

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 N C B E P 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 5

01 L 6 0 5 0 - 0 3 2 4 7 1 2 1 2 7 9 8 1 2 2 0 7 9 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 While performing PT 19.6.0.1, Visual Inspection of Inaccessible Snubbers, the follow-

03 ing snubbers were found on the safety relief valve F013H tailpipe: 1) B21-34SS296,

04 elongated hole in rodeye; 2) B21-34SS297, reservoir missing, broken shaft, two bent

05 rodeyes, bent extension; 3) B21-34SS298, clamp moved; 4) B21-34SS299, broken shaft,

06 bent rodeye, clamp moved; 5) B21-34SS300, cracked weld on I-beam, clamp moved; 6) B21-

07 34SS336, bent extension, clamp moved, valve body damaged, broken springs; 7) B21-

08 34SS337, broken shaft, clamp rotated, extended end springs jammed into valve (cont.)

09 C C 11 E 12 B 13 S U P O R T 14 D 15 Z 16

17 7 9 1 0 7 0 1 T 0

18 X 19 Z 20 Z 21 0 0 0 0 Y 23 Y 24 A 25 B 2 0 9

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 It is believed that this damage occurred following a reactor scram on November 20, 1979

11 when safety relief valves F013F, G, and H automatically lifted.

12 1) All other safety relief valves and associated piping were checked for damage

13 with none found.

14 2) All damaged snubbers were rebuilt and functionally tested successfully. (Cont.)

15 G 28 0 0 0 29 N/A B 31 Periodic Test 32

16 Z 33 Z 34 N/A N/A 36

17 0 0 0 37 Z 38 N/A 39

18 0 0 0 40 N/A 41

19 Z 42 N/A 43

20 N 44 N/A 45

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POOR ORIGINAL

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Facility: BSEP Unit #1

Event Date: 12-12-79

Event Description and Probable Consequences (cont.)

body; 8) B21-34SS338, valve body damaged by poppet spring; 9) B21-34SS339, rodeye bent, clamp moved; 10) B21-34SS340, bent rodeye, clamp moved.

Technical Specification 6.9.1.81

Cause Description and Corrective Actions (cont.)

- 3) All rodeyes, extensions, clamps, and I-beams were repaired or rebuilt, depending on the extent of damage.
- 4) All welds from the relief valve inlet to the relief line entry into the torus were cleaned and inspected by PT or MT and found satisfactory.
- 5) All relief line vacuum breakers were inspected and tested satisfactorily.
- 6) The testing and rebuild history of the snubbers on the F013H tailpipe were reviewed. There were no significant findings.
- 7) The F013H valve operating history was reviewed. There were no significant findings.
- 8) Special tests have been approved to:
 - a) Test F013F and H at 250 psig and inspect for damage. F013F and H share a common exhaust header in the torus.
 - b) Test F013F and H at normal pressure (900-1000 psig) to approximate the opening sequence occurring on November 20, 1979. Perform a tailpipe inspection.
- 9) Until permanent resolution is determined, if any pair of valves lift which share the same exhaust header, the tailpipes will be inspected.
- 10) The torus modifications scheduled for 1980 will rearrange the S/RV exhaust lines in the torus such that each will have a separate tee quencher.
- 11) United Engineers and Constructors has analyzed this event with the following preliminary results:
 - a) A normal valve discharge cannot cause the observed damage.
 - b) A normal valve discharge with selected inoperable snubbers cannot cause the observed damage.
 - c) A valve discharge with a water slug in the exhaust line is not likely to cause the observed damage.
 - d) A valve discharge with a water slug in the exhaust line and selected inoperable snubbers could produce the observed damage. The water slug was postulated to be generated by water being driven into the line as a result of SRV "F" discharge.
 - e) Conclusive proof of the cause has not been determined.