



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

NOV 19 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: R. Reid, Chief  
Operating Reactors Branch #4  
Division of Operating Reactors

FROM: G. Lainas, Chief  
Plant Systems Branch  
Division of Operating Reactors

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE 2 - CONTAINMENT PURGE OVERRIDE OF  
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION (TAC 10819)

Plant Systems Branch has identified the enclosed additional information as being required in order that we can complete our evaluation of the electrical override/bypass aspects of the containment isolation matter.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "G. Lainas", is positioned above the typed name and title.

G. Lainas, Chief  
Plant Systems Branch  
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosure:  
As stated

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ELECTRICAL OVERRIDE/BYPASS DESIGN CRITERIA

1. The overriding of one type of safety actuation signal (e.g., radiation) should not cause the blocking of any other type of safety actuation signal (e.g., pressure) to the isolation valves.
2. Sufficient physical features (e.g., key lock switches) should be provided to facilitate adequate administrative controls.
3. The system-level annunciation of the overridden status should be provided for every safety system impacted when an override is active.
4. Diverse signals should be provided to initiate isolation of the containment ventilation system. Specifically, containment high radiation, safety injection actuation, and containment high pressure should automatically initiate CVI.
5. The instrumentation and control systems provided to initiate CVI should be designed and qualified as safety-grade equipment.
6. The overriding or resetting of the isolation actuation signal should not cause the automatic reopening of any isolation/purge valve.