv. PHONE: 912-367-7781

Georgia Power Company
Plant E. I. Hatch
Baxley, Georgia 31513

Event Description and Probable Consequences (continued)

public health or safety due to this event.

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (continued)

The valve was disassembled and the valve seat was found galled. Valve repair is not complete at this time - an LER Update Report will be submitted following completion of valve repair and associated testing.

LER #: 50-321/1979-100
Licensee: Georgia Power Company
Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch
Docket #: 50-321

Narrative Report
For LER 50-321/1979-100

On December 11, 1979, with the unit in steady state power operation (at 99% of licensed thermal power), an observation of the RHR "B" Loop Heat Exchanger Pressure Indicator E11-R606B by a licensed operator in the control room showed that the heat exchanger was being pressurized. Investigation showed that if the LPCI outboard injection valve E11-F017B was closed, then pressurization of the heat exchanger would cease. Thus, the LPCI containment isolation valve E11-F015B was determined to be leaking. This problem is not a recurring one for this loop, but a similar event occurred on the RHR "A" Loop in January, 1979: refer to RO report number 50-321/1979-012. Nothing has happened to indicate that this problem is applicable to the F015 valves on the RHR "A" and "B" Loops on Unit 2; in fact, the valves are from a different manufacturer.

Upon discovery that the E11-F015B valve was leaking, licensed operators closed the E11-F017B valve and declared the RHR "B" Loop inoperable (7 day LCO per Tech Specs section 3.5.B.2.b). After consulting with the Architect Engineer (Bechtel) and the Nuclear Steam System Supplier (GE), plant management made the decision that it would be permissible to operate with both the E11-F015B and E11-F017B valves closed without having to consider the RHR "B" Loop inoperable. The E11-F015B valve was to be repaired the next time the unit was in the cold shutdown condition.

This decision was based upon power being available to operate both the E11-F015B and F017B valves in case of a LOCA and/or LOSP type accident. There were also no system problems because of the configuration. Primary containment integrity was maintained due to both valves being closed (with E11-F017B closed, the pressurizing ceased). Both the I&E (resident site inspector) and the NRR project manager were notified of the site's plans.

On December 15, 1979, the unit was placed in cold shutdown to repair a ground problem on the main generator. The valve was then disassembled and the valve seat was found to be galled. Valve repair is incomplete at this time - an LER update report will be submitted following completion of valve repair and associated testing.